Gary F. John, list,
Gary, I agree. But think you are to hard on John.
It does make sense to look at a token. I did it multiple times with art
students, comparing two stages in their design process, sign aspect after sign
aspect. Always with the qustion: why is the latter better, then the former
looked at from the goal described in the brief (what do I want to realize?).
the context pops up automatically in the analyzis. I learned a lot about
semiotics, by learning about the differences between the tokens.
For instance. Someone connected sooner with meaning or the semantical level,
than with communication or the pragmatic and social levels, may be expected to
formulate from that perspective. It's an application of what you said.
Best,
Auke
> Op 1 mei 2020 om 15:32 schreef [email protected]:
>
>
> Jon, I guess I’d better restate my point about semiotic “analysis” as
> simply as I can:
>
> First, in the real world there is no disembodied mind and no disembodied
> semiosis. Hence there is no context-free semiosis. Analysis of an instance
> of semiosis, whether that instance is observed or merely imagined, must take
> the context of that instance into account in order to explain how that actual
> process of semiosis works.
>
> I quoted an example of semiosis which Peirce analyzed: a bit of
> conversation with his wife. That was an example of communicative semiosis,
> and he analyzed it accordingly. If, as you said, you do not find that
> analysis helpful, i think it's because you are trying to construct a
> context-free analysis, based on an abstract mathematical schema. I just don't
> see how that kind of analysis serves any pragmatic purpose.
>
> In that same post i gave another example, this time of perceptual
> semiosis, which is embodied quite differently from communicational semiosis.
> This is the one you were referring to when you wrote that “Gary F.'s stated
> purpose is to analyze "a semiosic process going on in a single brain."” — as
> if that were the only kind of semiosic process I had in mind. That was a
> misreading on your part. The point I was trying to make, the (unstated)
> purpose of my post, was to make the rather simple assertion that the
> component parts of a semiosic process will naturally vary somewhat depending
> on the context of that process (communication, perception, deductive
> inference, etc.) You on the other hand think that the variations in Peirce’s
> terms for “the three interpretants” represent his experimenting with
> different naming schemes for a triad of interpretants which are always the
> same regardless of the context of the semiosis. That, and not a difference of
> “stated purposes,” is the difference between our views in this exchange. (Of
> course I can’t speak for Auke on this matter.) When you talk about “the
> analysis of an individual sign token” I really have no idea what you’re
> talking about.
>
> Gary f.
>
>
>
> From: Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]>
> Sent: 30-Apr-20 21:31
> To: [email protected]
> Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Different Semeiotic Analyses (was tree-structure)
>
>
>
> Auke, Gary F., List:
>
>
>
> I think it is clear by now that we indeed have different purposes for our
> analyses, and I continue to believe that this is why we reach different
> conclusions, which are not necessarily conflicting such that someone must be
> "wrong." Auke's stated purpose is "to semiotically analyze the process of
> interpreting signs that offer themselves for interpretation." Gary F.'s
> stated purpose is to analyze "a semiosic process going on in a single brain."
> My purpose is to analyze the process of semeiosis in general, admittedly a
> much more abstract pursuit--which is why I describe my project as falling
> within speculative (i.e., theoretical) grammar, rather than a special science
> such as communication theory or neurobiology.
>
>
>
> When I say that in my speculative grammar there are exactly three
> interpretants (immediate/dynamical/final), I am talking about the analysis of
> an individual sign token. Its immediate interpretant is what any token of
> the same type possibly could signify to someone acquainted with the system of
> signs to which it belongs. Its dynamical interpretant is what this
> particular token actually does signify to someone on this particular
> occasion. Its final interpretant is what any token of any type of the same
> sign necessarily would signify to someone under ideal circumstances, in the
> ultimate opinion after infinite inquiry by an infinite community. I suggest
> that these three levels of knowledge and associated habits of interpretation
> correspond at least roughly to the states of information that Peirce
> respectively called essential, informed, and substantial (CP 2.409, 1867; CP
> 4.67, 1893).
>
>
>
> > >
> > AvB: The object of the collection of qualisigns is the sign that
> > offers itself for interpretation. The object of the pure icon you are
> > writing about has the collection of qualisigns as its object. The object of
> > the pure sinsign is the actually inhering of the qualisign/icon combination
> > in my sheet of semiosis (or mind if you wish) as its object. The index
> > glues icon and sinsign together. By being indexically connected the sinsign
> > icon may have the legisign as its interpretant (this depends on whether the
> > sign that has to be interpreted is familiar or not), while the iconic
> > sinsign has the rheme as its interpretant. The legisign has the sinsign
> > icon as its object and the symbol as its interpretant. The Rheme has the
> > icon sinsign as its object and the symbol as its interpretant.
> >
> > >
>
>
> To be honest, none of this makes much sense to me, which is not to say
> that it is incorrect--again, I suspect that it simply reflects my different
> purpose, different standpoint, and different overall way of thinking. For
> example, my speculative grammar does not include qualisigns at all, for the
> reason that I already stated--a quality in itself cannot represent something
> else as its object, it can only present itself. Instead, I consider tones to
> be qualities of tokens that can affect the dynamical interpretant that it
> determines--voice inflections, punctuation marks, font changes for emphasis,
> etc.
>
>
>
> Moreover, the object of a sign is not necessarily another sign, and the
> object of an interpretant is always the same as the object of the sign that
> determines it. In my speculative grammar, the immediate object of a term is
> what any token of the same type possibly could denote to someone with the
> requisite collateral experience in the past (for descriptives) or collateral
> observation in the present (for designatives); while the dynamical object is
> what a particular token actually does denote on a particular occasion,
> whether a quality (for abstractives) or a thing (for concretives). The
> immediate object of a proposition or an argument is "the logical universe of
> discourse" (CP 2.323, EP 2:283, 1903), which is the collection of the
> immediate objects of the terms that it involves; while the dynamical object
> is "the universe of all universes" (CP 5.506, c. 1905), which is "the
> totality of all real objects" (CP 5.152, EP 2:209, 1903).
>
>
>
> > >
> > AvB: And here we see why besides the immediate, dynamical and
> > final interpetant, we need interpretants like the intentional, effectual
> > and communicational/cominterpretant if we want to understand and discuss
> > communication as an open ended process.
> >
> > >
>
>
> Fair enough, but I see a distinction between the (exactly three)
> different kinds of interpretants that every individual sign token must have
> (immediate/dynamical/final) and three different functions that these
> interpretants can have (intentional/effectual/communicational) within the
> specific context of communication. In other words, for me they are not
> different interpretants, but rather the same interpretants as characterized
> from different analytical perspectives.
>
>
>
> > >
> > AvB: By the way, the effectual interpretant in effect is not a
> > habit change but the resolution of doubt into belief.
> >
> > >
>
>
> In my view, since a belief is a habit, "the resolution of doubt into
> belief" is a habit-change. In my speculative grammar, the final interpretant
> of any term is association, which is a habit of feeling; the final
> interpretant of any proposition is belief, which is a habit of conduct; and
> the final interpretant of any argument is persuasion, which is a habit-change.
>
>
>
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