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}Robert, List
1] What?! Language is fascist?! Does he even know what the term
means? Most people who fling out this term have no understanding of
its meaning. No, he's ignoring the work of, if I recall, someone like
Michel Breal, who focused on language or speech as a living, almost
biological reality that changed as its users changed. And Bakhtin's
dialogic emphasis - as well as Peirce's dialogue and triad.
You wrote:" language is a powerful filter in the expression of
thought, while diagrams, which depend only on universal (or almost
universal) graphic conventions, are virtually free of any influence."
Yes - language/speech ties meaning to its immediate users.
2] I agree with your pointing out this obligation to find a 'formal
mathematized model and look for it in the "mathematical repository."
Without such grounds - as you point out, we become sophists or
'bricoleurs'.
4] The answer is obvious.
Edwina
On Sun 25/07/21 11:21 AM , robert marty robert.mart...@gmail.com
sent:
Dear John, List
Your message leads me to multiple questions, which, in my opinion,
raise fundamental problems.
1. JS > "Different people have different ways of thinking and
talking."
Yes, but the individuals, as a whole, do not think nor speak
independently of each other; diverse common cultural codes connect
them learned, inculcated like languages and signs organized in
systems; for a significant part of them, they are imposed (symbolic
violence). The semiologist Roland Barthes in his speech of reception,
remained famous to the College of France (1977), denounced the
languages as follows: "Language, as the performance of all language,
is neither reactionary nor progressive; it is quite simply fascist;
for fascism is not to prevent saying, it is to oblige to say." This
is obviously a figure of exaggeration. However, it reflects that
languages incorporate worldviews common to the people who use them
natively (the Hegelian weltanschauung). For my part, I put this quote
from Peirce at the beginning of my Ph.D. (1987): "All speech is but
such an algebra, the repeated signs being the words, which have
relations by virtue of the meanings associated with them."(CP 3.418).
The fundamental distinction I share with you between thinking in words
and thinking in diagrams thus results from the fact that language is a
powerful filter in the expression of thought, while diagrams, which
depend only on universal (or almost universal) graphic conventions,
are virtually free of any influence.
2. JS > "Phenomenology, phaneroscopy, or phenoscopy is the first
stage of analyzing and interpreting the phaneron in diagrams. It
depends on the three branches of mathematics (formal logic, discrete
math, and continuous math) to derive and classify the elements and
patterns of elements."
I agree, but I add that there are two ways to situate these
observations:
· either in the "Practical Sciences"( i.e.: "scientific
inquiry with an ulterior end (1911) "- "for the uses of life",- "e.g.
science of morality (ethics in common sense) "(see The outline of
Peirce's classification of sciences (1902-1911) compiled by Tommi
Vehkavaara)
· either in the "Sciences of Discovery" in which they
depend on mathematics. Then we have to consider a formal mathematized
model and look for it in the "mathematical repository."
Question: If we find such a model (which is very easy considering
only Peirce's definitions and what he says about the interdependence
between the universal categories by involvement), don't we have an
obligation to take it into account all along its deployment with
Phenomenology in the first line, because the dependence of
Phaneroscopy to Mathematics becomes quite explicit? Otherwise, won't
we remain confined to the Practical Sciences in the company of the
eternal conservative-bricoleurs?
3. JS > "The patterns are possibilities (hypotheses or guesses)
whose probability is evaluated by the normative sciences." The
syntactic mathematical model having been implemented in the universal
categories become a semantic model. It appears then constitutive of
phaneroscopy as a universal science of discovery; it is neither
hypothesis nor enigma, because it does not have to be submitted to an
evaluation, being exact by nature in all locations and at all times,
unlike the experimental models whose universality must be verified.
The above argumentation is clearly in line with the framework below
extracted from The Structure of Scientific Theories (Stanford
Encyclopedia of Philosophy) :
"A table helps summarize general aspects of the three views’
analyses of the structure of scientific theories:
Syntactic View
Semantic View
Pragmatic View
Theory Structure
Uninterpreted axiomatic system
(i) State-space,
(ii) Model-/set-theoretic
Internal and external pluralism
Theory Interpretation
Correspondence rules
(i) Hierarchy of models,
(ii) Similarity,
(iii) Isomorphism
(i) Structure already inflected by practice, function, and
application
(ii) Pragmatic virtues
Is theory interpretation an aspect of theory structure?
Yes
No
Yes, although the distinction is hard to make.
Table 2. General aspects of each view’s analysis of the structure
of scientific theories."
4. RM > his leads me finally to a final question to be discussed:
should the classification of sciences according to Peirce be
considered as a kind of imperative to be respected or can
phenomenology be approached from the logic that depends on it
according to this classification?Honorary Professor; Ph.D.
Mathematics; Ph.D. Philosophy
fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Marty [1]
https://martyrobert.academia.edu/ [2]
Le sam. 24 juil. 2021 à 04:28, John F. Sowa < s...@bestweb.net [3]>
a écrit :
Different people have different ways of thinking and talking. That
is
important, because the world is so complex, so diverse, and so
dynamic
that no single method could comprehend and describe it all.
Peirce's
method of diagrammatic thinking, which is the foundation for his
logic
and philosophy, is more fundamental than thinking in words.
For Peirce, words are necessary, but imperfect methods of
communication.
For example, his 76 definitions of the word 'sign' do not imply 76
different meanings. The multiplicity of definitions and
"outlandish"
terminology in the Commens dictionary shows his lifelong struggle to
map
his diagrammatic insights to words.
Phenomenology, phaneroscopy, or phenoscopy is the first stage of
analyzing and interpreting the phaneron in diagrams. It depends on
the three branches of mathematics (formal logic, discrete math, and
continuous math) to derive and classify the elements and patterns of
elements. The patterns are possibilities (hypotheses or guesses)
whose
probability is evaluated by the normative sciences.
For background, see the three appendices below: (1) quotations by
Peirce about diagrammatic reasoning; (2) quotations by other
mathematicians; and (3) quotations by Peirce about formal,
mathematical
methods.
For details, see Frederik Stjernfelt's "Diagrammatology: An
Investigation on the Borderlines of Phenomenology, Ontology, and
Semiotics". Stjernfelt goes into great detail about the
mathematical
foundations. He shows that Peirce and Husserl, despite completely
different terminology, had developed closely related theories.
http://frederikstjernfelt.dk/Peirce/Diagrammatology.%202007.pdf [4]
Husserl, by the way, had a PhD in mathematics and a strong
background in
logic. Both Peirce and Husserl were influenced by Hegel, and both
of
them used mathematics to develop a better foundation for
phenomenology.
As Peirce wrote, "the arbitrariness of Hegel's procedure... is in
great
measure avoided by my taking care never to miss the solid support of
mathematically exact formal logic beneath my feet." (R318, 1907)
John
---------------------------------
Appendix 1: Quotations about diagrammatic reasoning
These quotations by Peirce are discussed in "Natural logic is
diagrammatic reasoning about mental models" and related to current
research in cognitive science. See
http://jfsowa.com/pubs/natlog.pdf [5]
All necessary reasoning without exception is diagrammatic. That is,
we
construct an icon of our hypothetical state of things and proceed to
observe it. This observation leads us to suspect that something is
true, which we may or may not be able to formulate with precision,
and
we proceed to inquire whether it is true or not. For this purpose
it is
necessary to form a plan of investigation, and this is the most
difficult part of the whole operation. We not only have to select
the
features of the diagram which it will be pertinent to pay attention
to,
but it is also of great importance to return again and again to
certain
features. (EP 2:212)
The word diagram is here used in the peculiar sense of a concrete,
but
possibly changing, mental image of such a thing as it represents. A
drawing or model may be employed to aid the imagination; but the
essential thing to be performed is the act of imagining.
Mathematical
diagrams are of two kinds; 1st, the geometrical, which are composed
of
lines (for even the image of a body having a curved surface without
edges, what is mainly seen by the mind’s eye as it is turned
about, is
its generating lines, such as its varying outline); and 2nd, the
algebraical, which are arrays of letters and other characters whose
interrelations are represented partly by their arrangement and
partly by
repetitions. If these change, it is by instantaneous metamorphosis.
(NEM 4:219)
We form in the imagination some sort of diagrammatic, that is,
iconic,
representation of the facts, as skeletonized as possible. The
impression of the present writer is that with ordinary persons this
is
always a visual image, or mixed visual and muscular... This
diagram,
which has been constructed to represent intuitively or
semi-intuitively
the same relations which are abstractly expressed in the premisses,
is
then observed, and a hypothesis suggests itself that there is a
certain
relation between some of its parts -- or perhaps this hypothesis had
already been suggested. In order to test this, various experiments
are
made upon the diagram, which is changed in various ways. (CP 2.778)
Diagrammatic reasoning is the only really fertile reasoning. If
logicians would only embrace this method, we should no longer see
attempts to base their science on the fragile foundations of
metaphysics
or a psychology not based on logical theory. (CP 4.571)
---------------------------------
Appendix 2: Related quotations by other mathematicians
The following quotations are discussed in "Peirce, Polya, and
Euclid:
Integrating Logic, Heuristics, and Geometry" and compared to closely
related comments by Peirce. http://jfsowa.com/talks/ppe.pdf [6]
Archimedes: "Eureka!" Shouted as he jumped out of his bathtub.
Leonhard Euler: "The properties of the numbers known today have
been
mostly discovered by observations... long before their truth has
been
confirmed by rigid demonstrations."
Paul Halmos: "Mathematics -- this may surprise or shock some -- is
never deductive in its creation. The mathematician at work makes
vague
guesses, visualizes broad generalizations, and jumps to unwarranted
conclusions. He arranges and rearranges his ideas, and becomes
convinced of their truth long before he can write down a logical
proof... the deductive stage, writing the results down, and writing
its
rigorous proof are relatively trivial once the real insight arrives;
it
is more the draftsman’s work not the architect’s."
Albert Einstein: "The words or the language, as they are written or
spoken, do not seem to play any role in my mechanism of thought.
The
psychical entities which seem to serve as elements in thought are
certain signs and more or less clear images which can be voluntarily
reproduced and combined... The abovementioned elements are, in my
case,
of visual and some of muscular type. Conventional words or other
signs
have to be sought for laboriously only in a secondary stage, when
the
mentioned associative play is sufficiently established and can be
reproduced at will."
---------------------------------
Appendix 3: Quotations by Peirce about formal, mathematical methods
1898; We pretend that the [existential] graph is a general
description
of a certain recognized state of things. We only pretend that it is
so;
for our purpose is merely to study formal logic, and the graph is a
mere
specimen of an assertion for whose matter we care nothing. In the
contents of consciousness we recognize three sorts of elements,
Firstness, Secondness, Thirdness. (R339, 11 June 1898)
1902: Accordingly by regarding logic as a science of signs or
formal
semeiotic, and in the main as a science of symbols, or formal
symbolic,
we accurately cover its subject matter, and at the same time insure
ourselves against all risk of being led astray into psychology. (R
425:117-118, 1902)
1903: For every symbol is a living thing, in a very strict sense
that
is no mere figure of speech. The body of the symbol changes slowly,
but
the meaning inevitably grows, incorporates new elements and throws
off
old ones. (CP 2.222).
1903: Phenomenology ascertains and studies the kinds of elements
universally present in the phenomenon. (CP 1.186, 1903)
1905: The other doctrine of mine which Royce attacks, as remarkably
shows how unscientific his training has been. He attacks my
one-two-three doctrine in the very field where it is most obviously
defensible, that of formal logic. (Letter to William James, August
1905)
c 1906: Phaneroscopy... is the science of the different elementary
constituents of all ideas. Its material is, of course, universal
experience, -- experience I mean of the fanciful and the abstract,
as
well as of the concrete and real. Yet to suppose that in such
experience the elements were to be found already separate would be
to
suppose the unimaginable and self-contradictory. They must be
separated
by a process of thought that cannot be summoned up Hegel-wise on
demand.
They must be picked out of the fragments that necessary reasonings
scatter; and therefore it is that phaneroscopic research requires a
previous study of mathematics. (R602, after 1903 but before 1908)
1907: My trichotomy is plainly of the family stock of Hegel’s
three
stages of thought, -- an idea that goes back to Kant, and I know not
how
much further. But the arbitrariness of Hegel's procedure, utterly
unavoidable at the time he lived, -- and presumably, in less degree,
unavoidable now, or at any future date, -- is in great measure
avoided
by my taking care never to miss the solid support of mathematically
exact formal logic beneath my feet.... (R318, 1907, p. 37)
CSP: The little that I have contributed to pragmatism (or, for that
matter, to any other department of philosophy), has been entirely
the
fruit of this outgrowth from formal logic, and is worth much more
than
the small sum total of the rest of my work, as time will show.
(CP 5.469, R318, 1907)
In a footnote to CP 4.240, Peirce added "'Formal logic' is also
used, by
Germans chiefly, to mean that sect of Logic, which makes Formal
Logic
pretty much the whole of Logic." Since Whitehead and Russell also
adhered to that "sect", the term 'formal logic' means any version of
logic that uses some precisely defined notation, linear or graphic.
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