Gary F, Auke, list
I agree with Gary's comments - however, specifically, I don't see
that the 'minute semiotic analysis' is even a semiotic analysis; it's
a terminological analysis. Semiosis is a dynamic process and a focus
on terms ignores this actuality.
My interest is in this semiosic process, as a continuous adaptive
transformative action - which is embodied, not merely in the brain,
but in matter [matter is effete mind]. To me, that's what Peirce is
talking about - and to confine analysis of his work to terms, to me
at least, utterly ignores this fact.
I also agree with Auke's comment asking why, if Peirce - as JAS
insists - uses only three Interpretants - then why did Peirce use
other terms for the actions of interpretation? Surely his focus on
clarification meant that he developed them for an explanatory
function.
I also reject JAS's inserting the Final interpretant as 'first' in
the trichotomy. This suggests an apriori causal determination and I
think that Peircean semiosis, with its specific capacities for
change, adaptation and evolution, rejects such a determinism. I
therefore agree with Gary F with his comment about the different
temporal phases. I'm using Matsuno's terms [which I've previously
referred to] - but, the point is, that Firstness is atemporal so to
speak, occurring in the Present tense. Secondness is in the Perfect
tense...with a clear perimeter between 'the previous second and this
second'. Thirdness or continuity is in the Progressive tense - with a
continuity of action but no 'presentness or perfectness' amd therefore
has no sense of linearity. Thus - it is not deterministic - and the
Final Interpretant IF, IF, it's in a mode of Thirdness certainly
can't be temporally 'first' but is instead, an underlying
force-of-continuity [habit].
Edwina
On Wed 22/04/20 9:32 AM , [email protected] sent:
Jon, I think we agree on the continuity of the process of semiosis,
but I find it as difficult to get interested in the minute semiotic
analysis of it as it is for you to get interested in how the whole
experiential process is embodied in the brain (or other biological
quasi-mind). So I only have one small suggestion to offer. You wrote,
“ This combination requires the trichotomy for the final
interpretant to come before the other two, as it does in my logical
order of determination, rather than after them, as it does in
Robert's.” It seems to me that the final interpretant (like a final
cause) operates over a longer time-scale than the other two — which
would imply that its mode of being “comes” both before and after
them.
Gary f.
From: Jon Alan Schmidt
Sent: 21-Apr-20 21:15
To: [email protected]
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Categories at work within the signs
Gary F., List:
Thanks for posting this interesting analysis. It probably will not
surprise anyone that I am responding mainly to your last statement.
GF: I will leave it to the reader to reconsider the signs, objects
and interpretants identified by Peirce in the conversational example
above, and judge for him- or herself whether a single linear order of
determination applies to its six components.
In accordance with Peirce's 1903 taxonomy, both examples are
obviously replicas of propositions; i.e., dicent symbols, and
therefore legisigns.
In accordance with the hexad, both examples are tokens of symbolic
types, and therefore must be collectives according to the dynamical
object and copulatives according to the immediate object. That does
not seem to square with Peirce's identification of the dynamical
objects as "the impression which I have presumably derived from
peeping between the window-curtains" and "the identity of the actual
and Real meteorological conditions at the moment." However, it is
consistent with his statements elsewhere that the dynamical object of
every proposition is the entire universe, while the immediate object
is the universe of discourse--the collection of whatever possibly
could be denoted by the terms that the proposition involves. The
latter matches up reasonably well with "the weather at that time" and
"the notion of the present weather so far as this is common to her
mind and mine."
Again, I do not believe that a linear sequence of trichotomies is
ultimately the right approach for speculative grammar, especially
when it comes to the two objects and the sign itself. For one thing,
I consider the S-Od division to be a matter of degree, rather than a
sharp distinction; signs are iconic, indexical, and symbolic, rather
than pure icons, indices, or symbols. For another, in my view
symbolic signs are clearly not limited to being collectives,
copulatives, and types. For example, the dynamical object of a
symbolic term can be an abstract quality (abstractive), a concrete
thing (concretive), or an ens rationis (collective); it can identify
its immediate object by relying on past collateral experience
(descriptive) or present collateral observation (designative); and in
itself, like all types, it exists only in its tokens.
As for the interpretants, in the first example Peirce says that the
immediate is "the quality of the weather," the dynamical is "my
answering her question" (not the answer itself), and the final is
"her purpose in asking it, what effect its answer will have as to her
plans for the ensuing day." This seems to indicate that his wife's
question, "What sort of a day is it?" is a categorical (graphed with
one line of identity), a percussive (actual effect is an exertion),
and a temperative (intended to produce self-control). However, I am
inclined to say that the purpose of every question, unless it is
strictly rhetorical, is to elicit an answer--i.e., to produce an
action--which would make it an actuous, rather than a temperative.
This combination is possible regardless of the order of the
interpretant trichotomies, since all three are existents.
In the second example, Peirce says that the immediate interpretant
is "the schema in her imagination, i.e., the vague Image of what
there is in common to the different Images of a stormy day"; the
dynamical is "the disappointment or whatever actual effect it at once
has upon her"; and the final is "the sum of the Lessons of the reply,
Moral, Scientific, etc." This seems to indicate that his response,
"It is a stormy day," is a categorical, a percussive, and a
temperative; I consider his wife's disappointment to be an exertion,
rather than a feeling, because it is a physical response. This
combination requires the trichotomy for the final interpretant to
come before the other two, as it does in my logical order of
determination, rather than after them, as it does in Robert's.
There are two remaining divisions in Peirce's 1905-1909
taxonomies--the manner of appeal, which corresponds to the relation
between the sign and the dynamical interpretant; and the nature of
assurance, which corresponds to the triadic relation between the
dynamical object, the sign itself, and the final interpretant. When
he first revealed that every sign has two objects and three
interpretants in a 1904 letter to Lady Welby, he also spelled out the
proper relationship between the two trichotomies according to the
sign's relations with its final and dynamical interpretants.
CSP: According to my present view, a sign may appeal to its dynamic
interpretant in three ways:
1st, an argument only may be submitted to its interpretant, as
something the reasonableness of which will be acknowledged.
2nd, an argument or dicent may be urged upon the interpretant by an
act of insistence.
3rd, argument or dicent may be, and a rheme can only be, presented
to the interpretant for contemplation. (CP 8.338, 1904)
This makes perfect sense and implies that S-If comes before S-Id in
the logical order of determination. Again, both examples are
propositions, but I am inclined to classify the question as a
suggestive (presented) and the answer as an imperative (urged) on the
basis of the different tones that accompany their tokens--a question
mark vs. a period at the end when written, and different voice
inflections when spoken. As for Od-S-If, its trichotomy most
obviously applies to indicative (submitted) arguments as
abducent/inducent/deducent--i.e.,
retroductive/inductive/deductive--so it must come last. The question
as a suggestive is necessarily an abducent, and I consider the answer
to be an inducent because it is an assertion of fact rather than
value.
Regards,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt [1] - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
[2]
Links:
------
[1] http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt
[2] http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
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