Gary F., List: Thanks for posting this interesting analysis. It probably will not surprise anyone that I am responding mainly to your last statement.
GF: I will leave it to the reader to reconsider the signs, objects and interpretants identified by Peirce in the conversational example above, and judge for him- or herself whether a single linear order of determination applies to its six components. In accordance with Peirce's 1903 taxonomy, both examples are obviously replicas of propositions; i.e., dicent symbols, and therefore legisigns. In accordance with the hexad, both examples are tokens of symbolic types, and therefore must be collectives according to the dynamical object and copulatives according to the immediate object. That does not seem to square with Peirce's identification of the dynamical objects as "the impression which I have presumably derived from peeping between the window-curtains" and "the identity of the actual and Real meteorological conditions at the moment." However, it is consistent with his statements elsewhere that the dynamical object of *every *proposition is the entire universe, while the immediate object is the universe of discourse--the collection of whatever *possibly could* be denoted by the terms that the proposition involves. The latter matches up reasonably well with "the weather at that time" and "the notion of the present weather so far as this is common to her mind and mine." Again, I do not believe that a linear sequence of trichotomies is ultimately the right approach for speculative grammar, especially when it comes to the two objects and the sign itself. For one thing, I consider the S-Od division to be a matter of degree, rather than a sharp distinction; signs are iconic, indexical, and symbolic, rather than pure icons, indices, or symbols. For another, in my view symbolic signs are clearly *not *limited to being collectives, copulatives, and types. For example, the dynamical object of a symbolic term can be an abstract quality (abstractive), a concrete thing (concretive), or an *ens rationis* (collective); it can identify its immediate object by relying on past collateral experience (descriptive) or present collateral observation (designative); and in itself, like all types, it exists only in its tokens. As for the interpretants, in the first example Peirce says that the immediate is "the quality of the weather," the dynamical is "my answering her question" (not the answer itself), and the final is "her purpose in asking it, what effect its answer will have as to her plans for the ensuing day." This seems to indicate that his wife's question, "What sort of a day is it?" is a categorical (graphed with one line of identity), a percussive (actual effect is an exertion), and a temperative (intended to produce self-control). However, I am inclined to say that the purpose of *every *question, unless it is strictly rhetorical, is to elicit an answer--i.e., to produce an action--which would make it an actuous, rather than a temperative. This combination is possible regardless of the order of the interpretant trichotomies, since all three are existents. In the second example, Peirce says that the immediate interpretant is "the schema in her imagination, i.e., the vague Image of what there is in common to the different Images of a stormy day"; the dynamical is "the disappointment or whatever actual effect it at once has upon her"; and the final is "the sum of the Lessons of the reply, Moral, Scientific, etc." This seems to indicate that his response, "It is a stormy day," is a categorical, a percussive, and a temperative; I consider his wife's disappointment to be an exertion, rather than a feeling, because it is a *physical *response. This combination requires the trichotomy for the final interpretant to come *before *the other two, as it does in my logical order of determination, rather than *after *them, as it does in Robert's. There are two remaining divisions in Peirce's 1905-1909 taxonomies--the manner of appeal, which corresponds to the relation between the sign and the dynamical interpretant; and the nature of assurance, which corresponds to the triadic relation between the dynamical object, the sign itself, and the final interpretant. When he first revealed that every sign has two objects and three interpretants in a 1904 letter to Lady Welby, he also spelled out the proper relationship between the two trichotomies according to the sign's relations with its final and dynamical interpretants. CSP: According to my present view, a sign may appeal to its dynamic interpretant in three ways: 1st, an argument only may be *submitted *to its interpretant, as something the reasonableness of which will be acknowledged. 2nd, an argument or dicent may be *urged* upon the interpretant by an act of insistence. 3rd, argument or dicent may be, and a rheme can only be, presented to the interpretant for *contemplation*. (CP 8.338, 1904) This makes perfect sense and implies that S-If comes *before *S-Id in the logical order of determination. Again, both examples are propositions, but I am inclined to classify the question as a suggestive (presented) and the answer as an imperative (urged) on the basis of the different *tones* that accompany their tokens--a question mark vs. a period at the end when written, and different voice inflections when spoken. As for Od-S-If, its trichotomy most obviously applies to indicative (submitted) arguments as abducent/inducent/deducent--i.e., retroductive/inductive/deductive--so it must come last. The question as a suggestive is necessarily an abducent, and I consider the answer to be an inducent because it is an assertion of fact rather than value. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Sun, Apr 19, 2020 at 1:25 PM <[email protected]> wrote: > I haven’t been following this thread (or group of threads) closely, but I > noticed that in the discussion of the ‘hexad’ there’s been a call for more > concrete examples, an interest in biological applications, and a question > about the linearity of the “order of determination,” especially in regard > to the three interpretants. In this post I’ll try to address all of those. > > In a 1909 letter to William James where Peirce explains the difference > between Immediate and Dynamical Objects (CP 8.314, EP2:498), he follows up > with a specific example drawn from ordinary conversation to illustrate his > distinctions between the two Objects and three Interpretants of a Sign: > > [[ For instance, suppose I awake in the morning before my wife, and that > afterwards she wakes up and inquires, “What sort of a day is it?” *This* > is a sign, whose Object, as expressed, is the weather at that time, but > whose Dynamical Object is the *impression which I have presumably derived > from peeping between the window-curtains.* Whose Interpretant, as > expressed, is the quality of the weather, but whose Dynamical Interpretant, > is *my answering her question.* But beyond that, there is a *third* > Interpretant. The *Immediate Interpretant* is what the Question > expresses, *all* that it immediately expresses, which I have imperfectly > restated above. The *Dynamical Interpretant* is the actual effect that it > has upon me, its interpreter. But the Significance of it, the *Ultimate,* > or *Final, Interpretant* is her *purpose* in asking it, what effect its > answer will have as to her plans for the ensuing day. I reply, let us > suppose: “It is a stormy day.” Here is another sign. Its *Immediate > Object* is the notion of the present weather so far as this is common to > her mind and mine,— not the *character* of it, but the *identity* of it. > The *Dynamical Object* is the *identity* of the actual and *Real* > meteorological conditions at the moment. The *Immediate Interpretant* is > the *schema* in her imagination, i.e. the vague Image or what there is in > common to the different Images of a stormy day. The *Dynamical > Interpretant* is the disappointment or whatever actual effect it at once > has upon her. The *Final Interpretant* is the sum of the *Lessons* of the > reply, Moral, Scientific, etc. Now it is easy to see that my attempt to > draw this three-way, “trivialis,” distinction, relates to a real and > important three-way distinction, and yet that it is quite hazy and needs a > vast deal of study before it is rendered perfect. ]] > > Referring to his wife's question as a sign, Peirce says that its > ‘Dynamical Object is the *impression which I have presumably derived from > peeping between the window-curtains.*’ Now suppose we regard this > ‘peeping’ along with the deriving of an ‘impression’ from it as itself an > instance of *semiosis* or “sign-action.” The biological embodiment of > such a process always requires a *flow of energy* (as well as the flow of > time). The continuity of this energy flow, and thus of the semiosic > process, makes it somewhat problematic to label its parts as if they were > discrete. > > The energy flow involved in this particular sign is already implied by > Peirce's reference to his ‘impression’ as the *Dynamical* Object of > another sign (his wife's question). We, including Peirce, often speak of a > perceived or denoted Object as if it were an *individual* object or > static *thing*; but more strictly speaking, the Object of an indexical > sign is ‘in dynamical (including spatial) connection both with the > individual object, on the one hand, and with the senses or memory of the > person for whom it serves as a sign, on the other hand’ (*Baldwin's > Dictionary*, ‘Index’ <http://www.gnusystems.ca/BaldwinPeirce.htm#Indexi>). > Peirce wrote this before he made the distinction between Immediate and > Dynamical Objects, but if every sign has both kinds of object, we should be > able to analyze the ‘dynamical connection’ between external object and > internal nervous system in a way that distinguishes the two objects. > > In thermodynamics, we typically observe an energy flow from “source” to > “sink.” But in the *biology* of a semiosic process such as visual > perception, we find that energy flows are much more complex, and often > recursive. Peirce referred to ‘senses or memory’ as one end of the > dynamical connection which has the individual external object at the other > end; but due to advances in neuroscience since the time of Peirce and > James, we now know that the dynamical connections (energy flows within the > brain) *between senses and memory* are themselves extremely complex and > recursive. It is pretty well established now that within the hierarchical > brain structure, perception involves a top-down flow of memory-based > ‘prediction’ and a bottom-up flow from the sense organ's point of contact > with the external world (in visual perception, the retina). The *form* of > each flow constitutes *information*, and the perceptual processing > consists mostly of the two flows influencing each other, so that the > top-down flow is modified on the way down by news of ‘prediction error’ > coming from lower levels of the process, while the bottom-up flow is also > modified by (for instance) the top-down control of eye, head and body > movements. To fill out the details of this rough sketch of ‘predictive > processing,’ see (for instance) Andy Clark's *Surfing Uncertainty* > (2015). > > With this in mind, let us return to a biosemiotic analysis of Peirce's > ‘impression’ which he identified as the Dynamical Object of his wife's > question. We could also take it as an *interpretant* of the perceptual > sign whose Dynamical Object is the *form or pattern of the energy flow* > from his retina toward the higher levels of the visual system in his brain. > In that case, the Immediate Object of the perceptual sign would be his > memory-based *prediction of what he was likely to see* when he looked out > the window. This is not a *conscious* prediction, of course; it is > embodied as the form or pattern of the top-down energy flow in the visual > system in his brain. But it fits Peirce's description of the Immediate > Object as internal to the sign (process) while the Dynamical Object is > relatively external. (I say ‘relatively’ because the entire > semiosic/perceptual process is taking place within the brain, although its > points of contact with the world external to the brain (e.g. the retina) > are often crucial to determining its interpretant). > > To further simplify our biosemiotic analysis, the Immediate Object in > perception is a *top-down energy flow* while the Dynamical Object is a > *bottom-up > flow* from the point where the sense organs connect with the external > world. But since these Objects are not separate and independent flows (let > alone *individual* objects), it would be unrealistic to arrange them in a > linear order of determination. We would have to represent their relations > in the way that Peirce's EGs represent the Composition process of Terms, > Propositions and Arguments: ‘namely, each component must be indeterminate > in some respect or another; and in their composition each determines the > other’ (CP 4.572, 1906). > > More generally still, we can say that perception and action, as > constructed by brain processing, are ‘both co-determined and > co-determining’ (Clark 2015, 176). If the same is true of *cognition and > behavior*, which occur at higher spatial and temporal scales, this would > suggest that the order of determination among the sign, the two objects and > the three interpretants is also nonlinear, at least in some contexts. It > follows that a context-free schema which imposes a fixed order of > determination on the components of *all* semiosic processes is unlikely > to be realistic for any universe of actual processing (as opposed to > mathematical abstractions). I will leave it to the reader to reconsider the > signs, objects and interpretants identified by Peirce in the conversational > example above, and judge for him- or herself whether a single linear order > of determination applies to its six components. > > Gary F. > > } Now we never can know precisely what we mean by any description > whatever. [Peirce, CP 7.119] { > > http://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{ transition conversation >
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