John, List: I appreciate the frank recognition in the last sentence below that I am *not *"claiming to be a better semeiotician than Peirce was," simply by virtue of reaching a few different conclusions about semeiotic than he did. Likewise, I would never suggest that someone was claiming to be a better logician than Peirce was, simply by virtue of reaching a few different conclusions about logic than he did. After all, we agree that Peirce considered *every *theory of *every *science to be fallible, and scrupulously applied that principle to his own ideas; all the more so in semeiotic, where he explicitly described himself as "a pioneer, or rather a backwoodsman, in the work of clearing and opening up" that field (CP 5.488, EP 2:413, 1907).
Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Sun, May 3, 2020 at 9:21 AM John F. Sowa <[email protected]> wrote: > Edwina and Jon, > > Induction always begins with data -- a set of observations about some > subject. By finding analogies and commonalities among the observations, it > derives a probable hypothesis about the subject matter. Further testing is > necessary to increase the probability and generalize the hypothesis to a > wider range of phenomena. > > If the observations are about nature, the hypothesis is the starting point > for some law of science. If the observations are about some text, the > hypothesis is a starting point for some textual criticism. > > ET> I was saying that developing a strictly formal and textual argument > about reality... > > My suggested continuation of that line: "requires data from new > observations of reality." > > JAS> As with any scientific inquiry, in speculative grammar we employ > retroduction to formulate hypotheses, deduction to explicate them, and > induction to evaluate them. > > That is a worthy goal. But the data required for any theory of > speculative grammar must ultimately come from experiences in the phaneron. > If the only source of data is from texts by Peirce, your theory cannot go > beyond what Peirce said. > > JAS> "Constant references to the text" are a valid inductive method for > testing hypotheses about the text itself, as well as hypotheses about the > views of the author as expressed in the text. > > That is a project in textual criticism. It can be used to clarify what > Peirce was saying, but it cannot go beyond what Peirce said. In order to > develop a version of speculative grammar that adds something new, it's > essential to find new data. You must do your own phaneroscopy -- you must > analyze experiences in your own phaneron according to the methodology that > Peirce defined. > > If you don't do that, you cannot claim to have added anything beyond what > Peirce said. If your conclusion differs from his in any way, you are > claiming to be a better semeiotican than Peirce was. And frankly, I don't > believe that you are. > > John >
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