Gary F., List: GF: ... I find it as difficult to get interested in the minute semiotic analysis of it as it is for you to get interested in how the whole experiential process is embodied in the brain (or other biological quasi-mind).
Understood and agreed. :-) GF: It seems to me that the final interpretant (like a final cause) operates over a longer time-scale than the other two--which would imply that its mode of being “comes” both before and after them. Again, I was referring to the *logical* order of determination, which (according to Peirce, EP 2:481,1908) dictates which classes of signs are possible. When I say that the division of signs according to the purpose of the final interpretant comes *before* the one according to the mode of being of the dynamical interpretant, I am not saying anything about their *temporal *relationship. Instead, I am simply suggesting the following. - A gratific (ideally would produce a feeling) is always a sympathetic (actually does produce a feeling). - An actuous (ideally would produce an exertion) can be either a sympathetic or a percussive (actually does produce an exertion). - A temperative (ideally would produce a further sign) can be a sympathetic, a percussive, or a usual (actually does produce a further sign). As I have mentioned before, the upshot is that the actual effect of a sign can only deviate from its ideal/intended effect in the direction of involution (3ns→2ns→1ns). Likewise, when I say that the division of signs according to the mode of being of the dynamical interpretant comes *before *the one according to the mode of presentation of the immediate interpretant, I am simply suggesting the following. - A sympathetic is always a hypothetic (EG is an unattached spot). - A percussive can be either a hypothetic or a categorical (EG has one line of identity). - A usual can be a hypothetic, a categorical, or a relative (EG has two or more lines of identity). The upshot here is not as clear, at least until we also look at what I believe is the *next* division of signs, according to the nature of the influence of the sign, which corresponds to its relation with the final interpretant--term/seme, proposition/pheme, or argument/delome. Sticking with the traditional names ... - A term can be a hypothetic (monadic), a categorical (dyadic), or a relative (triadic or higher). - A proposition can be either a categorical (involving two monadic terms) or a relative (involving at least one dyadic or higher term). - An argument is always a relative (involving two or more propositions). Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Wed, Apr 22, 2020 at 8:32 AM <[email protected]> wrote: > Jon, I think we agree on the continuity of the process of semiosis, but I > find it as difficult to get interested in the minute semiotic analysis of > it as it is for you to get interested in how the whole experiential process > is embodied in the brain (or other biological quasi-mind). So I only have > one small suggestion to offer. You wrote, “This combination requires the > trichotomy for the final interpretant to come *before *the other two, as > it does in my logical order of determination, rather than *after *them, > as it does in Robert's.” It seems to me that the final interpretant (like a > final cause) operates over a longer time-scale than the other two — which > would imply that its mode of being “comes” *both* before and after them. > > > > Gary f. >
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