John, List: JFS: But Peirce didn't have final answers.
I agree, and have said so on-List before; but this does not refute my usual *working *assumption, which I acknowledge to be fallible, that Peirce's later answers are *more considered* than his earlier answers. JFS: Three points: (1) It's my diagram, not Peirce's; (2) Every feature of that diagram is consistent with what Peirce wrote; (3) It does not make any assumptions that go beyond what he wrote. Regarding (1), please change the title of the diagram accordingly. Regarding (2) and (3), again, he *never *situated *any *aspect of Semeiotic under Phenomenology; more on that below. JFS: With his blackboard metaphor in RLT, Peirce illustrated his views of continuity. But that metaphor is not consistent with quantum mechanics. It is not a *metaphor*, it is (by his own reckoning) a *diagram*; i.e., it primarily represents the significant *relations *among the parts of its object. As Jeff already alluded, it remains to be seen whether it is consistent with quantum mechanics, since physicists are still seeking a unification of their most fundamental theories. JAS: Logic as the third branch of Normative Science is "the science of the general laws of signs"--i.e., Semeiotic--and depends on Ethics (which depends on Esthetics), as well as Phenomenology and Mathematics. Speculative Grammar, which I assume corresponds to "Formal Semeiotic," is the first branch of Logic. JFS: No. CP has 119 occurrences of 'formal logic' ... In CP 1.185, he wrote "Mathematics may be divided into a. the Mathematics of Logic; b. the Mathematics of Discrete Series; c. the Mathematics of Continua and Pseudocontinua." But that is the only context where he used the term 'mathematics of logic'. My statement above is not merely my opinion, it is a straightforward summary of Peirce's own words within the very passage cited as the source for the diagram. As for "formal logic," that is precisely what Peirce here called "the Mathematics of Logic," which he elsewhere called "mathematical logic" (CP 1.247; 1902) and sharply distinguished from "logic proper." CSP: Mathematical logic is formal logic. Formal logic, however developed, is mathematics. Formal logic, however, is by no means the whole of logic, or even its principal part. It is hardly to be reckoned as a part of logic proper. Logic has to define its aim; and in doing so is even more dependent upon ethics, or the philosophy of aims, by far, than it is, in the methodeutic branch, upon mathematics ... Logic depends upon mathematics; still more intimately upon ethics; but its proper concern is with truths beyond the purview of either. (CP 4.240; 1902) Hence formal logic is the very first branch of *Mathematics*, which is the very first branch of *all *the sciences. As such, it is the *logica utens* employed in *every other* branch, including Phenomenology. By contrast, "the general theory of the nature and meanings of signs" is "Speculative Grammar," which is the first branch of Logic proper--"the science of the general laws of signs"--which is the third branch of Normative Science, and thus also depends upon ethics (CP 1.191, EP 2:260; 1903). JAS: This is very disappointing--despite all of the recent on-List complaints about attributing 's views to someone apart from verbatim quotations, the attachment still falsely claims that it presents Peirce's classification of the sciences. As I pointed out several months ago, it does not--there is no passage whatsoever where he employed the term "Formal Semeiotic," and also no passage whatsoever where he situated any aspect of Semeiotic under Phenomenology." JFS: No. Please note CP Vol 1, Book 3. Its title is "Phenomenology", and its major topic is the use of formal logic to derive the categories. That is the foundation for Peirce's semeiotic. The title of Book 4 is "The Normative Sciences". The arrangement and titles of the eight CP volumes were *arbitrarily *assigned by the editors, and are by no means authoritative--certainly not more so than Peirce's own words. JFS: I agree that phenomenology is a single subject, whose major product is the semeiotic categories (sometimes called phenomenological). See CP Vol 1, Book 3, 1.284-572. I have never seen anyone else call them "semeiotic categories," probably because signs are the paradigmatic examples of *only one* of them (3ns). They are typically (not just "sometimes") called "phenomenological categories" or "phaneroscopic categories." Normative Science has three branches *because *there are three such categories; the primary subject matter of each is 1ns as feeling for Esthetics, 2ns as action for Ethics, and 3ns as thought for Logic as Semeiotic. JFS: In his classificatiion of the sciences, Peirce omits his most famous achievement: semeiotic. Since I believe that it should be mentioned in that diagram, I put one line under Phenomenology and added the label Formal Semeotic. Again, he omitted the *word *"Semeiotic," but he included Logic as the third branch of Normative Science and defined it as "the science of the general laws of signs." There is absolutely no warrant from Peirce's writings for locating Semeiotic (formal or otherwise) *anywhere else* in the diagram. JFS: The single line and label show that phenomenology is a single subject, which consists of the use of formal logic to analyze and classify signs. According to Peirce, "Phenomenology ascertains and studies the kinds of elements universally present in the phenomenon; meaning by the *phenomenon*, whatever is present at any time to the mind in any way" (CP 1.186, EP 2:259; 1903). As such, its scope is by no means limited to representation/mediation (3ns); it also includes quality (1ns) and relation/reaction (2ns). Instead, the science that "consists of the use of formal logic to analyze and classify signs" is Speculative Grammar, the first branch of Logic, the third branch of Normative Science (CP 1.191, EP 2:260; 1903). JAS: I have never claimed that Peirce denied CP 1.412. What I have maintained is that we should interpret it in light of later passages, which presumably reflect Peirce's more considered views. JFS: Unfortunately, nobody knows what Peirce was considering in his later years. We know what Peirce *wrote *in his later years--some of it published at the time, but most of it in handwritten manuscripts--and that is exactly what I said we should take into account when interpreting his *earlier *writings. JFS: Peirce adopted objective idealism from Schelling, and added some modifications of his own. But I believe that a version of logical idealism, as proposed by Helmut Pape, is closer in spirit to Peirce's logic and semeiotic. That is fine as a personal opinion, but as we have been reminded repeatedly, no one can properly ascribe such a view to Peirce *himself *without providing verbatim quotations that support it. JFS: It's consistent with objective idealism, but it requires fewer assumptions, and it can be interpreted as a formal verion of Peirce's informal claim that everything is a sign ... Logical idealism supports a kind of monism with just one category of primordial entities: signs. These claims fall under Metaphysics, which is why Phenomenology cannot *presuppose *them, as implied by treating the latter as equivalent to "Formal Semeiotic." JFS: Objective idealism makes the dubious assumption that mental entities have a privileged status in comparison to physical entities. "Privileged status" is not Peirce's terminology. Rather, he discussed whether matter, mind, or neither is *primordial *(CP 6.24, EP 1:292; 1891)--i.e., (logically) basic and fundamental, and/or (temporally) from the beginning. Once dualism and neutralism are ruled out by synechism, the choice is between materialism and idealism--"Either *mind *is a peculiar kind of *matter*, or else *matter *is a peculiar sort of *mind*" (R 936:3; c. 1891). Peirce considered it *more *dubious to assume that physical entities are primordial relative to mental entities, even while acknowledging that "there is much to be said" for that theory (*ibid*). Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Tue, Sep 3, 2019 at 10:33 AM John F. Sowa <[email protected]> wrote: > > Jon and Gary R, > > I had some work that kept me from spending time on email. But that delay > gave me some time to put these issues into perspective. I realized that > Jon is constantly looking for Peirce's "considered" answers. But Peirce > didn't have final answers. He developed a scientific framework for asking > questions, analyzing guesses, and refining hypotheses into theories. But > no theory is final. Every answer generates more questions. There is no > stopping point. > > Re classification of the sciences: I originally drew that diagram for > some discussions in the Ontolog Forum email list. I wanted to show how > Peirce's classification, which is still the best available, can relate the > many theories of science, engineering, law, art, and everyday life. Since > then, I discussed that diagram with several Peirce scholars. They made > helpful suggestions, which led me to make some revisions. Three points: > (1) It's my diagram, not Peirce's; (2) Every feature of that diagram is > consistent with what Peirce wrote; (3) It does not make any assumptions > that go beyond what he wrote. See http://jfsowa.com/peirce/cspscience.png > > Re Cosmology: Peirce learned mathematics, physics, and astronomy at his > father's knee. Until he lost his position at USCGS and JHU, his knowledge > of those fields was at the forefront of research, and that research is > reflected in his cosmology. No one knows what he might have thought about > quantum mechanics. It supports his Tychism, but it poses a challenge to > his preference for Synechism. > > Re physical and metaphysical cosmology: In RLT p. 267, Peirce wrote "The > subject of mathematical metaphysics, or cosmology, is not so very > difficult, provided it be properly expanded and displayed." But there are > infinitely many theories of math. With his blackboard metaphor in RLT, > Peirce illustrated his views of continuity. But that metaphor is not > consistent with quantum mechanics. > > For these reasons, I'm skeptical about using Synechism to support claims > about cosmology. Peirce's logic and semeiotic are still at the forefront > of research today. But his physics is obsolete, and so is any mathematical > metaphysics that is inconsistent with QM. > > JAS > > Logic as the third branch of Normative Science is "the science of the > general laws of signs"--i.e., Semeiotic--and depends on Ethics (which > depends on Esthetics), as well as Phenomenology and Mathematics. > Speculative Grammar, which I assume corresponds to "Formal Semeiotic," is > the first branch of Logic. > > No. CP has 119 occurrences of 'formal logic'. Peirce used the term for > the mathematical notations by logicians from Boole to himself. He also > used it for the logics from Aristotle to the Scholastics to Kant. Logic as > a normative science is Peirce's update of the Greco-Roman Trivium: the > Liberal Arts of Grammar, Logic, and Rhetoric. See CP 1.159, which defines > logic as the second "of a trivium of conceivable sciences." He later > called it Critic. > > In CP 1.185, he wrote "Mathematics may be divided into a. the Mathematics > of Logic; b. the Mathematics of Discrete Series; c. the Mathematics of > Continua and Pseudocontinua." But that is the only context where he used > the term 'mathematics of logic'. > > However, CP has 16 occurrences of 'the logic of mathematics'. Most of > them are in CP 1.417 to 1.519, which has the subtitle "An attempt to derive > my categories from within." (c 1896), The last occurrence, CP 8.171, is in > Peirce's 1903 Review of Bertrand Russell's book _Principles of > Mathematics_. That shows Peirce considered Russell's version of formal > logic to be an example of the logic of mathematics. > > For more, see his definition of 'formal' in the Century Dictionary: "1. > According to form, rule, or established order; according to the rules of > law or custom; systematic; regular; legal." He also defined 'formal logic' > as "the theory of the relations of different forms of propositions and > syllogisms." > > By adopting De Morgan's term 'formal logic', Peirce followed his own > ethics of terminology. Since it is still the most common term in the 21st > c, anyone who accepts Peirce's ethics would also have an obligation to use > it. > > GR quoting JAS > > Moving to another matter, [JAS] wrote regarding John Sowa's diagram of > Peirce's classification of the sciences: > > > > JAS: This is very disappointing -- despite all of the recent on-List > complaints about attributing 's views to someone apart from verbatim > quotations, the attachment still falsely claims that it presents Peirce's > classification of the sciences. As I pointed out several months ago, it > does not -- there is no passage whatsoever where he employed the term > "Formal Semeiotic," and also no passage whatsoever where he situated any > aspect of Semeiotic under Phenomenology." > > No. Please note CP Vol 1, Book 3. Its title is "Phenomenology", and its > major topic is the use of formal logic to derive the categories. That is > the foundation for Peirce's semeiotic. The title of Book 4 is "The > Normative Sciences". > > Summary of the issues: > > 1, I agree that phenomenology is a single subject, whose major product is > the semeiotic categories (sometimes called phenomenological). See CP Vol > 1, Book 3, 1.284-572. > > 2. In his classificatiion of the sciences, Peirce omits his most famous > achievement: semeiotic. Since I believe that it should be mentioned in > that diagram, I put one line under Phenomenology and added the label Formal > Semeotic. > > 3, The single line and label show that phenomenology is a single subject, > which consists of the use of formal logic to analyze and classify signs. > But then I needed a label for it. There are several options: Semeiotic > Categories, Phenomeological Categories, Semeiotic, or Formal Semeiotic. > > 4. Since Peirce's CD definition of the word 'formal' is also appropriate > for the way he derived his semeiotic categories, that would suggest the > label 'formal semeiotic'. That term would be defined as the method of > derivation in Book 3. > > In Book 3, the logic he uses is his own formal logic, not the normative > branch. For example, in CP 1.293, he wrote "A thorough study of the logic > of relatives confirms the conclusions which I had reached before going far > in that study. It shows that logical terms are either monads, dyads, or > polyads," > > Therefore, the term 'formal semeiotic' is consistent with Peirce's > definitions and practices, I'm not claiming that he used the term or that > he would approve of my use. But I believe that it's pedagogically useful > for helping students remember how the trichotomies ere derived. > > GR > > [JAS makes] it clear enough that not only was the latter Peirce's ... > considered view that continuity, "the tendency to take habits," 3ns, was > first, that is, original before time was, so to speak... > > > > Then, in the last of the 1898 Lectures (RLT), ... Peirce makes this > explicit such that the 'sporting' of 1ns 'occurs' upon a pre-cosmic > blackboard, so to speak, representing a kind of ur-continuity, that > "principle of habit," a primordial continuity which is the sine qua non of > Peirce's early cosmology in my view. > > > > Finally, in his last, or at least penultimate, thinking on the matter > Peirce would write that the development of laws occurred "... under a > certain universal tendency toward habit-forming..." 1908 > > No. Everything Peirce wrote was his considered view at the moment. But > his First Rule of Reason implies that anything considered as a final view > would block the way of inquiry. > > His writings after 1910 show that his own views were still growing and > evolving. 1914 was a stopping point, but it was not the completion. With > a few more years and better access to contemporary science, he would have > been actively debating with Einstein, Bohr, and others. > > Lecture 8 of RLT is a good illustration of the issues. In that lecture > Peirce expressed his hopes for the future developments of cosmology. His > own contributions were tentative, speculative, and vague. Some quotations: > > CSP from RLT, pp 261 to 263. > > I object to having my metaphysical system as a whole called Tychism... > I like to call my theory Synechism, because it rests on the study of > continuity... Let the clean blackboard be a sort of Diagram of the > original vague potentiality, or at any rate of its determination. (p 261) > > > > Where does this continuity come from? It is nothing but the original > continuity of the black board... Continuity, as generality, is inherent in > potentiality, which is essentially general. (p 262) > > > > all this, be it remembered, is not of the order of the existing > universe, but is merely a Platonic world... (p 263) > > In Lecture 8 of RLT, Peirce said that he had more math to support his > claims, but what he wrote is "sufficiently vague" to be acceptable. > Quantum mechanics does not contradict everything he wrote about continuity, > but it would make Tychism just as important, if not more important than > Synechism. > > JAS > > I have never claimed that Peirce denied CP 1.412. What I > have maintained is that we should interpret it in light of later passages, > which presumably reflect Peirce's more considered views. > > Unfortunately, nobody knows what Peirce was considering in his later > years. When he visited Harvard to give lectures, he may have learned > snippets of what was going on. His Neglected Argument of 1908 was > "sufficiently vague" to be consistent with anything. But the lack of > detail is a warning. He was acutely aware of major new developments about > which he couldn't say anything definite. > > Conclusion: Peirce's work in progress > > Peirce adopted objective idealism from Schelling, and added some > modifications of his own. But I believe that a version of logical > idealism, as proposed by Helmut Pape, is closer in spirit to Peirce's logic > and semeiotic. It's consistent with objective idealism, but it requires > fewer assumptions, and it can be interpreted as a formal verion of Peirce's > informal claim that everything is a sign. See > https://www.academia.edu/371730/The_Logical_Structure_of_Idealism_CS_Peirces_Search_for_a_Logic_of_Mental_Processes > > Logical idealism supports a kind of monism with just one category of > primordial entities: signs. Abstract entities, mathematical entities, > mental entities, and physical entities are kinds of signs. The three > universes of possibilities, actualities, and necessities consist of signs. > Logic expresses the laws, facts, and relations among signs. > > Objective idealism makes the dubious assumption that mental entities have > a privileged status in comparison to physical entities. But logical > idealism implies that all signs are really real. It explains how > mathematicians can claim that mathematical entitie are real, and it > explains how Peirce could say that possibilities are real. > > Finally, Peirce's First Rule of Reason implies that all science is work in > progress. And he took great pleasure in one critic's recognition of that > point: > > CSP, CP 1.10 > > Only once, as far as I remember, in all my lifetime have I experienced > the pleasure of praise -- not for what it might bring but in itself. That > pleasure was beatific; and the praise that conferred it was meant for > blame. It was that a critic said of me that I did not seem to be > absolutely sure of my own conclusions. > > John >
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