John, List: I will spell out my position one more time, but I continue to find these strictly methodological criticisms tiresome, and I suspect that many others on the List would prefer not to be subjected to further debates about them. I respectfully request that in the future any such exchanges be kept off-List.
JFS: But when trying to understand what Peirce wrote, it's essential to interpret his words according to his way of thinking. The only way to ascertain Peirce's way of thinking in the first place is by interpreting his words. JFS: The reason why you always agree with Jon is that you both happen to think in the same way. Gary R. does not *always *agree with me, and we do not think in *exactly* the same way. What we do have in common are certain methodological principles for interpreting Peirce or any other author, which are very widely accepted within the entire community of scholars. JFS: Robert and I are not claiming that your way is a bad way. We're just saying that it's not the way Peirce was thinking. Therefore, it's unreliable as a method for deriving any conclusions from his writings. Robert can speak for himself, and no one can authoritatively declare what is and is not "the way Peirce was thinking" except by quoting his own words. Again, his writings constitute the only *definitive *evidence available, so we must appeal to them when making our respective cases. JFS: I strongly agree with Robert's objections to a "literalist' method of just quoting words. Robert raised no particular objections, he simply made an offhand reference to my alleged "incessant 'literalist' activism." In any case, what alternative would somehow *better *support one's interpretations of Peirce's writings than quoting his own words? After all, someone once asserted <https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2020-04/msg00118.html> (albeit without textual warrant) that "Peirce would cringe at most, if not all attempts to paraphrase his thoughts," and then later claimed <https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2020-05/msg00301.html> never to have "seen any paraphrase of Peirce's words that was clearer or more precise than his own." If both quotes and paraphrases are disallowed, then what else is left? No reputable scholar would seriously advocate such an impossibly restrictive approach. JFS: Since Jon has an engineering background, he would have had enough training in science and mathematics that he could learn to appreciate Peirce's way of thinking. I have indeed learned to appreciate Peirce's way of thinking, which is why I have spent so much time contemplating it and then writing about it, both here and in various publications. In particular, my series of articles on "The Logic of Ingenuity" (beginning here <https://www.structuremag.org/?p=10373>, with links to the other three parts) is a direct application of it to the way of thinking that we engineers routinely employ. Peirce even did some structural calculations himself in the mid-1890s, for George S. Morison's proposed (but never constructed) bridge over the Hudson River (see here <https://www.structuremag.org/?p=11048> and here <https://www.structuremag.org/?p=11401>). JFS: Unfortunately, Peirce's late writings present his conclusions without going into the details of how he derived his results. Those writings are good for learning Peirce's conclusions, but they don't show how to draw any further inferences from them. I strongly disagree. Since most of those late writings are in various manuscripts and letters, including unsent drafts, they do not merely "present his conclusions," they *embody *his way of thinking. The images of his original pages are especially enlightening, showing his self-corrections, marginal notes, and various false starts. Like me and many others, Peirce wrote to find out what he thought, going so far as to state that his inkstand was as essential to his thinking as any lobe of his brain. Oops, that is a paraphrase, so here is a quote of the relevant passage for good measure. CSP: A psychologist cuts out a lobe of my brain (*nihil animale me alienum puto*) and then, when I find I cannot express myself, he says, "You see your faculty of language was localized in that lobe." No doubt it was; and so, if he had filched my inkstand, I should not have been able to continue my discussion until I had got another. Yea, the very thoughts would not come to me. So my faculty of discussion is equally localized in my inkstand. It is localization in a sense in which a thing may be in two places at once. On the theory that the distinction between psychical and physical phenomena is the distinction between final and efficient causation, it is plain enough that the inkstand and the brain-lobe have the same general relation to the functions of the mind. (CP 7.366, 1902) Studying Peirce's own words is the best--really, the only--method for learning his way of thinking. Accordingly, quoting Peirce's own words is the best--really, the only--method for supporting one's interpretations of his writings. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Sun, Jun 7, 2020 at 6:28 AM John F. Sowa <[email protected]> wrote: > Gary R, Jon AS, and Robert, > > There are many ways of thinking, and no method is ideal for all purposes. > But when trying to understand what Peirce wrote, it's essential to > interpret his words according to his way of thinking. > > GR> I must immediately add that I do not see Jon as distorting Peirce's > thinking in any way, and in particular in consideration of the type-token > distinction and the commens. In my opinion, Jon's use of quotations has > been apt and judicious in supporting his > interpretations. > > The reason why you always agree with Jon is that you both happen to think > in the same way. Robert and I are not claiming that your way is a bad > way. We're just saying that it's not the way Peirce was thinking. > Therefore, it's unreliable as a method for deriving any conclusions from > his writings. > RM> I think you [JAS] are distorting Peirce's thinking in this way, and I > am clearly opposed to it. I also think you are trying to compensate for the > weakness of your arguments with incessant "literalist" activism. > > Yes. I strongly agree with Robert's objections to a "literalist' method > of just quoting words. See the excerpts from CP 1.6 and 1.7 (copied > below). Note Peirce's emphasis on mathematics and science, and his point > about metaphysicians. > > Since Jon has an engineering background, he would have had enough training > in science and mathematics that he could learn to appreciate Peirce's way > of thinking. Unfortunately. Peirce's late writings present his conclusions > without going into the details of how he derived his results. Those > writings are good for learning Peirce's conclusions, but they don't show > how to draw any further inferences from them. > > To understand Peirce's way of analyzing any subject and systematically > working through the evidence, I suggested his book _Photometric Researches_ > (1878). That book is an excellent companion to his article "How to make > our ideas clear", which was also published in 1878. Together, they show > Peirce's mind at work. > > For 16 pages of excerpts from that book, see > http://jfsowa.com/peirce/PRexcerpts.pdf . That is sufficient for a > start, but browsing through the rest of the book is also useful. > > John > > ________________________________________________________________ > > CP 1.6: The works of Duns Scotus have strongly influenced me. If his logic > and > metaphysics, not slavishly worshipped, but torn away from its medievalism, > be > adapted to modern culture, under continual wholesome reminders of > nominalistic > criticisms, I am convinced that it will go far toward supplying the > philosophy > which is best to harmonize with physical science. But other conceptions > have to > be drawn from the history of science and from mathematics. > > CP 1.7. Thus, in brief, my philosophy may be described as the attempt of a > physicist to make such conjecture as to the constitution of the universe > as the > methods of science may permit, with the aid of all that has been done by > previous > philosophers. I shall support my propositions by such arguments as I can. > Demonstrative proof is not to be thought of. The demonstrations of the > metaphysicians are all moonshine. The best that can be done is to supply a > hypothesis, not devoid of all likelihood, in the general line of growth of > scientific > ideas, and capable of being verified or refuted by future observers >
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