Jon Alan Schmidt, list,
JAS: Sure, but as I understand it, the continuity of the process of
thought/semeiosis and the primordiality of mind (objective idealism)
together constitute a fallible metaphysical hypothesis that purports
to explain the /surprising /fact of continuous spacetime as observed
in the special sciences.
I'm not sure that Peirce or anybody in his time regarded continuity of
space & time (and among later physicists, spacetime) as surprising. I
don't know whether Newtonian physics implied continuity of space & time,
although I suspect that the answer is simple (just not for me!). The use
of the real number system for such physics certainly suggests
continuity. Prominent arguments for discrete spacetime seem more recent,
and they're disfavored by currently accumulated evidence insofar as they
imply violations of Lorentz symmetries (note for general readers,
"Lorentz symmetries," singular or plural, usually refers to the same
issues as "Lorentz invariance" refers, especially constancy
(invariance-&-universality) of the signal speed limit = lightspeed).
Yes, Peirce grasped that his conclusions about continuity of thought,
space, and time amounted to hypotheses, but his seeming confidence in
those conclusions over the years could mislead Peirce-reading
non-specialists like me into seeming overconfident in arguing for
continuity of spacetime. Note, Peirce's 1868 argument for continuity of
thought (in "Questions Concerning Certain Faculties Claimed For Man"
(1868)
<http://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/menu/library/bycsp/question/qu-frame.htm>)
doesn't depend on objective idealism, which came later.
JAS: Matter itself is indeed discrete, but it is always in a state
of continuous motion, such that positions and instants are
artificial creations for /describing/ that motion. Likewise,
definite propositions are artificial creations for /describing/ the
continuous process of thought/semeiosis.
In saying that quantum discretism does not apply to positions in
spacetime, I meant merely that it doesn't require spacetime to be
pixellated.
Best, Ben
On 9/4/2019 2:15 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote:
Ben U., List:
BU: Peirce's _reason_ for thinking space and time continuous was
that he thought that the process of thought is continuous.
Insofar as that was at the basis of his argument for Synechism,
John S is right, many of us would be reluctant to say that
physicists ought — even without special relativity or recent
observations of neutrinos — to expect continuity of spacetime on
the basis of continuity of the process of thought as such.
Sure, but as I understand it, the continuity of the process of
thought/semeiosis and the primordiality of mind (objective idealism)
together constitute a fallible metaphysical hypothesis that purports
to explain the /surprising /fact of continuous spacetime as observed
in the special sciences.
BU: The discretism of quantum mechanics pertains first of all to
amounts of energy and the like, not at all to positions in
spacetime. Moreover Peirce did not hold that everything
whatsoever is continuous; he said more than once that matter is
discrete and once that it "no doubt" consists of "Boscovitchian
points."
Matter itself is indeed discrete, but it is always in a state of
continuous motion, such that positions and instants are artificial
creations for /describing/ that motion. Likewise, definite
propositions are artificial creations for /describing/ the continuous
process of thought/semeiosis.
CSP: ... an Argument is no more built up of Propositions than a
motion is built up of positions. So to regard it is to neglect the
very essence of it ... Just as it is strictly correct to say that
nobody is ever in an exact Position (except instantaneously, and
an Instant is a fiction, or /ens rationis/), but Positions ... are
/entia rationis/ (i.e. fictions recognized to be fictions, and
thus no longer fictions) invented for the purposes of closer
descriptions of states of motion; so likewise, Thought (I am not
talking Psychology, but Logic, or the essence of Semeiotics)
cannot, from the nature of it, be at rest, or be anything but
inferential process; and propositions ... are artificial creations
intended to render the description of Thought-motion possible; and
Names are creations of a second order serving to render the
representation of propositions possible. (R 295:117-118[102-103];
1906)
Peirce also discussed the parallels between thought and motion in CP
2.27 (1902), invoking "the Achilles and Tortoise argument of Zeno" and
characterizing the formulation of an argument into a series of
definite propositions (premisses and conclusions) as "only the
self-defence of the process" /after/ it has already run its
(continuous) course. I have suggested on-List previously that in
accordance with his objective idealism, motion is a /degenerate/ form
of thought/semeiosis, since "physical events are but degraded or
undeveloped forms of psychical events" and "the phenomena of matter
are but the result of the sensibly complete sway of habits upon mind"
(CP 6.264, EP 1:348; 1892).
Regards,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt
<http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> -
twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt <http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt>
On Wed, Sep 4, 2019 at 10:56 AM Ben Udell <[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
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