Jeff, List: JD: In his account of the seven systems of metaphysics, he classifies his own position in metaphysics, along with those of Plato, Aristotle, Kant and Reid as affirming the value, significance and reality of the categories of firstness, secondness and thirdness as being integral parts of nature considered as a whole. (CP, vol. 2, 179 ff)
I assume that the intended reference is to this passage. CSP: ... it would seem that no division of theories of metaphysics could surpass in importance a division based upon the consideration of what ones of the three categories each of the different metaphysical systems has fully admitted as real constituents of nature. It is, at any rate, a hypothesis easy to try; and the exact logic of hypothesis allots great weight to that consideration. There will be then these seven possible classes. I - Nihilism, so-called, and Idealistic Sensualism. II - Strict individualism. The doctrine of Lutoslawski and his unpronounceable master. Ill - Hegelianism of all shades. II III - Cartesianism of all kinds, Leibnizianism, Spinozism and the metaphysics of the physicists of today. I III - Berkeleyanism. Ill - Ordinary Nominalism. I II III - The metaphysics that recognizes all the categories may need at once to be subdivided. But I shall not stop to consider its subdivision. It embraces Kantism,--Reid's philosophy and the Platonic philosophy of which Aristotelianism is a special development. (CP 5.77n, EP 2:179-180; 1903) Peirce then proceeded to align himself with Aristotle in particular. CSP: A great variety of thinkers call themselves Aristotelians, even the Hegelians, on the strength of special agreements. No modern philosophy or very little has any real right to the title. I should call myself an Aristotelian of the scholastic wing, approaching Scotism, but going much further in the direction of scholastic realism. The doctrine of Aristotle is distinguished from substantially all modern philosophy by its recognition of at least two grades of being. That is, besides *actual reactive existence*, Aristotle recognizes a germinal being, an *esse in potentia* or I like to call it an *esse in futuro*. In places Aristotle has glimpses of a distinction between *energeia *and *entelechia*. (*ibid*) Since we are talking about objective idealism, it seems noteworthy that Peirce's original draft stated something a bit different in two of the sentences. CSP: A great variety of thinkers call themselves Aristotelians ... No modern philosophy except my own has any real right to the title ... The doctrine of Aristotle is distinguished from all modern philosophy except perhaps Schelling's & mine by its recognition of at least two grades of being. (EP 2:522n3-4) Of course, more than a decade earlier, Peirce had described his metaphysics as not only "objective idealism"--a term that Schelling introduced--but also "a Schelling-fashioned idealism" (CP 6.102, EP 1:312; 1892). Moreover, he was inconsistent with his assignments of past philosophers to the last grouping within this scheme. In the immediately previous Harvard Lecture, he characterized Kant's among the "philosophies which seem to do full justice to Categories Second and Third and to minimize the First" (CP 5.81, EP 2:165); and a few months later, in one of the Lowell Lectures, he asserted that both Reid and Kant were nominalists (CP 1.19). In the initial Cambridge Conferences Lecture, he stated, "Although Plato's whole philosophy is a philosophy of Thirdness ... he himself only recognizes duality, and makes himself an apostle of Dichotomy,--which is a misunderstanding of himself" (EP 2:38; 1898). He later claimed that "the doctrine of Platonic ideas has been held by the extremest nominalists. There is some reason to suspect that it was shared by Roscellinus himself" (CP 5.470; 1906). In another presentation where Form, Matter, and Entelechy correspond respectively to 1ns, 2ns, and 3ns, not even Aristotle escaped the charge of nominalism. CSP: Aristotle, so far as he is a nominalist, and he may, I think, be described as a nominalist with vague intimations of realism, endeavors to express the universe in terms of Matter and Form alone ... It may be remarked that if, as I hold, there are three categories, Form, Matter, and Entelechy, then there will naturally be seven schools of philosophy; that which recognizes Form alone, that which recognizes Form and Matter alone, that which recognizes Matter alone (these being the three kinds of nominalism); that which recognizes Matter and Entelechy alone; that which recognizes Entelechy alone (which seems to me what a perfectly consistent Hegelianism would be); that which recognizes Entelechy and Form alone (these last three being the kinds of imperfect realism); and finally the true philosophy which recognizes Form, Matter, and Entelechy. (NEM 4:295; 1904) All of this suggests that we probably should not put too much stock in Peirce's alignment of himself with any other individual philosopher; he was truly one of a kind, including in his own mind. :-) JD: There is no real opposition between his commitments to objective idealism and his rather extreme form of scholastic realism. As far as I know, no one has suggested any such opposition. Again, I view Peirce's metaphysics as being inclusive of synechism, tychism, (objective) idealism, and (scholastic) realism. JD: On Peirce' account, both feeling and reasonableness are mind-like features of the world. I agree; hence my suggestion earlier today that the *primary *associations of synechism and realism with 3ns, and of tychism and idealism with 1ns, are not coincidental. JD: What role does the material existence of individual objects play in objective idealism. Could there be growth of reasonableness as matter taking habits without it? The trivial answer is no, because by definition, without "material existence of individual objects" there would not *be *any matter to take habits in the first place. But perhaps you have in mind this passage by Peirce. CSP: The very being of the General, of Reason, *consists *in its governing individual events. So, then, the essence of Reason is such that its being never can have been completely perfected. It always must be in a state of incipiency, of growth ... So, then, the development of Reason requires as a part of it the occurrence of more individual events than ever can occur. It requires, too, all the coloring of all qualities of feeling, including pleasure in its proper place among the rest. This development of Reason consists, you will observe, in embodiment, that is, in manifestation. (CP 1.615, EP 2:255; 1903) The evolution of states proceeds away from the ideal 1ns of "unpersonalized feeling" and toward the ideal 2ns of "dead matter" by means of an ongoing process governed by 3ns at any assignable date. JD: More to the point, must material existence have some kind of formal properties for it to be the kind of thing that is (1) governed by laws and (2) capable of an increase in its order as those laws grow? I am not sure. What do you think? How is this particular question "more to the point" than the previous ones? Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Fri, Aug 16, 2019 at 5:12 PM Jeffrey Brian Downard < [email protected]> wrote: > Jon, Gary R, List, > > The remarks about idealism being associated primarily with the category > of firstness does not fit very well with a number of things Peirce says > about his version of objective idealism. Without digging into details, the > main point can be made in historical terms. In his account of the seven > systems of metaphysics, he classifies his own position in metaphysics, > along with those of Plato, Aristotle, Kant and Reid as affirming the value, > significance and reality of the categories of firstness, secondness and > thirdness as being integral parts of nature considered as a whole. (CP, > vol. 2, 179 ff) > > As such, we have Aristotle's realism, Plato's idealism, Kant's > transcendental idealism, and Reid's common sense realism as > metaphysical positions that affirm the same basic commitments with respect > to the reality of the fundamental categories as Peirce's version of > objective idealism. Note that he says Aristotle realism is really just a > variant of Plato's idealism. So, on his interpretation of these classical > positions, there is no fundamental opposition between some versions of > idealism and realism. The same holds for his own position. There is no real > opposition between his commitments to objective idealism and his rather > extreme form of scholastic realism. > > On my interpretation of Peirce's objective idealism, the key point is that > he is following a method whereby we should take the principles from our > normative theory of critical logic and our speculative grammar not just as > regulative for our inquiries in metaphysics, but as constitutive of being. > As such, we can treat the principles expressed in our theory as > approximations of laws of logic (i.e., laws of reasonableness) that really > govern things in the world. > > What is unique in Peirce's theory as compared to the others listed above > is that he is working on the hypothesis that the laws of nature are > evolving and that the historical growth of the natural laws is governed by > the laws of association. Those laws of association regulate the growth > of material habits in a manner that follows the general law of abduction, > which is akin to association by similarity, and induction, which is akin to > association by contiguity. > > The upshot is that objective idealism affirms the reality of possibility, > quality and feeling, and it also affirms the reality of reasonableness as > two aspects of the mind-like character of the world. On Peirce' account, > both feeling and reasonableness are mind-like features of the world. > > What role does the material existence of individual objects play in > objective idealism. Could there be *growth* of reasonableness as matter > taking habits without it? More to the point, must material existence have > some kind of formal properties for it to be the kind of thing that is > (1) governed by laws and (2) capable of an increase in its order as those > laws grow? > > --Jeff > Jeffrey Downard > Associate Professor > Department of Philosophy > Northern Arizona University > (o) 928 523-8354 > >>
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