Helmut, List: As I have noted previously, the "special role" of the sign is *doing *the representing or mediating, which is why it is the *first *correlate of the genuine triadic relation. The sign *represents *its object to its interpretant. The sign *mediates *between its object and its interpretant. On the other hand, the object *determines* the sign to *determine* the interpretant. Peirce's own formulation is not quite as succinct, but hints at Gary F.'s excellent explanation <http://www.gnusystems.ca/TS/css.htm#x04> of what determination means in this context.
CSP: ... a sign is anything, of whatsoever mode of being, which mediates between an object and an interpretant; since it is both determined by the object *relatively to the interpretant*, and determines the interpretant *in reference to the object*, in such wise as to cause the interpretant to be determined by the object through the mediation of this "sign." The object and the interpretant are thus merely the two correlates of the sign; the one being antecedent, the other consequent of the sign. (EP 2:410, 1907) Semeiosis is thus a generalization of *logical *sequence--it always proceeds in one irreversible direction, from the object (antecedent) through the sign to the interpretant (consequent), conforming to Gary R.'s aptly named categorial vector <https://arisbe.sitehost.iu.edu/menu/library/aboutcsp/richmond/trikonic.htm> of *determination *(2ns→1ns→3ns). Likewise, *temporal* sequence always proceeds in one irreversible direction, from the past through the present to the future. However, this does not entail causal *determinism*, which Peirce usually calls "necessitarianism" and quite vociferously opposes. While "the mode of the Past is that of Actuality" and the present is "the Nascent State of the Actual," the future "is not Actual ... but is either Necessary or Possible, which are of the same mode" (CP 5.459-462, EP 2:357-359, 1905). Moreover, the reality of spontaneity as affirmed by Peirce's tychism entails that the necessities of the future are *conditional*, not inevitable. As a result, the ongoing evolution of our existing universe conforms to Gary R.'s categorial vector of *process *(1ns→3ns→2ns)--from being absolutely indeterminate in the infinite past, when everything would have been in the future, toward being absolutely determinate in the infinite future, when everything would be in the past. These are *ideal* states of things, not *actual* states of things, and in the meantime ... CSP: Between these, we have on our side a state of things in which there is some absolute spontaneity counter to all law, and some degree of conformity to law, which is constantly on the increase owing to the growth of *habit*. (CP 8.317, 1891) The overall state of things is always becoming *more *determinate, and cannot ever become *less* determinate again. In other words, the "one *individual*, or completely determinate, state of things, namely, the all of reality" (CP 5.549, EP 2:378, 1906) is perpetually *growing *as indeterminate possibilities (1ns) and conditional necessities (3ns) of the future are constantly becoming determinate actualities (2ns) of the past. CSP: The very being of the General, of Reason, consists in its governing individual events. So, then, the essence of Reason is such that its being never can have been completely perfected. It always must be in a state of incipiency, of growth. … This development of Reason consists, you will observe, in embodiment, that is, in manifestation. The creation of the universe, which did not take place during a certain busy week, in the year 4004 B.C., but is going on today and never will be done, is this very development of Reason. (CP 1.615, EP 2:255, 1903) Hence Peirce anticipated what is now widely known as the *growing block* theory of time, in which the past and the present exist but not the future. In fact, he evidently viewed it as following directly from his synechism--"If all things are continuous, the universe must be undergoing a continuous growth from non-existence to existence" (CP 1.175, c. 1893). Regards, Jon S. On Tue, Apr 28, 2020 at 1:59 AM Helmut Raulien <[email protected]> wrote: > Jon, List, > > if the object needs the sign to determine the interpretant through it, > doesnt the sign then have a kind of special role, compared with the other > two characters? So I thought, the representing-triad is different from > normal triadic relations, in which there is not one character necessarily > more essential than the other two, e.g.: > "A gives B to C" = "C receives B from A" = "B passes to C through A"? Here > you have a transitivity in each of the three versions, while in the > representing-triad you only have it with "the object determines the > interpretant through the sign", but not with "the object determines the > sign". Or is it the same, because you may say: "The object determines the > sign in order to get an interpretant"? > > Best, > > Helmut > 28. April 2020 um 03:36 Uhr > "Jon Alan Schmidt" <[email protected]> > wrote: > Helmut, List: > > It just seems jarring to say that the sign *consists *of itself, the > object, and the interpretant. Rather, the sign *consists *only of > itself, and stands in a genuine triadic *relation* with the object and > the interpretant. If we must give a name to this relation, then for the > sake of clarity I advocate "representing" or "mediating," rather than > "sign" (or "sign triad") since that is already the name of one of its > correlates. Admittedly, "sign relation" appears quite a bit in the > secondary literature, but as far as I know, Peirce himself never uses that > term. > > Again, the dyadic relation of the object to the interpretant is not really > a "missing link," it is simply the *same *as the dyadic relation of the > object to the sign. The object determines the interpretant *through* the > sign, which is why the overall relation is *genuinely* triadic--it cannot > be reduced to *any* mere combination of the dyadic relations that it > involves. > > Regards, > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > > On Mon, Apr 27, 2020 at 11:24 AM Helmut Raulien <[email protected]> wrote: > >> Edwina, Jon, List, >> >> I guess the contradictions base partly on terms. That you, Jon, said, >> that "these three are distinct correlates", I would agree, in your (and >> maybe Peirce´s) use of terms. They are distinct, because they are not >> spatiotemporally composed. A dynamic object can be light years away and in >> the far past. I have subsumed it under "composition", in the sense of >> functional composition, not spatiotemporal composition, but the term >> "functional composition" is by me, not by Peirce. I guess it is the same >> like your (and Peirce´s) "correlation". The reason for me to subsume this >> under "composition" was, to have a distinction between composition and >> classification, or between a composition and a class. I use this >> distinction to show, that in a composition a whole triadicity (the levels I >> have written about) is there, but in a class not. To the distinction >> between composition and classification I was inspired by Stanley N. Salthe >> (I cannot find the name of the paper now). >> >> What I call "functional composition" is a complete or triadic function >> consisting of other functions. In a sign triad, only the sign is such a >> triadic functional composition, as it consists of three functions >> (correlates, including the sign itself), but the object is not, as it does >> not have an interpretant correlation. I was guessing that this "missing >> link", as I have once called it, between the object and the interpretant is >> somehow the reason for complexity. Otherwise, I guess, if all three >> correlates were equally connected with each other, there just would be a >> static sponge-like structure with normal logic of relations. >> >> Because in this functional composition a sign consists of itself plus >> the other two correlates, or functional parts, as I would call them, I >> assumed, that in a functional composition, other than in a spatiotemporal >> one, such a thing is possible, which I had called "re-entry": Something >> consisting of itself plus other things. Whether or not this has to do with >> Spencer-Brown´s "re-entry", I am not sure. >> >> But there is a lot of guessing and not-ready thoughts or assumptions in >> my way of seeing it. >> >> Best, >> Helmut >> >
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