Jerry C., List: JLRC: ... I suggest that you may be misreading the meaning of the sentence that you cited.
That is why I asked for clarification. Unfortunately, I remain puzzled. JLRC: ... *all three terms* are composed terms coined by CSP for his specific usage as the base for semiosis. Yes, but he abandoned them not long after introducing them, replacing them (in most cases) with tone/token/type. JLRC: The meaning of the sentence in question is constrained to a small fraction of the totality of scientific epistemology and relates specifically to the syntax and semantics of experience of a sinsign, that is, perceptions of natural processes (in the sense of Whitehead.) Sinsigns/tokens are not limited to natural processes, they also include any concrete embodiments of qualisigns/tones and legisigns/types, such as these words conveyed as recognizable combinations of pixels on a screen. JLRC: As a professional chemist, CSP grounded these terms in mathematical calculations that generate molecular structures from atomic formula and molecular formula and the grammars of combinatorics that relate atomic sentences to molecular sentences. This is an interesting hypothesis, but are there any passages in Peirce's writings that *explicitly *support it? The quotations below do not say anything whatsoever about molecular structures or atomic formulas. On the contrary, the trichotomy of qualsign/sinsign/legisign or tone/token/type is *identified *within speculative grammar as the first branch of the normative science of logic as semeiotic, using principles furnished by phaneroscopy, and is then *applied *within the special science of chemistry. JLRC: With regard to the “arrow” symbols, these are used in the sense of traditional chemical usage. That is, the implication is obligatory with respect to the parts of the wholes of the antecedent and consequent. Sorry, I do not see how a qualisign/tone *implies *a sinsign/token, which *implies *a legisign/type. Instead, my understanding from Peirce is that a legisign/type *involves *sinsigns/tokens, which *involve *qualisigns/tones. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Sun, Aug 8, 2021 at 11:08 PM Jerry LR Chandler < [email protected]> wrote: > > List, Jon: > > In response to your post of August 4, 2021(copied below) I suggest that > you may be misreading the meaning of the sentence that you cited. > > In particular, the three terms are not general linguistic propositional > terms derived from historical Greek or Latin roots, but *all three terms* > are composed terms coined by CSP for his specific usage as the base for > semiosis. Thus, if the nine terms of the trichotomy are indeed a set of > connected meanings such that a logical proposition is formed, then a > coherent correspondence to pragmatic realism is necessarily asserted. > > The meaning of the sentence in question is constrained to a small fraction > of the totality of scientific epistemology and relates specifically to the > syntax and semantics of experience of a sinsign, that is, perceptions of > natural processes (in the sense of Whitehead.) > > The logic CSP asserts is composed from step-by-step paths among the nine > terms and their pragmatic interconnectedness (in the sense of > Wittgenstein). As a professional chemist, CSP grounded these terms in > mathematical calculations that generate molecular structures from atomic > formula and molecular formula and the grammars of combinatorics that relate > atomic sentences to molecular sentences. > > The pragmatic interconnectedness of sinsigns, prior to the discovery of > the nuclear atom in 1912, was deciphered from “wet chemistry” methods that > were based on the mass of the legi-signs and the collections of > quali-signs. The assertions were composed from the meanings of any > legi-signs under compositions of chemical elements. > > With regard to the “arrow” symbols, these are used in the sense of > traditional chemical usage. That is, the implication is obligatory with > respect to the parts of the wholes of the antecedent and consequent. > > But, note that the traditional chemical arrow specifies a set of triadic > illations among attributes, diagrammatic identity, and formal semantics of > natural objects. In other words, quali-signs, sin-sign and legi-sign. > > Yes, this is cyclic logic. This cyclic logic is necessitated by > compositional logic of part-whole illations and whole-part illations. A > critical component of the demonstration is CSP assertion that the the > mapping from the icon to a rhema is comparable to a chemical radical. (I do > not have the book on graph theory at hand but is occurs in the first few > pages.) > > I will not develop the multiple propositions necessary to develop the > illations between quali-signs, sin-signs and legsi-signs here. The logic > follows from the definitions of CSP and the obligatory logics atomic and > molecular sentences as applied to the semiotic attributes of chemical > elements. > > However, the references necessary to compose the propositions and the > grammatical compositions include the following quotes : > 1905-12-20 | The Logic Notebook | MS [R] 339:267r > > “Philosophy” has 2 principal meanings > > 1. The cream of the science, – synthetic or positive philosophy > 2. Cenoscopy, the study of the experience already acquired. > > > "Next, passing to Class II, philosophy, whose business it is to find out > all that can be found out from those universal experiences which confront > every man in every waking hour of his life, must necessarily have its > application in every other science. For be this science of philosophy that > is founded on those universal phenomena as small as you please, as long as > it amounts to anything at all, it is evident that every special science > ought to take that little into account before it begins work with its > microscope, or telescope, or whatever special means of ascertaining truth > it may be provided with.” > > 1896 [c.] | Lessons of the History of Science | CP 1.65 > > There are in science three fundamentally different kinds of reasoning, > Deduction (called by Aristotle {synagögé} or {anagögé}), Induction > (Aristotle’s and Plato’s {epagögé}) and Retroduction (Aristotle’s > {apagögé}, but misunderstood because of corrupt text, and as misunderstood > usually translated abduction). Besides these three, Analogy (Aristotle’s > {paradeigma}) combines the characters of Induction and Retroduction. > > All that makes knowledge applicable comes to us viâ abduction. > > "The first step of inference usually consists in bringing together certain > propositions which we believe to be true, but which, supposing the > inference to be a new one, we have hitherto not considered together, or not > as united in the same way. This step is called colligation. The compound > assertion resulting from colligation is a conjunctive proposition, that > is, it is a proposition with a composite icon, as well as usually with a > composite index. Colligation is a very important part of reasoning, calling > for genius perhaps more than any other part of the process. Many logicians > refuse the name of reasoning to an inferential act of which colligation > forms no part. Such an inferential act they call an immediate inference. > This term may be accepted; but although colligation certainly gives a > higher intellectuality to inference, yet its importance is exaggerated when > it is represented to be of more account than the conscious control of the > operation. The latter ought to determine the title of reasoning.” > 1899-1900 [c.] | Notes on Topical Geometry | MS [R] 142:6 > > Symbols are of three classes: terms, which call attention to things or > quasi-things; propositions, which declare facts; and arguments, which > profess to enlighten us as to the rational connections of facts or possible > facts. > 1901-1902 [c.] | Definitions for Baldwin's Dictionary [R] | MS [R] 1147 > > An argument may be defined as a symbol which definitely and separately > shows what interpretant, or conclusion, it aims at. > 1866 | Logic Chapter I | W 1:355 > > … the relation of a repraesentamen to its object (correlate) may be a real > relation and, then, either an agreement or a difference, or it may be an > ideal r[elati]on or one from which the reference to a correspondent > (subject of representation) cannot be prescinded by position. [—] In the > second case, there is a real difference of the repraesentamen from its > object, that is to say not a mere difference in quality but also a bringing > of them together in nature; in this case the representative character of > the one will consist in constant accompaniment by the other, so that it > indicates the existence of the latter without noting any characters of > it. Such a representation may be termed an index. > > 1903 | Syllabus: Nomenclature and Division of Triadic Relations, as far > as they are determined | EP 2:294 > > … a Qualisign is any quality in so far as it is a sign. Since a quality > is whatever it is positively in itself, a quality can only denote an object > by virtue of some common ingredient or similarity; so that a Qualisign is > necessarily an Icon. Further, since a quality is a mere logical > possibility, it can only be interpreted as a sign of essence, that is, as > a Rheme. > 1903 | Syllabus: Nomenclature and Division of Triadic Relations, as far > as they are determined | EP 2:291 > > A Sinsign (where the syllable sin is taken as meaning “being only once,” > as in single, simple, Latin semel, etc.) is an actual existent thing or > event which is a sign. It can only be so through its qualities; so that > it involves a qualisign, or rather, several qualisigns. But these > qualisigns are of a peculiar kind and only form a sign through being > actually embodied. > 1903 [c.] | P of L | MS [R] 800:4 > > …signs are divisible, first, according to their modes of being, as > objects; secondly, according to the modes of their references to their > objects; thirdly, according to the modes of their references to their > interpretants. In the first way of dividing them, signs are either > qualisigns, or signs that are abstract qualities (in a wide sense), or > suisigns, signs that are essentially existent as individual objects or > events, or legisigns, signs that [are] general types, laws, or habits. > 1904 | Letters to Lady Welby | SS 32 > > As it is in itself, a sign is either of the nature of an appearance, when > I call it a qualisign; or secondly, it is an individual object or event, > when I call it a sinsign (the syllable sin being the first sillable [sic] > of semel, simul, singular, etc); or thirdly, it is of the nature of a > general type, when I call it a legisign. > > The readiest characteristic test showing whether a sign is a Dicisign or > not is that a Dicisign is either true or false, but does not directly > furnish reasons for its being so. This shows that a Dicisign must profess > to refer or relate to something as having a real being independently of the > representation of it as such, and further that this reference or relation > must not be shown as rational, but must appear as a blind Secondness. But > the only kind of sign whose object is necessarily existent is the genuine > Index. This Index might, indeed, be a part of a Symbol; but in that case > the relation would appear as rational. Consequently a Dicisign necessarily > represents itself to be a genuine Index, and to be nothing more. > > Cheers > > Jerry >
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