Jon Alan Schmidt wrote: In my view--and evidently Peirce's, as well (CP 2.219-226, EP 2:263-366, 1903)--consistent terminology fosters greater clarity, especially when comparing results from different fields that "are talking about the same [or similar] processes." [And we can and should] mutually strive to maintain "a general agreement concerning the use of terms and of notations,--not too rigid, yet prevailing with most of the co-workers in regard to most of the symbols, to such a degree that there shall be some small number of different systems of expression that have to be mastered" (CP 2.220, EP 2:263).
I couldn't agree more; it is my view as well. In a word, in science including scientific philosophy, at least as Peirce conceived of it (which, of course, includes rather centrally, logic as semeiotic), we need to know *what we're talking about*, to employ the colloquial expression, as we discuss matters among ourselves within, especially, but also in our postmodern era, across disciplines. This is a central tenet of Peirce's *Ethics of Terminology *which I believe we are at communicational hazard to ignore. Best, Gary "Time is not a renewable resource." gnox *Gary Richmond* *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* *Communication Studies* *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* On Sat, May 2, 2020 at 9:10 PM Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]> wrote: > Edwina, List: > > As with any scientific inquiry, in speculative grammar we employ > retroduction to formulate hypotheses, deduction to explicate them, and > induction to evaluate them. I admittedly tend to concentrate mainly on the > first two steps, but still proceed to the third one at times; e.g., to > explain why I find certain logical orderings of the ten trichotomies (or > subsets thereof) more plausible than others. > > "Constant references to the text" are a valid inductive method for testing > hypotheses *about *the text itself, as well as hypotheses about the views > of the author as *expressed *in the text. For example, descriptions of > "the logical and pragmatic infrastructure of the Peircean framework" > require textual support in order to warrant the claim that the > infrastructure and framework in question are indeed recognizably Peircean. > > In my view--and evidently Peirce's, as well (CP 2.219-226, EP 2:263-366, > 1903)--consistent terminology fosters greater clarity, especially when > comparing results from different fields that "are talking about the same > [or similar] processes." Obviously none of us are in a position to *impose > *a particular lexicon on others, but we can still mutually strive to > maintain "a general agreement concerning the use of terms and of > notations,--not too rigid, yet prevailing with most of the co-workers in > regard to most of the symbols, to such a degree that there shall be some > small number of different systems of expression that have to be mastered" > (CP 2.220, EP 2:263). > > Regards, > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > > On Sat, May 2, 2020 at 8:19 AM Edwina Taborsky <[email protected]> wrote: > >> List >> >> My question about 'pure theorizing' so to speak, also arises from the >> quote below: >> >> "Now the whole process of development among the community of students of >> those formulations by abstractive observation and reasoning of the truths >> which must hold good of all signs used by a scientific intelligence is >> an observational science, like any other positive science, notwithstanding >> its strong contrast to all the special sciences which arises from its >> aiming to find out what must be and not merely what is in the actual >> world. (CP 2.227, c. 1897; my emphasis] >> >> My question is - with reference to these abstract theories - how does >> one know that the theory has any validity? >> >> After all - since mankind's emergence- we have had multiple theories >> about our reality - most of which have a logical basis, are reasonably >> coherent and yet - have no capacity other than their own insistence and our >> acceptance - to move out of a pure Argument and into the real world of >> Secondness and explain what is going on in this real world. >> >> As Peirce noted - even pure abstract theorizing is an 'observational >> science' and therefore, must be grounded in contextual reality. The >> contextual reality can't be constant references to the text - ie, the >> Peircean texts, for this is merely a circular argument - but has to be >> within the real world. >> >> My second concern is that, if we focus on the real world and our theories >> about how it operates, then, I think we have to acknowledge that we can use >> different words and terms for these actions. That is - many different >> research disciplines are exploring this real world - and their vocabulary >> differs - even though they are talking about the same processes! Therefore >> - I think that the Peircean world should not reject the research of other >> disciplines merely because the terms are different. The analysis is dealing >> with the very same processes - and it can be shown that the logical and >> pragmatic infrastructure of the Peircean framework is similar to that of >> these other disciplines. >> >> Edwina >> >
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