Edwina, List: As with any scientific inquiry, in speculative grammar we employ retroduction to formulate hypotheses, deduction to explicate them, and induction to evaluate them. I admittedly tend to concentrate mainly on the first two steps, but still proceed to the third one at times; e.g., to explain why I find certain logical orderings of the ten trichotomies (or subsets thereof) more plausible than others.
"Constant references to the text" are a valid inductive method for testing hypotheses *about *the text itself, as well as hypotheses about the views of the author as *expressed *in the text. For example, descriptions of "the logical and pragmatic infrastructure of the Peircean framework" require textual support in order to warrant the claim that the infrastructure and framework in question are indeed recognizably Peircean. In my view--and evidently Peirce's, as well (CP 2.219-226, EP 2:263-366, 1903)--consistent terminology fosters greater clarity, especially when comparing results from different fields that "are talking about the same [or similar] processes." Obviously none of us are in a position to *impose *a particular lexicon on others, but we can still mutually strive to maintain "a general agreement concerning the use of terms and of notations,--not too rigid, yet prevailing with most of the co-workers in regard to most of the symbols, to such a degree that there shall be some small number of different systems of expression that have to be mastered" (CP 2.220, EP 2:263). Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Sat, May 2, 2020 at 8:19 AM Edwina Taborsky <[email protected]> wrote: > List > > My question about 'pure theorizing' so to speak, also arises from the > quote below: > > "Now the whole process of development among the community of students of > those formulations by abstractive observation and reasoning of the truths > which must hold good of all signs used by a scientific intelligence is an > observational science, like any other positive science, notwithstanding its > strong contrast to all the special sciences which arises from its aiming > to find out what must be and not merely what is in the actual world. (CP > 2.227, c. 1897; my emphasis] > > My question is - with reference to these abstract theories - how does one > know that the theory has any validity? > > After all - since mankind's emergence- we have had multiple theories about > our reality - most of which have a logical basis, are reasonably coherent > and yet - have no capacity other than their own insistence and our > acceptance - to move out of a pure Argument and into the real world of > Secondness and explain what is going on in this real world. > > As Peirce noted - even pure abstract theorizing is an 'observational > science' and therefore, must be grounded in contextual reality. The > contextual reality can't be constant references to the text - ie, the > Peircean texts, for this is merely a circular argument - but has to be > within the real world. > > My second concern is that, if we focus on the real world and our theories > about how it operates, then, I think we have to acknowledge that we can use > different words and terms for these actions. That is - many different > research disciplines are exploring this real world - and their vocabulary > differs - even though they are talking about the same processes! Therefore > - I think that the Peircean world should not reject the research of other > disciplines merely because the terms are different. The analysis is dealing > with the very same processes - and it can be shown that the logical and > pragmatic infrastructure of the Peircean framework is similar to that of > these other disciplines. > > Edwina >
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