Gary R., List: GR: And so, say, a book hidden away for hundreds of years in some European monastery may contain *thoughts* which, when the content of it is brought to light, translated, etc. we may now *think *about. In short, and while it seems obvious once stated, we can only then* begin to think the thoughts* in the volume once hidden in obscurity. So, we can now, individually and in communities of common interest, read and write about them, agree/disagree regarding their meanings, develop these thoughts, perhaps create experiments to test hypotheses suggested by the ideas contained in the book, etc.
Indeed, and we can say the same about manuscripts hidden away for a hundred years or so in an American university library; bringing their contents to light enables our community of common interest to think Peirce's thoughts with him, although our different collateral experiences result in different Dynamic Interpretants when we do so. GR: In considering exactly what this thinking/thought distinction entails, you offered one of my favorite Peirce quotations of which, in my opinion, the underlying idea can't be repeated often enough: That quotation (R 295:117-118[102-103]; 1906) is a good example of what I just described, since it comes from a discarded draft of "Prolegomena to an Apology for Pragmaticism" and draws the analogy between motion and thought much more clearly and completely than the published version (CP 4.572). In fact, comparing it with another manuscript passage from the same year makes the similarity even more striking. CSP: Now no perfect sign is in a statical condition: you might as well suppose a portion of matter to remain at rest during a thousandth of a second, or any other long interval of time. The only signs which are tolerably fixed are non-existent abstractions. We cannot deny that such a sign is real; only its mode of reality is not that active kind which we call existence. The existent acts, and whatsoever acts changes. Perhaps the reader may demur to this, saying that the earth acts to press him against the floor, but does not thereby undergo any change. But the floor is elastic, and his weight [missing text] never lasts. He vibrates up and down; and action and reaction being equal, the centre of gravity of the earth reciprocally vibrates up and down. It is abstractly conceivable that a particle should remain at rest; but in fact, it never does so. (EP 2:545n25, R 283:259-260[115-116]; 1906) The *physical* universe consists of *matter* in constant *motion* according to the laws of *nature*, commonly expressed as *subjunctive conditionals*. The material parts of this true continuum are *positions*, which we artificially create for the purpose of describing hypothetical instantaneous states of the real *dynamic* process, employing *variables* and *equations* within an arbitrary system of *coordinates*. The *psychical* universe consists of *mind* in constant *thought* according to the laws of *logic*, commonly expressed as *leading principles*. The material parts of this true continuum are *propositions*, which we artificially create for the purpose of describing hypothetical instantaneous states of the real *inferential* process, employing *subjects* and *predicates *within an arbitrary system of *signs*. This parallelism reflects Peirce's objective idealism, according to which "matter is effete mind, inveterate habits becoming physical laws" (CP 6.25, EP 1:293; 1891). Motion and thought are *both* examples of semeiosis, since "physical events are but degraded or undeveloped forms of psychical events" and "the phenomena of matter are but the result of the sensibly complete sway of habits upon mind" (CP 6.264, EP 1:348; 1892). Ultimately, "dead matter would be merely the final result of the complete induration of habit reducing the free play of feeling and the brute irrationality of effort to complete death" (CP 6.201; 1898)--i.e., the cessation of *all *semeiosis, including *both *motion and thought. What prevents this outcome? CSP: Every real ingredient of the perfect sign is aging, its energy of action upon the interpretant is running low, its sharp edges are wearing down, its outlines becoming more indefinite. On the other hand, the perfect sign is perpetually being acted upon by its object, from which it is perpetually receiving the accretions of new signs, which bring it fresh energy, and also kindle energy that it already had, but which had lain dormant. In addition, the perfect sign never ceases to undergo changes of the kind we rather drolly call *spontaneous*, that is, they happen *sua sponte* but not by *its *will. They are phenomena of growth. (EP 2:545n25, R 283:260-261[116-117]; 1906) Left to themselves, the universes of matter (2ns) and mind (3ns) would indeed eventually grind to a halt; but instead, the ongoing actions of their Creator and Object, as well as the reality of spontaneity (1ns), "perpetually" renew, refresh, reinvigorate, and revise them. GR: The next distinction discussed, namely, semiosis being a top-down rather than a bottom-up process, seems to represent a significant change in your thinking in the matter. Yes, and I acknowledged as much in my post; in fact, that quotation from R 295 was instrumental in helping me to see things differently. Of course, this is an example of how I *do not* approach such topics with my mind dogmatically made up, but remain open to persuasion. GR: I'm quite in agreement on how this helps explain how languages and various sign systems evolve, but I'm not at all clear on how it explains how they come into being. Would you explain what you mean by that? I only mean that if propositions *themselves*--along with their constituent subjects and predicates (including syntax)--are arbitrary inventions, then the same is presumably true of the languages and other sign systems in which we *express *them. GR: Finally, what seems to be the conception that you've been leading up to, what may at first appear to be a rather audacious 'suggestion', does, it seems to me, follow directly from your argumentation; and now, especially, in light of the quotation just above (EP 2:304). JAS: I now suggest that Truth is the "one general law" or "one Idea" to which the Universe as a Sign and all of its material parts conform, such that it is a *perfect continuum*. To be honest, this conclusion--whose implications I am still contemplating, including the unification of Peirce's late definitions of continuity, with semeiosis as the paradigmatic example--only occurred to me *after *I had drafted the rest of the post; in particular, the restatement of my previous suggestion that Truth is the Final Interpretant of any Sign whose Dynamic Object is Reality, followed by its application to Propositions and then to the entire Universe as an Argument. That earlier hypothesis was directly prompted by Lane's "dual-aspect account of truth" (chapter 1), in which a true belief (1) represents reality and (2) would be permanently settled by infinite inquiry; as I see it, (1) and (2) correspond to the Dynamic Object and Final Interpretant, respectively. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Sat, Jul 20, 2019 at 4:37 PM Gary Richmond <[email protected]> wrote: > Jon, List, > > Thanks for this post which, including your remarks on some passages from > Robert Lane's book, helped me better grasp some of the ideas you've > recently been developing in this thread and elsewhere. Lane's book and your > posts are, in my view, exceedingly helpful in clarifying Peirce's > conceptions of realism and idealism, especially in their relation to each > other. > > You noted that once one adopts the external/internal distinction Peirce > makes and Lane explicates, it becomes clear that ". . . anything external > is *necessarily *real, but it is also *possible *for something *internal *to > be real--like the fact of having a dream, though not its content (cf. CP > 8.191; c. 1904), and, further, and importantly, "that prescission and > abstraction are *internal. . ." * > > From this follows this often quoted passage on Truth: > > > CSP: *Truth belongs exclusively to propositions*. A proposition has a > subject (or set of subjects) and a predicate. The subject is a sign; the > predicate is a sign; and the proposition is a sign that the predicate is a > sign of that of which the subject is a sign. If it be so, it is true. (CP > 5.553, EP 2:379; 1906) (Boldface added GR} > > Lane reminds us of Peirce's important distinction between 'thinking' and > 'thought': > > RL: ... recall [Peirce's] distinction between *thinking*, which is a > mental process in which each person engages on her own, and *thought*, > which is, at least in part, a content that can be shared by multiple > thinkers and the character of which does not depend on anyone actually > thinking it ... Thoughts, unlike thinking, are external. (p. 109). > > And so, say, a book hidden away for hundreds of years in some European > monastery may contain *thoughts* which, when the content of it is brought > to light, translated, etc. we may now *think *about. In short, and while > it seems obvious once stated, we can only then* begin to think the > thoughts* in the volume once hidden in obscurity. So, we can now, > individually and in communities of common interest, read and write about > them, agree/disagree regarding their meanings, develop these thoughts, > perhaps create experiments to test hypotheses suggested by the ideas > contained in the book, etc. > > In considering exactly what this thinking/thought distinction entails, you > offered one of my favorite Peirce quotations of which, in my opinion, the > underlying idea can't be repeated often enough: > > CSP: ... *an Argument is no more built up of Propositions than a motion > is built up of positions.* So to regard it is to neglect the very essence > of it ... Just as it is strictly correct to say that nobody is ever in an > exact Position (except instantaneously, and an Instant is a fiction, or *ens > rationis*), but Positions ... are *entia rationis* (i.e. fictions > recognized to be fictions, and thus no longer fictions) invented for the > purposes of closer descriptions of states of motion; so likewise, *Thought > (I am not talking Psychology, but Logic, or the essence of Semeiotics) > cannot, from the nature of it, be at rest, or be anything but inferential > process; and propositions ... are artificial creations intended to render > the description of Thought-motion possible; and Names are creations of a > second order serving to render the representation of propositions possible.* > (R 295:117-118[102-103]; 1906) (Bold added GR) > > > (Cf: CP 5.553, EP 2:379; 1906 above.) > > The next distinction discussed, namely, semiosis being a top-down rather > than a bottom-up process, seems to represent a significant change in your > thinking in the matter. Not so long ago--a couple of months back, > perhaps?--you seemed to be emphasizing the idea that "continuous > predicates marry subjects into propositions, and leading principles marry > propositions into arguments," that is, aligning yourself to the bottom-up > view. You now are arguing for a different 'marriage': > > > JAS: Instead, it is a *top-down* process--one vast argument, the entire > Universe [being] "perfused with signs, if it is not composed exclusively of > signs"[. . .] *We invent propositions married by leading principles > as entia rationis for the purpose of describing external "Thought-motion," > which further requires us to invent subjects married by continuous > predicates [. . .] for the purpose of representing those propositions. The > Universe as an argument is thus a semeiosic continuum whose only parts > are material parts *(cf. CP 6.174; 1908)*--potential and indefinite > parts--which > we are free to distinguish in any way that suits our intentions, like > marking points on a line *(emphasis added by GR). > > > JAS: This [i.e. the whole of the top-down argument] helps explain why > different languages and other particular Sign Systems come about and then > evolve over time. > > > I'm quite in agreement on how this helps explain how languages and various > sign systems evolve, but I'm not at all clear on how it explains how they > come into being. Would you explain what you mean by that? > > The following quotation by Lane on prescission is well worth repeating, > especially since his examples (one taken directly from Peirce) are so > helpful in clarifying his meaning, especially that "Concepts that result > from the process of hypostatic abstraction do not necessarily add anything > to our ontology.": > > RL: A specific instance of prescission will yield a general concept in > that inquirer's mind, but it cannot result in a real, external general. > What's more, prescission can yield, not just the general concepts *pear* > and *human*, but also *vampire*, and so it is not guaranteed to result > in a concept that corresponds to a real general ... *Concepts that result > from the process of hypostatic abstraction do not necessarily add anything > to our ontology*. The general *sweet* is real, since it is true that > honey is sweet. *Hypostatic abstraction can infer from that belief the > further belief that honey possesses sweetness, but this does not > necessarily commit us to saying that there is an entity that the concept > of sweetness represents.* (pp. 131-132) (Boldface added: GR) > > > And now it is possible to see how an 'internal concept' via > 'representation' can be connected with a real 'external general'--and even > 'Truth' to 'Reality': > > JAS: *Here we see how an internal concept resulting from prescission or > abstraction can be connected with a real, external general--namely, by the > relation of representation*, according to which (as I recently suggested) > Truth is the Final Interpretant of any Sign whose Dynamic Object is > Reality. (Boldface added GR) > > > This brings us to the concluding section of your argument in this post. > You begin with what I consider an 'essential' quotation from Peirce on the > "Universe *qua* fact" and the " 'Truth' of being"--"the fact that is not > abstracted but complete": > > CSP: What we call a "fact" is something having the structure of a > proposition, but supposed to be an element of the very universe itself. The > purpose of every sign is to express "fact," and by being joined with other > signs, to approach as nearly as possible to determining an interpretant > which would be the *perfect Truth*, the absolute Truth, and as such (at > least, we may use this language) would be the very Universe. . . . *The > entelechy of the Universe of being, then, the Universe **qua **fact, will > be that Universe in its aspect as a sign, the "Truth" of being. The > "Truth," the fact that is not abstracted but complete, is the ultimate > interpretant of every sign*. (EP 2:304; 1904) (Boldface added GR) > > > Finally, what seems to be the conception that you've been leading up to, > what may at first appear to be a rather audacious 'suggestion', does, it > seems to me, follow directly from your argumentation; and now, especially, > in light of the quotation just above (EP 2:304). You wrote: > > > J*AS: I now suggest that Truth is the "one general law" or "one Idea" to > which the Universe as a Sign and all of its material parts conform, such > that it is a **perfect continuum *(boldface added GR). > > CSP: *A perfect continuum belongs to the genus, of a whole all whose > parts without any exception whatsoever conform to one general law to which > same law conform likewise all the parts of each single part. Continuity is > thus a special kind of generality, or conformity to one Idea. *(CP > 7.535n6, R 204:23-24[15-16]; 1908 May 24) (Boldface added) > > > Jon, again, for those folk who, like me, have worked at closely following > your clear, but often subtle and complex, argumentation (consider just in > this last post the several 'distinctions' which had to be clarified in > preparing for your concluding "suggestion"); again, those who do this, and > especially do it in 'dialogue' with Lane's book and with sincere > intellectual generosity will, I believe, gain a much better, much clearer > understanding of the semiosic relationship holding between the external > and the internal, the real and the ideal, in Peirce. > > So, your bold conclusion: > > JAS: *. . . semeiosis itself is a real general that encompasses both the > internal (thinking) and the external (thought)*--which is why, "just as > we say that a body is in motion, and not that motion is in a body, we ought > to say that we are in thought, and not that thoughts are in us" (CP > 5.289n1, EP 1:42n1; 1868) (boldface added GR). > > > Thanks again for your challenging yet, ultimately, quite satisfying and > personally rewarding post. I look forward to further discussions on the > subject. > > Best, > > Gary > > *Gary Richmond* > *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* > *Communication Studies* > *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* > >>
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