Jon, List I always thought that the most peircean of the classifications of sciences was this one :
*Mathematics* the study of ideal constructions without reference to their real existence, -Empirics, the study of phenomena with the purpose of identifying their forms with those *mathematics* has studied, -Pragmatics, the study of how we ought to behave in the ligth of the truths of empirics."(NEM, vol.IV, p. 1122) and you ? Le mar. 28 avr. 2020 à 03:25, Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com> a écrit : > John, List: > > We are indeed on the same page here, and my emphasis on *exist* was quite > intentional. I believe that it is precisely because Plato--or at least, > the philosophy that bears his name--advocates the *existence *of forms > that Peirce considers him to be a nominalist. > > Mathematical/logical "existence" is obviously not synonymous with > metaphysical/ontological existence, defined by Peirce as "react[ing] with > the other like things in the environment" (CP 6.495, c. 1906). On my > reading, Peirce was a mathematical *realist, *but not a mathematical > Platonist any more than he was a metaphysical Platonist. He defines > mathematics as "the study of what is true of hypothetical states of > things" (CP 4.233, 1902), rather than the study of abstract objects that > supposedly exist in some immaterial realm. > > Regards, > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > > On Mon, Apr 27, 2020 at 10:11 AM John F. Sowa <s...@bestweb.net> wrote: > >> Jon, List >> >> I'd like to point out that sometimes I agree with one of Jon's notes. I >> believe that Peirce's three "universes of discourse" constitute the best >> resolution of the debates between Plato and Aristotle: the universe of >> pure possibilities (mathematics); the universe of actuality (everything in >> space and time); and the universe of necessitants (the laws of nature, >> which govern the development of actuality). Plato said that the first and >> third were really real. Aristotle emphasized the second. Peirce said that >> all three are real. That point is consistent with what Jon wrote below. >> >> Unfortunately, I must also add a "but" about the following sentence: "They >> are thus *real *possibilities (1ns), but not forms that *exist *in some >> immaterial realm." >> >> The universe of possibilities is an immaterial realm, and mathematicians >> use existential quantifiers when writing about the mathematical patterns >> (forms) in it. >> >> John >> _________________________________ >> I agree that Peirce was not at all a Platonist, but nevertheless uses the >> expression "Platonic idea" in a peculiar way. The passages that come to my >> mind are where he describes Platonic ideas as the constituents of the first >> universe of experience. >> >> CSP: Some words shall herein be capitalized when used, not as >> vernacular, but as terms defined. Thus, an "idea" is the substance of an >> actual unitary thought or fancy; but "Idea,"--nearer Plato's idea of >> *ἰδέα*,--denotes anything whose Being consists in its mere capacity for >> getting fully represented, regardless of any person's faculty or impotence >> to represent it. ... >> Of the three Universes of Experience familiar to us all, the first >> comprises all mere Ideas, those airy nothings to which the mind of poet, >> pure mathematician, or another *might *give local habitation and a name >> within that mind. Their very airy-nothingness, the fact that their Being >> consists in mere capability of getting thought, not in anybody's Actually >> thinking them, saves their Reality. (CP 6.452&455, EP 2:434&435, 1908) >> >> They are thus *real *possibilities (1ns), but not forms that *exist *in >> some immaterial realm. >> Regards, >> >> Jon Alan Schmidt > >
----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
