List: I am repeating my post below from a few weeks ago with a new subject heading, because it seems to have gotten lost in the flurry of responses to the one on semeiotic that I sent a couple of hours later, which by now has spawned several subsequent threads. If it is actually just a case where no one had anything to say about it, then never mind. :-)
Thanks, Jon S. On Sat, Apr 11, 2020 at 2:17 PM Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]> wrote: > Robert, List: > > Thank you for sharing this very interesting paper. The "podium" diagram > strikes me as an effective representation of the relations among Peirce's > three categories, although his term was "involution" rather than > "presupposition"--3ns *involves *2ns, which *involves *1ns. > Coincidentally, I have been thinking about modes of being along similar > lines recently, since "Metaphysics consists in the results of the absolute > acceptance of logical principles not merely as regulatively valid, but as > truths of being" (CP 1.487, c. 1896). > > CSP: Just as the logical verb with its signification reappears in > metaphysics as a Quality, an ens having a Nature as its mode of being, and > as a logical individual subject reappears in metaphysics as a Thing, an ens > having Existence as its mode of being, so the logical reason, or premise, > reappears in metaphysics as a Reason, an ens having a Reality, consisting > in a ruling both of the outward and of the inward world, as its mode of > being. The being of the quality lies wholly in itself, the being of the > thing lies in opposition to other things, the being of the reason lies in > its bringing qualities and things together. (CP 1.515, c. 1896) > > > Applying this to the "podium" diagram, 1=essence, 2=existence, and > 3=reality. What about the inner portions? I suggest that 1/2=inherence, > 2/3=persistence, and 1/2/3=governance. > > In NEM 4:292-300 (1904), Peirce adapts Aristotelian terminology to discuss > the categories--form for 1ns, matter for 2ns, and entelechy for 3ns. He > describes form as "whatever it is in itself, irrespective of anything else" > (1=essence), matter as "all that it is in reference to something else than > itself" (2=existence), and entelechy as "that which brings things together" > (3=reality). He goes on to distinguish three relations--"the determination > of Matter by Form" (1/2=inherence), "the reaction of Matter with Matter" > (2=existence), and "a determination of a Matter to a Form" > (1/2/3=governance). The first and third quotes reflect two subtly > different meanings of "determination" as explained on page 12 of your > paper. > > In CP 1.175 (c. 1893), Peirce states, "The reality [3] of things [2] > consists in their persistent forcing themselves upon our recognition. ... > Reality, then, is persistence [2/3], is regularity." Vincent Colapietro > helpfully spells this out further in his 1989 book, *Peirce's Approach to > the Self: A Semiotic Perspective on Human Subjectivity*. > > VC: Existence is the mode of being of an individual substance considered > as a continuity of *reactions*; insofar as it is *actually *reacting > against other things, it exists. Persistence is the mode of being of such a > substance seen as a *continuity *of reactions; insofar as it endures > throughout a series of reactions, it persists. In other words, existence > (because it is an instance of opposition) designates the aspect of > secondness exhibited by any individual substance, while persistence > (because it is a case of continuity) designates one of the ways in which it > manifests thirdness. (p. 83) > > > Based on my immersion in Peirce's writings about time lately, another > candidate for 1/2/3 is diversity--the *realization *of different states > of things at different determinations of time, which involves both > persistent things (2/3) and changing qualities (1/2/3). Peirce describes > two different classes of possible states of things that may be realized at > a lapse of time--*prolonged *states, which are realized at any instant > within a lapse; and *gradual *states, which are realized only at an > entire lapse during which a change occurs from one prolonged state to > another, these two states being "logically incompossible" (see NEM > 3:1074-1077, c.1905). Such diversity requires *real *qualities to be > continuous (1/2/3), rather than isolated (1), and *real *things to > persist (2/3), not merely exist (2). > > CSP: Time with its continuity logically involves some other kind of > continuity than its own. Time, as the universal form of change, cannot > exist unless there is something to undergo change [2/3] and to undergo a > change continuous in time there must be a continuity of changeable > qualities [1/2/3]. (CP 6.132, EP 1:323, 1892) > > > This is one specific sense in which all three categories are always > present within our existing universe. > > CSP: I chiefly insist upon continuity, or Thirdness, and, in order to > secure to thirdness its really commanding function, I find it indispensable > fully [to] recognize that it is a third, and that Firstness, or chance, and > Secondness, or Brute reaction, are other elements, without the independence > of which Thirdness would not have anything upon which to operate. (CP > 6.202, 1898) > > > Regards, > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > >>
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