Robert, List, Robert wrote:
RM: I spent a year extracting all the definitions of the sign that Peirce could have imagined and I was not disappointed since I found 76; they're on peirce.org. I have taken this effort when I realized the incredible number of scholars who thought in a non-critical way about the definition of the sign they attributed to Peirce. In particular, I have seen impossible triangles and confusions, especially with the Saussurian tradition, with the conceptions of Hjemslev and in the end of Greimas and his Ecole de Paris. It would have taken a titanic job to denounce all distortions, fanciful borrowings and undue annexations. That was certainly time *very* well spent by you! I know of no Peirce scholar who isn't aware of your list of Peirce's 76 definitions of 'sign', and many who have referenced it in their own work. I myself have read through it several times over the years. It is surely a major contribution, especially since, as you commented, there were any "number of scholars who thought in a non-critical way about the definition of the sign they attributed to Peirce." Your scholarship has certainly contributed to dispelling the many "distortions, fanciful borrowings and undue annexations" regarding Peirce's semeiotic. I sometimes think, how much better Peirce's semeiotic might today be known, understood, further developed and applied, had it not been for Sassurean thinking having taken hold and rooting itself so deeply in Continental thinking for most of the 20th century; and, as a consequence, drawing attention away from Peirce's triadic semeiotic, distorting it with Sassurean concepts and language, dyadic and nominalistic thinking, etc. To some extent it seems to me that that remains the case to this very day. Shifting to an entirely different topic prompted by your most recent off-list email to me (I'm afraid the math in it, as the American English idiom has it, was "above my pay grade"), a question which has come upon the list before, albeit infrequently, concerns the conceptual relationship between Peirce's trichotomic category theory and contemporary mathematical category theory if any. What, may I ask, are your thoughts about that? Best, Gary R "Time is not a renewable resource." gnox *Gary Richmond* *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* *Communication Studies* *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* On Tue, May 5, 2020 at 6:19 AM Robert Marty <[email protected]> wrote: > Gary, Jon Alan, List > > I fully respect yours concerns and of course it is clear that everyone can > invest them in the podium that is quite honored. For the part concerning me > I see no difficulty in using "involution" rather than "presupposition" and > I do not think I have strayed too far from Peirce with "presupposition" > since I think I have shown on the basis of Frege's definition that the > relationships of determination between the elements of the phenomena as > stated by Peirce verified this assertion. For I just need to inscribe the > abstract arrows of the mathematical object that I build "*without > reference to their real existence",** within* Peirce's empirical > discourse. C.S. Peirce, 1976: NEM, vol. IV, 1122 : > > *"It is obvious that a Possible cannot determine anything other than a > Possible, and likewise a Necessitant cannot be determined by anything other > than a Necessitant** " *( letter to Lady Welby of December 23, 1908) > > I understood very early on that I had to trace a personal path in what > J.M. Chevalier quite rightly called "Le continent peircien" ( > https://www.academia.edu/3383353/La_d%C3%A9couverte_du_continent_peircien) > but by justifying at every step a very close and verifiable proximity to > the fundamental conceptions of phaneroscopy and semiotics. And when we > received in Perpignan the MS microfilms that we had ordered from the > Harvard Library (32 reels of 100m each - 3.2 km!) I don't regret my > decision ... I spent a year extracting all the definitions of the sign that > Peirce could have imagined and I was not disappointed since I found 76; > they're on peirce.org. I have taken this effort when I realized the > incredible number of scholars who thought in a non-critical way about the > definition of the sign they attributed to Peirce. In particular, I have > seen impossible triangles and confusions, especially with the Saussurian > tradition, with the conceptions of Hjemslev and in the end of Greimas and > his Ecole de Paris. It would have taken a titanic job to denounce all > distortions, fanciful borrowings and undue annexations. > > A practical consequence is that I have not acquired the skill to discuss > the relevance of the intellectual investments that can be made on the > podium. Let me reveal the picture came to mind when I read Jon Alan's first > and almost immediate reaction above; it is not derogatory: I saw a child > jumping from level 3 on the steps of the podium and I imagined all the > possible choices he could make to get down. Obviously there are 10 and even > there are 6 in the inner cylinder 3 in the outside cylinder and only 1 > outside the two cylinders. To each his obsessions! Since this (dynamic) > image no longer leaves my mind because I wonder if it does not open another > way to go to the lattice of the classes of signs that would not go through > the constraints of purely algebraic formalization. I think about it often > ... > > Best regards > > Robert > > Le mar. 5 mai 2020 à 06:04, Gary Richmond <[email protected]> a > écrit : > >> Jon, Robert, List, >> >> I began a draft response to your post, Jon, shortly after you wrote it, >> but things began to move so quickly on the list that my initial thoughts >> soon seemed to be superseded in the rapid fire exchanges following. So I am >> glad that you reposted it as it gives me another chance to respond (*if* >> I can complete it soon enough not to lose it again as things move on). >> >> I certainly agree with Jon that your paper, Robert, is most interesting >> and that your podium diagram effectively represents the relations holding >> among the three categories. But I also agree with you, Jon, >> that 'involution' is not only Peirce's term, but indeed expresses the >> concept of the logical relations holding among the categories more >> accurately than does 'presupposition', really optimally. I would very >> slightly modify Jon's expression of these involutional relations: 3ns >> *involves *2ns *and* 1ns; 2ns *involves *1ns. >> >> JAS: Applying this to the "podium" diagram, 1=essence, 2=existence, and >> 3=reality. What about the inner portions? I suggest that 1/2=inherence, >> 2/3=persistence, and 1/2/3=governance. >> >> GR: I think that inherence, persistence and governance make good >> terminological sense in consideration of "the inner portions" of the podium >> based on CP 1.175. But as I see it the Aristotelian terminology of NEM >> 4:292-300, "form for 1ns, matter for 2ns, and entelechy for 3ns" is >> potentially misleading, especially if we forget that for Peirce 'form' is, >> as you commented, Jon, "whatever it is in itself, irrespective of >> anything else/" (1=essence), matter as "all that it is in reference to >> something else than itself" (2=existence), and entelechy as "that which >> brings things together" (3=reality)." >> >> In short, I see no reason to employ the Aristotelian terminology, loaded >> as it is with pre-Peircean notions especially of form. 'Matter' and >> 'entelechy' fare somewhat better, but still bring with them the >> Aristotelian associations. I think that it is possible and desirable to >> move beyond these in Peircean scholarship. >> >> Indeed, I found it helpful to my own understanding to substitute Peirce's >> terms for Aristotle's in distinguishing the inner relations. So: "the >> determination of "[the existent] by [essence]" (1/2=inherence), "the >> reaction of [existent] with [existent] " (2=existence), and "a >> determination of [an existent] to [an essential form]" >> (1/2/3=governance). >> >> Jon, your quoting Colapietro helped clarify the following, I think, truly >> important notion: that "reality, is *persistence*, is regularity (or, >> persistence *in/as* regularity?). >> >> VC: Existence is the mode of being of an individual substance considered >> as a continuity of *reactions*; insofar as it is *actually *reacting >> against other things, it exists. Persistence is the mode of being of such a >> substance seen as a *continuity *of reactions; insofar as it endures >> throughout a series of reactions, it persists. In other words, existence >> (because it is an instance of opposition) designates the aspect of >> secondness exhibited by any individual substance, while persistence >> (because it is a case of continuity) designates one of the ways in which it >> manifests thirdness. (Vincent Colapietro, *Peirce's Approach to the >> Self: A Semiotic Perspective on Human Subjectivity,* 83). >> >> >> In a word, 'persistence' is the existential form of continuity. >> >> JAS: Peirce describes two different classes of possible states of things >> that may be realized at a lapse of time--*prolonged **states*, which are >> *realized >> at any instant within a lapse; *and *gradual **states**, which are >> realized only at an entire lapse during which a change occurs from one >> **prolonged >> state** to another*, these two states being "logically incompossible" >> (see NEM 3:1074-1077, c.1905). Such diversity requires *real *qualities >> to be continuous (1/2/3), rather than isolated (1), and *real *things to >> persist (2/3), not merely exist (2). (*Boldface* and *underlining *as >> emphasis added by GR.) >> >> To repeat: In a nutshell, real *qualities* are *continuous* (not >> isolated); real *things* persist (not just exist). >> >> I expect to spend more time reflecting on the following quotations (which >> I've read numerous times over the years) and your succinct comment which >> separates them. >> >> >> CSP: Time with its continuity logically involves some other kind of >> continuity than its own. Time, as the universal form of change, cannot >> exist unless there is something to undergo change [2/3] and to undergo a >> change continuous in time there must be a continuity of changeable >> qualities [1/2/3]. (CP 6.132, EP 1:323, 1892) >> >> >> JAS: This is one specific sense in which all three categories are always >> present within our existing universe. >> >> CSP: I chiefly insist upon continuity, or Thirdness, and, in order to >> secure to thirdness its really commanding function, I find it indispensable >> fully [to] recognize that it is a third, and that Firstness, or chance, and >> Secondness, or Brute reaction, are other elements, without the independence >> of which Thirdness would not have anything upon which to operate. (CP >> 6.202, 1898) >> >> >> Best, >> >> Gary >> >> "Time is not a renewable resource." gnox >> >> *Gary Richmond* >> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* >> *Communication Studies* >> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> On Mon, May 4, 2020 at 9:24 PM Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]> >> wrote: >> >>> List: >>> >>> I am repeating my post below from a few weeks ago with a new subject >>> heading, because it seems to have gotten lost in the flurry of responses to >>> the one on semeiotic that I sent a couple of hours later, which by now has >>> spawned several subsequent threads. If it is actually just a case where no >>> one had anything to say about it, then never mind. :-) >>> >>> Thanks, >>> >>> Jon S. >>> >>> On Sat, Apr 11, 2020 at 2:17 PM Jon Alan Schmidt < >>> [email protected]> wrote: >>> >>>> Robert, List: >>>> >>>> Thank you for sharing this very interesting paper. The "podium" >>>> diagram strikes me as an effective representation of the relations among >>>> Peirce's three categories, although his term was "involution" rather than >>>> "presupposition"--3ns *involves *2ns, which *involves *1ns. >>>> Coincidentally, I have been thinking about modes of being along similar >>>> lines recently, since "Metaphysics consists in the results of the absolute >>>> acceptance of logical principles not merely as regulatively valid, but as >>>> truths of being" (CP 1.487, c. 1896). >>>> >>>> CSP: Just as the logical verb with its signification reappears in >>>> metaphysics as a Quality, an ens having a Nature as its mode of being, and >>>> as a logical individual subject reappears in metaphysics as a Thing, an ens >>>> having Existence as its mode of being, so the logical reason, or premise, >>>> reappears in metaphysics as a Reason, an ens having a Reality, consisting >>>> in a ruling both of the outward and of the inward world, as its mode of >>>> being. The being of the quality lies wholly in itself, the being of the >>>> thing lies in opposition to other things, the being of the reason lies in >>>> its bringing qualities and things together. (CP 1.515, c. 1896) >>>> >>>> >>>> Applying this to the "podium" diagram, 1=essence, 2=existence, and >>>> 3=reality. What about the inner portions? I suggest that 1/2=inherence, >>>> 2/3=persistence, and 1/2/3=governance. >>>> >>>> In NEM 4:292-300 (1904), Peirce adapts Aristotelian terminology to >>>> discuss the categories--form for 1ns, matter for 2ns, and entelechy for >>>> 3ns. He describes form as "whatever it is in itself, irrespective of >>>> anything else" (1=essence), matter as "all that it is in reference to >>>> something else than itself" (2=existence), and entelechy as "that which >>>> brings things together" (3=reality). He goes on to distinguish three >>>> relations--"the determination of Matter by Form" (1/2=inherence), "the >>>> reaction of Matter with Matter" (2=existence), and "a determination of a >>>> Matter to a Form" (1/2/3=governance). The first and third quotes reflect >>>> two subtly different meanings of "determination" as explained on page 12 of >>>> your paper. >>>> >>>> In CP 1.175 (c. 1893), Peirce states, "The reality [3] of things [2] >>>> consists in their persistent forcing themselves upon our recognition. ... >>>> Reality, then, is persistence [2/3], is regularity." Vincent Colapietro >>>> helpfully spells this out further in his 1989 book, *Peirce's Approach >>>> to the Self: A Semiotic Perspective on Human Subjectivity*. >>>> >>>> VC: Existence is the mode of being of an individual substance >>>> considered as a continuity of *reactions*; insofar as it is *actually >>>> *reacting >>>> against other things, it exists. Persistence is the mode of being of such a >>>> substance seen as a *continuity *of reactions; insofar as it endures >>>> throughout a series of reactions, it persists. In other words, existence >>>> (because it is an instance of opposition) designates the aspect of >>>> secondness exhibited by any individual substance, while persistence >>>> (because it is a case of continuity) designates one of the ways in which it >>>> manifests thirdness. (p. 83) >>>> >>>> >>>> Based on my immersion in Peirce's writings about time lately, another >>>> candidate for 1/2/3 is diversity--the *realization *of different >>>> states of things at different determinations of time, which involves both >>>> persistent things (2/3) and changing qualities (1/2/3). Peirce describes >>>> two different classes of possible states of things that may be realized at >>>> a lapse of time--*prolonged *states, which are realized at any instant >>>> within a lapse; and *gradual *states, which are realized only at an >>>> entire lapse during which a change occurs from one prolonged state to >>>> another, these two states being "logically incompossible" (see NEM >>>> 3:1074-1077, c.1905). Such diversity requires *real *qualities to be >>>> continuous (1/2/3), rather than isolated (1), and *real *things to >>>> persist (2/3), not merely exist (2). >>>> >>>> CSP: Time with its continuity logically involves some other kind of >>>> continuity than its own. Time, as the universal form of change, cannot >>>> exist unless there is something to undergo change [2/3] and to undergo a >>>> change continuous in time there must be a continuity of changeable >>>> qualities [1/2/3]. (CP 6.132, EP 1:323, 1892) >>>> >>>> >>>> This is one specific sense in which all three categories are always >>>> present within our existing universe. >>>> >>>> CSP: I chiefly insist upon continuity, or Thirdness, and, in order to >>>> secure to thirdness its really commanding function, I find it indispensable >>>> fully [to] recognize that it is a third, and that Firstness, or chance, and >>>> Secondness, or Brute reaction, are other elements, without the independence >>>> of which Thirdness would not have anything upon which to operate. (CP >>>> 6.202, 1898) >>>> >>>> >>>> Regards, >>>> >>>> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA >>>> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman >>>> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt >>>> >>>>>
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