Auke, Gary F., List: I think it is clear by now that we indeed have different purposes for our analyses, and I continue to believe that this is why we reach different conclusions, which are not necessarily conflicting such that someone must be "wrong." Auke's stated purpose is "to semiotically analyze the process of interpreting signs that offer themselves for interpretation." Gary F.'s stated purpose is to analyze "a semiosic process going on in a single brain." My purpose is to analyze the process of semeiosis *in general*, admittedly a much more abstract pursuit--which is why I describe my project as falling within speculative (i.e., theoretical) grammar, rather than a special science such as communication theory or neurobiology.
When I say that in my speculative grammar there are *exactly three* interpretants (immediate/dynamical/final), I am talking about the analysis of an *individual* sign token. Its immediate interpretant is what any token of the same type *possibly could* signify to someone acquainted with the system of signs to which it belongs. Its dynamical interpretant is what this particular token *actually does* signify to someone on this particular occasion. Its final interpretant is what any token of any type of the same sign *necessarily would* signify to someone under ideal circumstances, in the ultimate opinion after infinite inquiry by an infinite community. I suggest that these three levels of knowledge and associated habits of interpretation correspond at least roughly to the states of information that Peirce respectively called *essential*, *informed*, and *substantial * (CP 2.409, 1867; CP 4.67, 1893). AvB: The object of the collection of qualisigns is the sign that offers itself for interpretation. The object of the pure icon you are writing about has the collection of qualisigns as its object. The object of the pure sinsign is the actually inhering of the qualisign/icon combination in my sheet of semiosis (or mind if you wish) as its object. The index glues icon and sinsign together. By being indexically connected the sinsign icon may have the legisign as its interpretant (this depends on whether the sign that has to be interpreted is familiar or not), while the iconic sinsign has the rheme as its interpretant. The legisign has the sinsign icon as its object and the symbol as its interpretant. The Rheme has the icon sinsign as its object and the symbol as its interpretant. To be honest, none of this makes much sense to me, which is not to say that it is incorrect--again, I suspect that it simply reflects my different purpose, different standpoint, and different overall way of thinking. For example, my speculative grammar does not include qualisigns at all, for the reason that I already stated--a quality in itself cannot *represent *something else as its object, it can only *present *itself. Instead, I consider tones to be qualities *of tokens* that can affect the dynamical interpretant that it determines--voice inflections, punctuation marks, font changes for emphasis, etc. Moreover, the object of a sign is not necessarily another sign, and the object of an interpretant is always the same as the object of the sign that determines it. In my speculative grammar, the immediate object of a *term *is what any token of the same type *possibly could* denote to someone with the requisite collateral experience in the past (for descriptives) or collateral observation in the present (for designatives); while the dynamical object is what a particular token *actually does* denote on a particular occasion, whether a quality (for abstractives) or a thing (for concretives). The immediate object of a *proposition *or an* argument *is "the logical universe of discourse" (CP 2.323, EP 2:283, 1903), which is the collection of the immediate objects of the terms that it involves; while the dynamical object is "the universe of all universes" (CP 5.506, c. 1905), which is "the totality of all real objects" (CP 5.152, EP 2:209, 1903). AvB: And here we see why besides the immediate, dynamical and final interpetant, we need interpretants like the intentional, effectual and communicational/cominterpretant if we want to understand and discuss communication as an open ended process. Fair enough, but I see a distinction between the (exactly three) different *kinds* of interpretants that every individual sign token *must *have (immediate/dynamical/final) and three different *functions* that these interpretants *can *have (intentional/effectual/communicational) within the specific context of communication. In other words, for me they are not different interpretants, but rather the *same* interpretants as characterized from different analytical perspectives. AvB: By the way, the effectual interpretant in effect is not a habit change but the resolution of doubt into belief. In my view, since a belief is a habit, "the resolution of doubt into belief" *is *a habit-change. In my speculative grammar, the final interpretant of any term is *association*, which is a habit of *feeling*; the final interpretant of any proposition is *belief*, which is a habit of *conduct*; and the final interpretant of any argument is *persuasion*, which is a *habit-change*. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Thu, Apr 30, 2020 at 7:15 AM <[email protected]> wrote: > I frogot one indication of the person writing. So, this one reads better > and has one typo corrected. > > ---------- Oorspronkelijk bericht ---------- > Van: [email protected] > Aan: Peirce-L <[email protected]> > Datum: 30 april 2020 om 12:39 > Onderwerp: Fwd: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: tree-structure > > Jon Alen, > > Op 30 april 2020 om 3:09 schreef Jon Alan Schmidt < > [email protected]>: > Auke, List: > > JAS: I remain reluctant to classify any *real * signs as pure icons, > indices, or symbols. Consider these comments by Peirce. > > You sneek in a restrictive claus: 'real' signs, see for comparison the > sentence to which I responded > > JAS: while I indeed consider signs to be iconic/indexical/symbolic rather > than pure icons/indices/symbols, > > Next you go on to elaborate on the part I agreed with all along, i.e. the > iconic/indexical/symbolic part: > > JAS cites: > > CSP: It will be observed that the icon is very perfect in respect to > signification, bringing its interpreter face to face with the very > character signified. For this reason, it is the mathematical sign par > excellence. But in denotation it is wanting. It gives no assurance that any > such object as it represents really exists. The index on the other hand > does this most perfectly, actually bringing to the interpreter the > experience of the very object denoted. But it is quite wanting in > signification unless it involves an iconic part. (EP 2:307, 1904) > > So, this part only wastes time. > > Next, you delete the rationale behind my remark: > > re: I think we need to consider them from both angles. If we deal with > interpretation processes we need the pure ones. The are needed to cover the > apprehension of the sign as an object, the sign copy stage that we have > virtually to go through before the meaning and effect of the sign develop > themselves in a given interpreter. > > And continu your response as if I had written pure icons are real signs: > A pure icon would signify something without denoting anything, while a > pure index would denote something without signifying anything. In other > words, a pure icon would have an interpretant but no object, while a pure > index would have an object but no interpretant. By definition, a sign has > *both > *denotation and signification--a genuine triadic relation with *both *an > object and an interpretant--so no *real* sign is a pure icon or a pure > index. suppose that a quality in itself as a *possible * form (1ns), > not *actually * inhering in any matter (2ns), could be considered a pure > icon. However, in my view it cannot be a *sign* , because it cannot > *represent > * something else as its object; it can only *present* itself. Moreover, > every *real * index "involves an iconic part" and every *real* symbol > involves both indexical and iconic parts. > > RE: AvB: > > Note that I did not write 'pure icon signs', but 'pure icons'. We need > 'pure icons' and 'pure indexes' if we want to semiotically analyze the > process of interpreting signs that offer themselves for interpretation. As > Lizska I regard this as a process of translation running, in analytical > mode, from qualisigns to a responsive sign type. Just a shot indication of > that translational process. > The object of the collection of qualisigns is the sign that offers itself > for interpretation. The object of the pure icon you are writing about has > the collection of qualisigns as its object. The object of the pure sinsign > is the actually inhering of the qualisign/icon combination in my sheet of > semiosis (or mind if you wish) as its object. The index glues icon and > sinsign together. By being indexically connected the sinsign icon may have > the legisign as its interpretant (this depends on whether the sign that has > to be interpreted is familiar or not), while the iconic sinsign has the > rheme as its interpretant. The legisign has the sinsign icon as its object > and the symbol as its interpretant. The Rheme has the icon sinsign as its > object and the symbol as its interpretant. If the goals, the situation and > the background knowledge of parties communicating, in short if the intended > and the effectual interpretant are the same (cominterpretant), then it is > to be expexted that the dynamical interpretant and the symbol are in > harmony and that the sign will reach its intended effect. If however the > dynamical interpretant (effectual interpretant) and the symbol (intended > interpretant) differ, the conversation goes in a direction that is not > intended. For a sign type we have sign aspects that together constitute > the type, for the translation process, the aspects function as signs > themselves, not real signs as the types, but virtual signs in the process > of interpretation often covered by habits, but not always and, also, not > always the habits of both parties are the same. > > Note that the qualisign/icon combination is needed in order to explain > optical illusions (and faulty readings of signs) like the old/young woman > image, i.e. the very same collection of qualisigns may be taken as two > different icons, depending on the legisign that is activated by the > qualisigns. You can switch between icons but not see them at the same time. > > AvB: The intensional interpretant (avb t typo in intensional) may be an > argument, but the effectual interpretant may take this argument as a term > that enters another process. A friend gets a stroke, after weeks you visit > him. He starts talking and gives an argument in favor of the lock down > (which he knows you opposed). Since you are curious about the damage done > by the stroke, you do not take the argument as it is intended to be, > instead you take the whole argument as a term, that, as indexically > connected with the utterer, proves to be a proposition, that enters an > argument with the conclusion: At first sight the damage at the least is > limited. > > JAS respons: > In this example, I would identify the friend's argument as the sign token > being analyzed, not the intentional interpretant or any other > interpretant. Instead, the intentional interpretant is the effect that my > friend *intends *the argument to have on me, and which it *necessarily > would *have on me under ideal circumstances (from my friend's > perspective)--i.e., the final interpretant--which is presumably the > habit-change of supporting the lockdown (new belief) rather than opposing > it (old belief). The effectual interpretant is the effect that the > argument *actually does *have on me on this occasion--i.e., the dynamical > interpretant--which is the habit-change of adopting the new belief that the > damage from the stroke is limited. > > re AVB: The friends intentional interpretant is the interpretant the > friend wants me to consider and preferably to adopt. Not the sign token, > that is just the means about which both interpreters agree. > And here we see why besides the immediate, dynamical and final > interpetant, we need interpretants like the intentional, effectual and > communicational/cominterpretant if we want to understand and discuss > communication as an open ended process. If two interpreters argue, the very > same sign token may lead to different results (intended vs effectual). In > the restricted view of sience those issues are resolved by trying to reach > a cominterpretant as a final interpretant (in the indefinite future) for > the issue at hand. But that does not cover all semeiotic processes. > > By the way, the effectual interpretant in effect is not a habit change but > the resolution of doubt into belief. Doubt: since it is known that a stroke > sometimes has a devastating effect and sometimes leaves almost no traces, I > wonder the effects the stroke had on my friend. > > What I wonder about. You deny the need for more than three interpretants, > but in your response you use more than three. I don't blame you for that, > since in my opinion more are needed in order to make sense of semeiosis as > a social process, as in this case they are needed in explanations for > divergent interpretation processes in exchanges between two people. In this > case indeed the sign token forks the interpretation processes into its > branches. > Why denial on the one hand and use in the other? > > To put my impression bluntly. All material substances can be devided > according to a simple scheme: 1. inanimate 2. animated immobile 3. animated > mobile. But, if we want to look in more detail, like a biological > morphologist, this cannot cover all kind of differences in internal and > external structure. So, (s)he coins new terms to cover those differences. > Next, some critical person pops up and states: "all phenomena can be > understood by this basic distinction in three". Next the biologists gives > some example of structural differences in and between classes. The critical > person takes each example specimen of the classes and states: x is > inanimate, y is animate immobile and z id animate mobile. See, I am right, > the division in three is all we need. > That is, what you, in my opinion do, if you state: there are only three > different interpretants. > > I see that you skipped the compositionality vs the service rendered issue > with regard to terms, props and arguments. > > JAS: In other words, we do not *construct *arguments from propositions, > we *prescind *propositions from arguments. > AvB: I like this one very much! Much more powerful then my mumbling about > input - output relations that are habitual, about which I talk in analysis > mode. > > JAS: > I am glad that we have found something on which we can agree. I also want > to acknowledge that different analyses--even of the same phenomena--often > have different purposes, and reach different conclusions accordingly. I do > not wish to create the wrong impression that I think my analysis is "right" > and others are "wrong," they are just different. > > AvB: With regard to Shorts and my devisions of interpretants, I agree that > they just differ, i.e. follow from the point of view, i.e. Short > concentrates on sign types, I concentrate on interpretation processes in > interactions, and I can imagine ways to bring the two approaches together. > But, with regard to the questions about the total number of interpretants > needed one is right, the other wrong. Not just different. > > Best, > > Auke > >
----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
