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Jeff, list
Agreed - all three categories are vital, and as such, I don't think
that we can see Peirce's objective idealism as functioning without
all three - at the same time and all as equally necessary. By the
way - no-one has yet defined the term of 'objective realism'. To say
that it's a form of idealism is not, of course, a definition.
I myself see a huge difference between Plato and Aristotle, and
align Plato with Hegel, who, as Peirce pointed out, considers
Thirdness as essentially primordial "the doctrine of Hegel is to be
commended who regards Category the Third as the only true one. For in
the Hegelian system the other two are only introduced in order to be
aufgehoben. [5.79]. Whereas Peirce considered all three as 'real
constituents of the universe' [1.82]
You wrote: "The upshot is that objective idealism affirms the
reality of possibility, quality and feeling, and it also affirms the
reality of reasonableness as two aspects of the mind-like character
of the world. On Peirce' account, both feeling and reasonableness are
mind-like features of the world."
I would say that objective idealism affirms the reality of the
evolving complexity of matter, or individual 'things'. That is your
comment above included only 1ns [possibility] and 3ns [reasonable]
and left out 2ns, which is, as Peirce noted, a 'real constituent of
the universe'. As such, I see Peirce's objective idealism as enabling
the increasing complexity of matter. That is - Peirce argues, I think,
that the three categories are independent of each other and yet
integral to the functioning of each other. See 5.92, "while you are
walking in the street reflecting upon how everything is the pure
distillate of Reason, a man carrying a heavy pole suddenly pokes you
in the small of the back".
Therefore - you then wrote: "What role does the material existence
of individual objects play in objective idealism. Could there be
growth of reasonableness as matter taking habits without it? More to
the point, must material existence have some kind of formal
properties for it to be the kind of thing that is (1) governed by
laws and (2) capable of an increase in its order as those laws grow?"
Since Secondness is, according to Peirce, a 'real constituent of the
universe', then, individual objects are vital to his 'objective
idealism'. I don't consider it a 'form of idealism', but a theory
that declares that all three categorical modes are real, independent,
and 'necessary' in the universe. The 3ns of idealism, combined with
the existentiality [2ns] of 'objective' and the possibility of 1ns -
all three are basic to the universe. So, if one considers a 'growth
of reasonableness' [3ns] - it can't happen without matter taking on
more complex habits.
I'm not sure what you mean by 'material existence have some kind of
formal properties'.....
Edwina
Jon, Gary R, List,
The remarks about idealism being associated primarily with the
category of firstness does not fit very well with a number of things
Peirce says about his version of objective idealism. Without digging
into details, the main point can be made in historical terms. In his
account of the seven systems of metaphysics, he classifies his own
position in metaphysics, along with those of Plato, Aristotle, Kant
and Reid as affirming the value, significance and reality of the
categories of firstness, secondness and thirdness as being integral
parts of nature considered as a whole. (CP, vol. 2, 179 ff)
As such, we have Aristotle's realism, Plato's idealism, Kant's
transcendental idealism, and Reid's common sense realism as
metaphysical positions that affirm the same basic commitments with
respect to the reality of the fundamental categories as Peirce's
version of objective idealism. Note that he says Aristotle realism is
really just a variant of Plato's idealism. So, on his interpretation
of these classical positions, there is no fundamental opposition
between some versions of idealism and realism. The same holds for
his own position. There is no real opposition between his commitments
to objective idealism and his rather extreme form of scholastic
realism.
On my interpretation of Peirce's objective idealism, the key point
is that he is following a method whereby we should take the
principles from our normative theory of critical logic and our
speculative grammar not just as regulative for our inquiries in
metaphysics, but as constitutive of being. As such, we can treat the
principles expressed in our theory as approximations of laws of logic
(i.e., laws of reasonableness) that really govern things in the world.
What is unique in Peirce's theory as compared to the others listed
above is that he is working on the hypothesis that the laws of nature
are evolving and that the historical growth of the natural laws is
governed by the laws of association. Those laws of association
regulate the growth of material habits in a manner that follows the
general law of abduction, which is akin to association by similarity,
and induction, which is akin to association by contiguity.
The upshot is that objective idealism affirms the reality of
possibility, quality and feeling, and it also affirms the reality of
reasonableness as two aspects of the mind-like character of the
world. On Peirce' account, both feeling and reasonableness are
mind-like features of the world.
What role does the material existence of individual objects play in
objective idealism. Could there be growth of reasonableness as matter
taking habits without it? More to the point, must material existence
have some kind of formal properties for it to be the kind of thing
that is (1) governed by laws and (2) capable of an increase in its
order as those laws grow?
--Jeff Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354
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