Jon Alen, you wrote: I continue to stand by my own definitions.
Own definitions? I only see citations. You wrote: I am really trying to understand both the system and the process. My question: is the text you wrote (see just below) in the same paragraph indicating your process view? Every sign in actu is a token of a type that belongs to a particular system of signs and is determined by its dynamical object to determine a dynamical interpretant--an actual effect on an interpreter as a feeling (emotional interpretant), an exertion (energetic interpretant), or a further sign (logical interpretant). However, an interpreter who is insufficiently acquainted with that system will be incapable of getting any idea signified by the sign token, or might (as in my example) misinterpret it as a token of a different sign type that belongs to a different system. best, Auke Op 26 mei 2020 om 3:11 schreef Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]>: Auke, List: AvB: The relevant part: "I have been accustomed to identify this [immediate interpretant] with the effect the sign first produces or may produce upon a mind". Peirce leaves two options open for the immediate interpretant here--it is either the effect that the sign first (actually) produces upon a mind or the effect that the sign may (possibly) produce upon a mind. In order to clarify this, I believe that the entire sentence is relevant, including a clause that I am underlining here because it is omitted from the quotation below. CSP: My Immediate Interpretant is, I think, very nearly, if not quite, the same as your "Sense"; for I understand the former to be the total unanalyzed effect that the Sign is calculated to produce, or naturally might be expected to produce; and I have been accustomed to identify this with the effect the sign first produces or may produce upon a mind, without any reflection upon it. (SS 110, 1909 Mar 14, underline added) The effect that the sign is calculated to produce or naturally might be expected to produce or may produce is not necessarily the effect that the sign actually does produce--except perhaps in the initial moment of apprehension, before any reflection upon it whatsoever. Later in the same paragraph, Peirce states, "I might describe my Immediate Interpretation, as so much of a Sign that would enable a person to say whether or not the Sign was applicable to anything concerning which that person had sufficient acquaintance" (ibid). In a letter to William James written on the very same day, he says that the immediate interpretant is the "Interpretant, as expressed ... what the [sign] expresses, all that it immediately expresses" (CP 8.314, EP 2:498, 1909 Mar 14); and a couple of weeks later, he says that it "consists in the Quality of the Impression that a sign is fit to produce, not to any actual reaction" (CP 8.315, EP 2:500, 1909 Apr 1). Taking all this into account, as well as Peirce's 1906 definition as quoted below and his statement to Lady Welby in another draft letter that the immediate interpretant is "the Interpretant represented or signified in the Sign" (CP 8.343, EP 2:482, 1908 Dec 24-28), I continue to stand by my own definitions. The immediate interpretant is whatever a sign type possibly could signify within the system of signs to which it belongs, the dynamical interpretant is whatever a sign token actually does signify on an individual occasion, and the final interpretant is whatever a sign itself necessarily would signify under ideal circumstances. AvB: Here you nicely illustrate our different viewpoints. You write: every sign is part of some system of signs I write: every sign in actu is part of a process of semiosis as a result you try to understand the system, I the process of interpretation. I am really trying to understand both the system and the process. Every sign in actu is a token of a type that belongs to a particular system of signs and is determined by its dynamical object to determine a dynamical interpretant--an actual effect on an interpreter as a feeling (emotional interpretant), an exertion (energetic interpretant), or a further sign (logical interpretant). However, an interpreter who is insufficiently acquainted with that system will be incapable of getting any idea signified by the sign token, or might (as in my example) misinterpret it as a token of a different sign type that belongs to a different system. JAS: One difference that I have with Peirce is that I consider the written and spoken versions of the same language to be two distinct systems of signs. AvB: The bridge is furnished by the very same symbol called forth by either of the signs, i.e. the spoken and written forms of horse. Thanks for this clarifying remark. Indeed, I consider "horse" as written and "horse" as spoken to be two different types of the same sign. From that standpoint, I agree that they belong to the same system of signs, so I suppose that going forward I should distinguish them as belonging to different systems of sign types--again, because the "definitely significant Form" of the same word is very different when written vs. when spoken, even though the immediate interpretant is the same. On the other hand, "Pferd" in German and "cheval" in French are additional types of the same sign that belong to different systems of sign types, and thus likely have slightly different immediate interpretants. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Laymanhttp://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt -http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Mon, May 25, 2020 at 4:41 AM < [email protected] mailto:[email protected] > wrote: Jon Alen, You cite: CSP: I do not mean by "collateral observation" acquaintance with the system of signs. What is so gathered is not COLLATERAL. It is on the contrary the prerequisite for getting any idea signified by the Sign. (CP 8.179, EP 2:494, 1909) and continue: The immediate interpretant is "the interpretant as it is revealed in the right understanding of the Sign itself, and is ordinarily called the meaning of the sign" (CP 4.536, 1906). For a term, this is simply its definition, and someone who is not acquainted with the system of signs to which the term belongs will be unable to get any idea signified by it. Since propositions and arguments involve terms, the same is true for those classes of signs, as well. Even knowledge of definitions may not be adequate by itself to understand terms as they are being employed in a particular context, something that I have personally experienced when reading explanations in the peculiar lingo of mathematical category theory. -- But also look at this: 1909 leter to Welby I understand the [Immediate Interpretant] to be the total unanalyzed effect that the Sign is calculated to produce; and I have been accustomed to identify this with the effect the sign first produces or may produce upon a mind, without any reflection upon it. [...] My Immediate Interpretant is implied in the fact that each Sign must have its peculiar Interpretability before it gets any Interpreter. [—] The Immediate Interpretant is an abstraction, consisting in a Possibility. http://www.commens.org/dictionary/term/immediate-interpretant I guess that here we find a reason why Pierce began to distinguish the intended from the effectual interpretant. The relevant part: " I have been accustomed to identify this with the effect the sign first produces or may produce upon a mind". This need not be the interpretant as it is revealed in the right understanding of the sign. Just recall my example of my friend with a stroke arguing. In both cases 1. following the argument 2. take the argument as a sign for recovery (which means a divergence of the intention) one could rightfully claim that the immediate interpretant in both cases is an example of 'right understanding'. The sign uttered has both possibilities for entering in a process of semiosis. You write: Since "there can be no isolated sign" (CP 4.551, 1906), every sign is part of some system of signs. -- Here you nicely illustrate our different viewpoints. You write: every sign is part of some system of signs I write: every sign in actu is part of a process of semiosis. as a result you try to understand the system, I the process of interpretation. JAS: One difference that I have with Peirce is that I consider the written and spoken versions of the same language to be two distinct systems of signs. -- This is an interesting point. I entertained the same idea as you did until I recognized that we may distinguish legisigns in two classes. 1. legisigns by comparison: the sinsign icons belong to a family either of visual or auditive signs 2. legisigns by convention. legisigns of two families (visual and auditive) are conjoined and recognaized as the same type. The bridge is furnished by the very same symbol called forth by either of the signs, i.e. the spoken and written forms of horse. best, Auke _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] with no subject, and with the sole line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. 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