List: What might Peirce have said about the Big Bang theory? As I acknowledged before, we cannot know for sure; but I suggest that he *could* have offered an argument *against* it--in fact, against *any* theory that posits a finite age and definite beginning of the universe--similar to that which he employed in one of his earliest published writings to deny that there is any such thing as an *intuition*; i.e., a cognition *not* determined by a *previous* cognition (CP 5.263, EP 1:26; 1868). Since Peirce's synechism, tychism, and (objective) idealism together conceive the entire universe as fundamentally a *semeiosic *continuum--a continuum of *mind*, including matter as "effete mind"--presumably the same basic reasoning applies to it.
CSP: Now let any horizontal line represent a cognition, and let the length of the line serve to measure (so to speak) the liveliness of consciousness in that cognition. A point, having no length, will, on this principle, represent an object quite out of consciousness. Let one horizontal line below another represent a cognition which determines the cognition represented by that other and which has the same object as the latter. Let the finite distance between two such lines represent that they are two different cognitions. With this aid to thinking, let us see whether "there must be a first." Not surprisingly, Peirce describes a *diagram*. In this one, a line represents a *distinct* cognition, such that a point represents something *outside of* cognition. Although real cognition is a *continuous* inferential process, in this exercise--written some four decades before Peirce finally settled on his "topological" conception of continuity--there will always be a *finite* distance between different lines representing different *discrete* cognitions. CSP (continued): Suppose an inverted triangle to be gradually dipped into water. At any date or instant, the surface of the water makes a horizontal line across that triangle. This line represents a cognition. At a subsequent date, there is a sectional line so made, higher upon the triangle. This represents another cognition of the same object determined by the former, and having a livelier consciousness. The apex of the triangle represents the object external to the mind which determines both these cognitions. The state of the triangle before it reaches the water, represents a state of cognition which contains nothing which determines these subsequent cognitions. The inverted triangle represents an individual Quasi-mind, which we can generalize to the entire universe. It is never static, but always in continuous motion downward, just as mind is always in continuous thought. The apex entering the water corresponds to the alleged instant when an external object "first" determines a cognition about it; i.e., the "beginning." CSP (continued): To say, then, that if there be a state of cognition by which all subsequent cognitions of a certain object are not determined, there must subsequently be some cognition of that object not determined by previous cognitions of the same object, is to say that when that triangle is dipped into the water there must be a sectional line made by the surface of the water lower than which no surface line had been made in that way. But draw the horizontal line where you will, as many horizontal lines as you please can be assigned at finite distances below it and below one another. For any such section is at some distance above the apex, otherwise it is not a line. Let this distance be *a*. Then there have been similar sections at the distances 1/2*a*, 1/4*a*, 1/8*a*, 1/16*a*, above the apex, and so on as far as you please. So that it is not true that there must be a first. At the apex itself, there can be no *cognition* yet, because there can be no one-dimensional *line*--only a dimensionless *point*, which is a "topical singularity" or discontinuity. Between that and any line of finite length, which must be a finite distance above the apex, there is room for infinitely many shorter lines at proportionally smaller finite distances. In fact, according to Peirce's "supermultitudinous" conception of continuity, there is room for shorter lines *exceeding all multitude*; and according to his "topological" conception, there is an inexhaustible supply of *indefinite* lines. Hence there is no "first" cognition, and the "beginning" is not a *definite* event. CSP (continued): Explicate the logical difficulties of this paradox (they are identical with those of the Achilles) in whatever way you may. I am content with the result, as long as your principles are fully applied to the particular case of cognitions determining one another. Deny motion, if it seems proper to do so; only then deny the process of determination of one cognition by another. Say that instants and lines are fictions; only say, also, that states of cognition and judgments are fictions. The point here insisted on is not this or that logical solution of the difficulty, but merely that cognition arises by a *process *of beginning, as any other change comes to pass. The paradox of *ongoing* cognitions without a *first* cognition--and thus, of the universe not having a *definite* beginning--is a variation of Zeno's famous paradoxes, which concerned physical motion. They arise from the false but common assumption that *positions* in space and *instants* in time are real, which ultimately requires the denial that *motion* is real. The alternative is to recognize that *continuous* motion is the fundamental *physical* reality, such that *discrete* positions and instants are strictly hypothetical "fictions"--*entia rationis*, artificial creations for the purpose of description. Likewise, *continuous* thought, "the process of determination of one cognition by another," is the fundamental *psychical* reality, such that *discrete* "states of cognition and judgments are fictions"--again, *entia rationis*, artificial creations for the purpose of description. Peirce recognized that this parallel is a key to the *intelligibility* of the universe. CSP: Philosophy tries to understand. In so doing, it is committed to the assumption that things are intelligible, that the process of nature and the process of reason are one. (CP 6.581; c. 1905) Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt >
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