Jon Alan, List, I think that by now our discussion about interpretants has been carried trough to a sufficient degree. In the sense that the respective positions have been clarified as far as possible and no further gain is to be expected.
Yust one note about doubt supposed to be a habit. The method to resolve doubt can be called a habit (tenacity, etc.). But doubt itself is a secondness, a resistance, just like a tooth ache. Somewhere in the semiotic fabric a door proved shut and an interpretation process couldn't be completed satisfactory. Semiotics provides a strategy to systematically inspect the process and indicate where the obstruction resides and what to look for as a remedy. I only consider one subject deserving further discussion: qualisigns. It surprises me that you omit them. JAS: For example, my speculative grammar does not include qualisigns at all, for the reason that I already stated--a quality in itself cannot represent something else as its object, it can only present itself. --- As a side remark I wrote "collection of qualities" and not just "quality". You hit the hammer on the nail! Exactly. The question is: To what do they present themselves? In analysis mode continuing. Collections of qualisigns present themselves to an interpreting thought in development, by being taken as a sign for some object. - I use the stages Sarbo and farkas introduced- First step is sorting, i.e. It gets severed from the interpreting sheet by appearing as a one time (with an indefinite beginning and end, etc.) iconic form (icon aspect, collection of qualities) written on the sheet (sinsign aspect). Next comes abstraction. The form proves (un)familiar to the sheet (legisign aspect or doubt), but the completion of the process also depend on the interpretative interpretational possibilities a (un)familiar form offers to this sheet (Rheme aspect). By the way. I always regarded Claudio's nonagons to deal with this rhematic aspect. In short and incomplete: Take the Bense diagramm of the 9 sign aspects. Take something you are interested in. Claudio has a very nice one on color. Put color in the index position and start pondering color from the point of view of the different sign aspects. Like KiF, it is like doing a sudoku. A fascinating feat is the possibility to drill down in each field in order to arrange the items you found. In KiF you only drill down in the index position, in order to explicates the sub-processes, needed for completion of the process. Next completion. The legisign may be indexically connected with a symbol, like for example 'horse'. Lets just stick to part of a lexicon as rhematic possibilities of the sign and take 1. an animal and 2. a gymnastics device. Depending on the context the sheet is in, one of these possibilities (only potentially present) will surface (dynamical interpretant aspect). If the habit fits the situation, we have a satisfying result. As a side result, the normal interpretant gets strenghtend. How could we arive there, if the qualisigns did not present themselves? it is of interest to note that already in 1868 Peirce remarked that `[. . . ] in no instant in my state of mind there is cognition or representation, but in the relation of different instants there is.' [...] the immediate (and therefore in itself insusceptible of mediation -the Unanalyzable, the Inexplicable, the Unintellectual ) runs in a continuous stream through our lives. W. II, p. 22730 The step from stating that the unanalyzable runs in a coninuous stream through our lives, to the statement that qualisigns enter the interpretational process by emerging on the Semiotic Sheet as an sinsign/icon adressing rheme and legisign, is not that great. In box-x, the model Peirce created to generate the 16 booleans. First step take an x and put 00, 10, 10 and 11 in the 4 compartments. Step 2, repeat step one in each section, prefix the value we already have in that compartment. Let FFFF express the unintellectual, the unknowable that runs in a continuous stream through our lives (qualisigns) And let TTTT express all that can possibly be expressed by a sign, whether true or false in any assumed universe. Over and against any cognition, there is an unknown but knowable reality; but over against all possible cognition, there is only the selfcontradictory. Writings II, p. 208 hen, box-x can be regarded as expressing what is logically involved in the process that runs from doubt to belief. Rotate the diamond and we get the Bense diagram, with qualisigns at the FFFF position and TTTT at the argument position and we established a link with the work of Claudio. Rotate again to its original position and we have KiF with the sign aspects on the nodes. >From the point of view of architectonics here we have a nice example of how >logic and semiotic are related. The former delivering the principles, the >latter the matter. Phaneroscopy inbetween, only covering the apprehension of >the sign as an object, or probably better, it covers the proces that takes the >collection of qualities as a sign. Here resides one reason why I propose to distinghuis an alpha, beta and gamma part of semiotics. Box-x is a relation between the Booleans and the small classification. It is to be expected that what the Welby classification adds, works, so to speak, as a modifier on the nodes. As step 2 in Box-x did. Bernard Moran has a nice book about the relation between the Small and the Welby classification highly relevant for this point. Best, Auke > Op 1 mei 2020 om 3:31 schreef Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com>: > > Auke, Gary F., List: > > I think it is clear by now that we indeed have different purposes for our > analyses, and I continue to believe that this is why we reach different > conclusions, which are not necessarily conflicting such that someone must be > "wrong." Auke's stated purpose is "to semiotically analyze the process of > interpreting signs that offer themselves for interpretation." Gary F.'s > stated purpose is to analyze "a semiosic process going on in a single brain." > My purpose is to analyze the process of semeiosis in general, admittedly a > much more abstract pursuit--which is why I describe my project as falling > within speculative (i.e., theoretical) grammar, rather than a special science > such as communication theory or neurobiology. > > When I say that in my speculative grammar there are exactly three > interpretants (immediate/dynamical/final), I am talking about the analysis of > an individual sign token. Its immediate interpretant is what any token of > the same type possibly could signify to someone acquainted with the system of > signs to which it belongs. Its dynamical interpretant is what this > particular token actually does signify to someone on this particular > occasion. Its final interpretant is what any token of any type of the same > sign necessarily would signify to someone under ideal circumstances, in the > ultimate opinion after infinite inquiry by an infinite community. I suggest > that these three levels of knowledge and associated habits of interpretation > correspond at least roughly to the states of information that Peirce > respectively called essential, informed, and substantial (CP 2.409, 1867; CP > 4.67, 1893). > > > > > AvB: The object of the collection of qualisigns is the > sign that offers itself for interpretation. The object of the pure icon you > are writing about has the collection of qualisigns as its object. The object > of the pure sinsign is the actually inhering of the qualisign/icon > combination in my sheet of semiosis (or mind if you wish) as its object. The > index glues icon and sinsign together. By being indexically connected the > sinsign icon may have the legisign as its interpretant (this depends on > whether the sign that has to be interpreted is familiar or not), while the > iconic sinsign has the rheme as its interpretant. The legisign has the > sinsign icon as its object and the symbol as its interpretant. The Rheme has > the icon sinsign as its object and the symbol as its interpretant. > > > > > > To be honest, none of this makes much sense to me, which is not to say > that it is incorrect--again, I suspect that it simply reflects my different > purpose, different standpoint, and different overall way of thinking. For > example, my speculative grammar does not include qualisigns at all, for the > reason that I already stated--a quality in itself cannot represent something > else as its object, it can only present itself. Instead, I consider tones to > be qualities of tokens that can affect the dynamical interpretant that it > determines--voice inflections, punctuation marks, font changes for emphasis, > etc. > > Moreover, the object of a sign is not necessarily another sign, and the > object of an interpretant is always the same as the object of the sign that > determines it. In my speculative grammar, t he immediate object of a term is > what any token of the same type possibly could denote to someone with the > requisite collateral experience in the past (for descriptives) or collateral > observation in the present (for designatives); while the dynamical object is > what a particular token actually does denote on a particular occasion, > whether a quality (for abstractives) or a thing (for concretives). The > immediate object of a proposition or an argument is "the logical universe of > discourse" (CP 2.323, EP 2:283, 1903), which is the collection of the > immediate objects of the terms that it involves; while the dynamical object > is "the universe of all universes" (CP 5.506, c. 1905), which is "the > totality of all real objects" (CP 5.152, EP 2:209, 1903). > > > > > AvB: And here we see why besides the immediate, > dynamical and final interpetant, we need interpretants like the intentional, > effectual and communicational/cominterpretant if we want to understand and > discuss communication as an open ended process. > > > > > > Fair enough, but I see a distinction between the (exactly three) > different kinds of interpretants that every individual sign token must have > (immediate/dynamical/final) and three different functions that these > interpretants can have (intentional/effectual/communicational) within the > specific context of communication . In other words, for me they are not > different interpretants, but rather the same interpretants as characterized > from different analytical perspectives. > > > > > AvB: By the way, the effectual interpretant in effect is > not a habit change but the resolution of doubt into belief. > > > > > > In my view, since a belief is a habit, "the resolution of doubt into > belief" is a habit-change. In my speculative grammar, the final interpretant > of any term is association, which is a habit of feeling; the final > interpretant of any proposition is belief, which is a habit of conduct; and > the final interpretant of any argument is persuasion, which is a habit-change. > > Regards, > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran > Laymanhttp://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt > -http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > > On Thu, Apr 30, 2020 at 7:15 AM < a.bree...@chello.nl > mailto:a.bree...@chello.nl > wrote: > > > > > > I frogot one indication of the person writing. So, this one reads > > better and has one typo corrected. > > > > > -------- Oorspronkelijk bericht ---------- > Van: a.bree...@chello.nl mailto:a.bree...@chello.nl > Aan: Peirce-L < peirce-l@list.iupui.edu > mailto:peirce-l@list.iupui.edu > > Datum: 30 april 2020 om 12:39 > Onderwerp: Fwd: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: tree-structure > > Jon Alen, > > Op 30 april 2020 om 3:09 schreef Jon Alan Schmidt > <jonalanschm...@gmail.com mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com >: > > Auke, List: > > JAS: I remain reluctant to classify any real signs as pure icons, > indices, or symbols. Consider these comments by Peirce. > > You sneek in a restrictive claus: 'real' signs, see for > comparison the sentence to which I responded > > JAS: while I indeed consider signs to be > iconic/indexical/symbolic rather than pure icons/indices/symbols, > > Next you go on to elaborate on the part I agreed with all along, > i.e. the iconic/indexical/symbolic part: > > JAS cites: > > CSP: It will be observed that the icon is very perfect in > respect to signification, bringing its interpreter face to face with the very > character signified. For this reason, it is the mathematical sign par > excellence. But in denotation it is wanting. It gives no assurance that any > such object as it represents really exists. The index on the other hand does > this most perfectly, actually bringing to the interpreter the experience of > the very object denoted. But it is quite wanting in signification unless it > involves an iconic part. (EP 2:307, 1904) > > So, this part only wastes time. > > Next, you delete the rationale behind my remark: > > re: I think we need to consider them from both angles. If we deal > with interpretation processes we need the pure ones. The are needed to cover > the apprehension of the sign as an object, the sign copy stage that we have > virtually to go through before the meaning and effect of the sign develop > themselves in a given interpreter. > > And continu your response as if I had written pure icons are real > signs: > > A pure icon would signify something without denoting anything, > while a pure index would denote something without signifying anything. In > other words, a pure icon would have an interpretant but no object, while a > pure index would have an object but no interpretant. By definition, a sign > has both denotation and signification--a genuine triadic relation with both > an object and an interpretant--so no real sign is a pure icon or a pure > index. suppose that a quality in itself as a possible form (1ns), not > actually inhering in any matter (2ns), could be considered a pure icon. > However, in my view it cannot be a sign , because it cannot represent > something else as its object; it can only present itself. Moreover, every > real index "involves an iconic part" and every real symbol involves both > indexical and iconic parts. > > > RE: AvB: > Note that I did not write 'pure icon signs', but 'pure icons'. We > need 'pure icons' and 'pure indexes' if we want to semiotically analyze the > process of interpreting signs that offer themselves for interpretation. As > Lizska I regard this as a process of translation running, in analytical mode, > from qualisigns to a responsive sign type. Just a shot indication of that > translational process. > The object of the collection of qualisigns is the sign that > offers itself for interpretation. The object of the pure icon you are writing > about has the collection of qualisigns as its object. The object of the pure > sinsign is the actually inhering of the qualisign/icon combination in my > sheet of semiosis (or mind if you wish) as its object. The index glues icon > and sinsign together. By being indexically connected the sinsign icon may > have the legisign as its interpretant (this depends on whether the sign that > has to be interpreted is familiar or not), while the iconic sinsign has the > rheme as its interpretant. The legisign has the sinsign icon as its object > and the symbol as its interpretant. The Rheme has the icon sinsign as its > object and the symbol as its interpretant. If the goals, the situation and > the background knowledge of parties communicating, in short if the intended > and the effectual interpretant are the same (cominterpretant), then it is to > be expe! xted that the dynamical interpretant and the symbol are in harmony and that the sign will reach its intended effect. If however the dynamical interpretant (effectual interpretant) and the symbol (intended interpretant) differ, the conversation goes in a direction that is not intended. For a sign type we have sign aspects that together constitute the type, for the translation process, the aspects function as signs themselves, not real signs as the types, but virtual signs in the process of interpretation often covered by habits, but not always and, also, not always the habits of both parties are the same. > > Note that the qualisign/icon combination is needed in order to > explain optical illusions (and faulty readings of signs) like the old/young > woman image, i.e. the very same collection of qualisigns may be taken as two > different icons, depending on the legisign that is activated by the > qualisigns. You can switch between icons but not see them at the same time. > > AvB: The intensional interpretant (avb t typo in intensional) > may be an argument, but the effectual interpretant may take this argument as > a term that enters another process. A friend gets a stroke, after weeks you > visit him. He starts talking and gives an argument in favor of the lock down > (which he knows you opposed). Since you are curious about the damage done by > the stroke, you do not take the argument as it is intended to be, instead you > take the whole argument as a term, that, as indexically connected with the > utterer, proves to be a proposition, that enters an argument with the > conclusion: At first sight the damage at the least is limited. > > JAS respons: > In this example, I would identify the friend's argument as the > sign token being analyzed, not the intentional interpretant or any other > interpretant. Instead, the intentional interpretant is the effect that my > friend intends the argument to have on me, and which it necessarily would > have on me under ideal circumstances (from my friend's perspective)--i.e., > the final interpretant--which is presumably the habit-change of supporting > the lockdown (new belief) rather than opposing it (old belief). The > effectual interpretant is the effect that the argument actually does have on > me on this occasion--i.e., the dynamical interpretant--which is the > habit-change of adopting the new belief that the damage from the stroke is > limited. > > re AVB: The friends intentional interpretant is the interpretant > the friend wants me to consider and preferably to adopt. Not the sign token, > that is just the means about which both interpreters agree. > And here we see why besides the immediate, dynamical and final > interpetant, we need interpretants like the intentional, effectual and > communicational/cominterpretant if we want to understand and discuss > communication as an open ended process. If two interpreters argue, the very > same sign token may lead to different results (intended vs effectual). In > the restricted view of sience those issues are resolved by trying to reach a > cominterpretant as a final interpretant (in the indefinite future) for the > issue at hand. But that does not cover all semeiotic processes. > > By the way, the effectual interpretant in effect is not a habit > change but the resolution of doubt into belief. Doubt: since it is known that > a stroke sometimes has a devastating effect and sometimes leaves almost no > traces, I wonder the effects the stroke had on my friend. > > What I wonder about. You deny the need for more than three > interpretants, but in your response you use more than three. I don't blame > you for that, since in my opinion more are needed in order to make sense of > semeiosis as a social process, as in this case they are needed in > explanations for divergent interpretation processes in exchanges between two > people. In this case indeed the sign token forks the interpretation processes > into its branches. > Why denial on the one hand and use in the other? > > To put my impression bluntly. All material substances can be > devided according to a simple scheme: 1. inanimate 2. animated immobile 3. > animated mobile. But, if we want to look in more detail, like a biological > morphologist, this cannot cover all kind of differences in internal and > external structure. So, (s)he coins new terms to cover those differences. > Next, some critical person pops up and states: "all phenomena can be > understood by this basic distinction in three". Next the biologists gives > some example of structural differences in and between classes. The critical > person takes each example specimen of the classes and states: x is inanimate, > y is animate immobile and z id animate mobile. See, I am right, the division > in three is all we need. > That is, what you, in my opinion do, if you state: there are only > three different interpretants. > > I see that you skipped the compositionality vs the service > rendered issue with regard to terms, props and arguments. > > JAS: In other words, we do not construct arguments from > propositions, we prescind propositions from arguments. > AvB: I like this one very much! Much more powerful then my > mumbling about input - output relations that are habitual, about which I talk > in analysis mode. > > JAS: > I am glad that we have found something on which we can agree. I > also want to acknowledge that different analyses--even of the same > phenomena--often have different purposes, and reach different conclusions > accordingly. I do not wish to create the wrong impression that I think my > analysis is "right" and others are "wrong," they are just different. > > AvB: With regard to Shorts and my devisions of interpretants, I > agree that they just differ, i.e. follow from the point of view, i.e. Short > concentrates on sign types, I concentrate on interpretation processes in > interactions, and I can imagine ways to bring the two approaches together. > But, with regard to the questions about the total number of > interpretants needed one is right, the other wrong. Not just different. > > Best, > > Auke > > ----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
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