Gary R., List: I wrote the first part of this reply Sunday evening and intended to post it to the List, but discovered today that I inadvertently sent it only to Gary R. That gave me a chance to append a few additional thoughts.
Thanks for accepting my correction in the spirit intended. My only further comment for now is that in my own speculative grammar, while I indeed consider signs to be iconic/indexical/symbolic rather than pure icons/indices/symbols, by contrast I view terms/propositions/arguments as sharply distinguished. In other words, every sign is *either *a term, a proposition, or an argument. As I recently summarized, every argument *involves *multiple propositions, and every proposition *involves *multiple terms. - A term can be a hypothetic (monadic), a categorical (dyadic), or a relative (triadic or higher). - A proposition can be either a categorical (involving two monadic terms) or a relative (involving at least one dyadic or higher term). - An argument is always a relative (involving two or more propositions). Moreover, I currently hold that the minimum of *real *semeiosis is a continuous argument--"any process of thought reasonably tending to produce a definite belief" (CP 6.456, EP 2:435, 1908)--while discrete propositions and terms are *artificial *creations for describing it in retrospect as "proceeding upon definitely formulated premisses" (ibid). CSP: Practically, when a man endeavors to state what the process of his thought has been, after the process has come to an end, he first asks himself to what conclusion he has come. That result he formulates in an assertion, which, we will assume, has some sort of likeness,--I am inclined to think only a very conventionalized one,--with the attitude of his thought at the cessation of the motion. That having been ascertained, he next asks himself how he is justified in being so confident of it; and he proceeds to cast about for a sentence expressed in words which shall strike him as resembling some previous attitude of his thought, and which at the same time shall be logically related to the sentence representing his conclusion, in such a way that if the premiss-proposition be true, the conclusion-proposition necessarily or naturally would be true. That argument is a representation of the last part of his thought, so far as its logic goes, that is, that the conclusion would be true supposing the premiss is so. But the self-observer has absolutely no warrant whatever for assuming that that premiss represented an attitude in which thought remained stock-still, even for an instant. … Adopting that idea, the logical argument only represents the last part of thought, for the reason that it supposes a premiss which represents some attitude of thought which can only have resulted from thinking. (CP 2.27, 1902) CSP: [A]n Argument is no more built up of Propositions than a motion is built up of positions. So to regard it is to neglect the very essence of it. ... Just as it is strictly correct to say that nobody is ever in an exact Position (except instantaneously, and an Instant is a fiction, or *ens rationis*), but Positions are either vaguely described states of motion of small range, or else (what is the better view), are *entia rationis* (i.e. fictions recognized to be fictions, and thus no longer fictions) invented for the purposes of closer descriptions of states of motion; so likewise, Thought (I am not talking Psychology, but Logic, or the essence of Semeiotics) cannot, from the nature of it, be at rest, or be anything but inferential process; and propositions are either roughly described states of Thought-motion, or are artificial creations intended to render the description of Thought-motion possible; and Names are creations of a second order serving to render the representation of propositions possible. (R 295:117-118[102-103], 1906) In other words, we do not *construct *arguments from propositions, we *prescind *propositions from arguments. CSP: I have maintained since 1867 that there is but one primary and fundamental logical relation, that of illation, expressed by *ergo*. A proposition, for me, is but an argumentation divested of the assertoriness of its premiss and conclusion. This makes every proposition a conditional proposition at bottom. In like manner a "term," or class-name, is for me nothing but a proposition with its indices or subjects left blank, or indefinite. ... This doctrine, which is in harmony with the above theory of signs, gives a great unity to logic ... (CP 3.440, 1896) In existential graphs, the scroll corresponds to the "one primary and fundamental logical relation, that of illation," which is why the cut (or shading) for negation is derived from it rather than the other way around (CP 4.454-456, 1903; CP 4.564n, c. 1906). It is evident that "every proposition [is] a conditional proposition at bottom" from the fact that any EG is equivalent to the same EG in the inner close of a scroll with an empty outer close. I look forward to receiving your feedback on this, as well as on my other recent posts. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Sun, Apr 26, 2020 at 5:33 PM Gary Richmond <[email protected]> wrote: > Jon, Helmut, List, > > Jon wrote: > > JAS: At level 2, the sign is the first correlate (1) of a genuine triadic > relation, while the object is the second correlate (2) and the interpretant > is the third correlate (3). However, *the second and third trichotomies > of Peirce's famous 1903 taxonomy are not divisions according to the object > and interpretant **themselves, but rather their relations **with the sign* (CP > 2.242-243, EP 2:290-291, 1903); this is my only quibble with Gary > R.'s response earlier today, which is otherwise excellent. Arranging them > logically in a linear order and applying the rule of determination (EP > 2:481,1908) results in the familiar 10 classes of signs. [Emphasis added by > GR] > > > Thank you for your favorable response to my post. I was, however, a bit > taken aback by your "quibble" above that "the second and third > trichotomies of Peirce's famous 1903 taxonomy are not divisions according > to the object and interpretant *themselves*, but rather their *relations *with > the sign." > > I was just about to furiously plunge into my CP and EP, esp. the former > which I recalled had sections titled something like "A Second Trichotomy" > and "A Third Trichotomy" where I was sure my analysis would be supported. > But then, a fraction of a moment later, I thought, of course Jon is right, > and that is why, for example, I "corrected" Peirce's "*Dicent* Indexical > Sinsign " to read "Dicent(*ic*) Indexical Sinsign." For, indeed, the > adjectival form of the 2nd and 3rd trichotomies better shows their *relations > *to the sign when naming its class, the sign itself always expressed in a > noun. > > So in describing trichotomic sign classes, although Peirce didn't > consistently do so, it seems better to characterize each sign -- as to the > 2nd and 3rd trichotomies -- as iconic, indexical, or symbolic; and > rhematic, dicentic, or argumentative (although one never sees the very last > one, 'argumentative', for the obvious reason that only one of the 10 > classes of signs *is* an Argument. > > Indeed, it has been argued, correctly I think, that there are no pure > icons, indices, or symbols. The status of arguments, propositions, and > terms would seem to be somewhat more problematic until you consider that *as > *signs they are all legisigns. > > I hope to have more to say in regard to your other recent posts, but won't > get to that today. Meanwhile, thanks for your correction. > > Best, > > Gary R > > "Time is not a renewable resource." gnox > *Gary Richmond* > *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* > *Communication Studies* > *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* >
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