Getting back to the substantive issue raised in my previous post …
In his third Lowell Lecture (1903), Peirce says that the Firstness of Firstness can be called “qualitative possibility.” But earlier in the same lecture, he says this: CSP: That wherein all such qualities agree is universal Firstness, the very being of Firstness. The word possibility fits it, except that possibility implies a relation to what exists, while universal Firstness is the mode of being of itself. That is why a new word was required for it. Otherwise, “possibility” would have answered the purpose. GF: In this context, Peirce acknowledges that in ordinary English usage, “possibility implies a relation to what exists.” Since existence involves Secondness, that renders the word “possibility” unfit for rendering the concept named “Firstness.” In order to consistently use “qualitative possibility” in reference to Firstness, it is necessary to explicitly set aside the ordinary implication which connects the word to Secondness. This is what Peirce does in the bolded words quoted from EP2:479: CSP: One of these [three] Universes embraces whatever has its Being in itself alone, except that whatever is in this Universe must be present to one consciousness, or be capable of being so present in its entire Being. It follows that a member of this universe need not be subject to any law, not even to the principle of contradiction. I denominate the objects of this Universe Ideas, or Possibles, although the latter designation does not imply capability of actualization. GF: The quote is continued below by Robert (who omitted the first two sentences given above). Peirce invokes the principle of contradiction and the logic of vagueness in order to show that in the language of exact logic (as opposed to ordinary English usage), “possibility” does not imply capability of actualization. This effectively cancels, in the logical context, the objection which prevented him (in the Lowell Lecture) from using “possibility” as another name for “Firstness,” justifies Peirce’s use of “qualitative possibility” in reference to Firstness, and gives us De Tienne (and the rest of us) license to use “possibility” in that way. I think De Tienne’s virtual identification of positivity with actuality and Secondness is more problematic, though. Peirce’s statement in a 1904 letter to Welby that “Firstness is the mode of being of that which is such as it is, positively and without reference to anything else” (CP 8.328) suggests that Firstness has its own kind of positivity, just as it has its own kind of reality. But I haven’t found any firm evidence for this in Peirce’s text, so I don’t intend to argue the point. Gary f. From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu <peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu> On Behalf Of g...@gnusystems.ca Sent: 19-Aug-21 09:51 To: 'Peirce-L' <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu> Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 27 Robert, your opening shot at “ADT supporters” is yet another example of what I meant by “tribalism”: lumping together a group of people as a tribe opposed to your tribe (“ADT opponents”, I suppose). This dualistic (and duelistic) practice overrides the “Will to Learn” (Peirce’s capitalization) something about phaneroscopy through dialogue. (Attempts to define “tribalism” differently are, in my view, mere quibbles about terminology.) By the way, I regard this tribalism as merely a symptom of the root problem with your crusade, which lies in the motivation for insisting on what is (to any dispassionate reader) an egregious misreading of what ADT’s text. Your own posts have made that motivation pretty clear, so I won’t comment on it here. The quotes you provide could serve a better purpose, though, than your highlighting of the parts you think will serve as weapons against the other tribe. Specifically, the relation between “possibility” and “Firstness” in Peirce’s actual usage of those terms is worth a close and unprejudiced look if we want to learn something about his “phaneroscopy.” To that end, I’d like to add another quotation, which is especially relevant because it is from one of Peirce’s core texts on phenomenology. The context, namely the third Lowell Lecture of 1903, is online here: https://gnusystems.ca/Lowell3.htm#1530 . The question about “possibility” arises in the second paragraph of this selection: CSP: But now I wish to call your attention to a kind of distinction which affects Firstness more than it does Secondness, and Secondness more than it does Thirdness. This distinction arises from the circumstance that where you have a triplet ∴ you have 3 pairs; and where you have a pair, you have 2 units. Thus, Secondness is an essential part of Thirdness though not of Firstness, and Firstness is an essential element of both Secondness and Thirdness. Hence there is such a thing as the Firstness of Secondness and such a thing as the Firstness of Thirdness; and there is such a thing as the Secondness of Thirdness. But there is no Secondness of pure Firstness and no Thirdness of pure Firstness or Secondness. When you strive to get the purest conceptions you can of Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness (thinking of quality, reaction, and mediation), what you are striving to apprehend is pure Firstness, the Firstness of Secondness — that is what Secondness is, of itself — and the Firstness of Thirdness. … A Firstness is exemplified in every quality of a total feeling. It is perfectly simple and without parts; and everything has its quality. Thus the tragedy of King Lear has its Firstness, its flavor sui generis. That wherein all such qualities agree is universal Firstness, the very being of Firstness. The word possibility fits it, except that possibility implies a relation to what exists, while universal Firstness is the mode of being of itself. That is why a new word was required for it. Otherwise, “possibility” would have answered the purpose. … To express the Firstness of Thirdness, the peculiar flavor or color of mediation, we have no really good word. Mentality is, perhaps, as good as any, poor and inadequate as it is. Here, then, are three kinds of Firstness, qualitative possibility, existence, mentality, resulting from applying Firstness to the three categories. We might strike new words for them: primity, secundity, tertiality. [end CSP quote] Gary f. From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu <mailto:peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu> <peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu <mailto:peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu> > On Behalf Of robert marty Sent: 19-Aug-21 05:03 List, No comment; submitted for all to examine. Expected response from ADT supporters. ADT > • The actualization of firsts or possibilia includes the actualization of a special form, which can be rendered into the term positiveness, an abstraction resulting from positivization. • THEREFORE, what follows mathematics in the order of the classification of the sciences is a scientific activity that will explore that resulting positiveness (or secondization). CSP > "I denominate the objects of this Universe Ideas, or Possibles,although the latter designation does not imply capability of actualization. On the contrary as a general rule, if not a universal one, an Idea is incapable of perfect actualization on account of its essential vagueness if for no other reason. For that which is not subject to the principle of contradiction is essentially vague. For example, geometrical figures belong to this Universe; now since every such figure involves lines which can only be supposed to exist as boundaries where three bodies come together, or to be the place common to three bodies, and since the boundary of a solid or liquid is merely the place at which its forces of cohesion are neither very great nor very small, which is essentially vague, it is plain that the idea is essentially vague or indefinite. Moreover, suppose the three bodies that come together at a line are wood, water, and air, then a whole space including this line is at every point either wood, water, or air; and neither wood and water, nor wood and air, nor water and air can together occupy any place. Then plainly the principle of contradiction, were it applicable, would be violated in the idea of a place where wood, water, and air, come together. Similar antinomies affect all Ideas. We can only reason about them in respects which the antinomies do not affect, and often by arbitrarily assuming what upon closer examination is found to be absurd. There is this much truth in Hegel's doctrine, although he is frequently in error in applying the principle." (EP2 479) [emphasize mine] "But, further, although usually appearances are either only confirmed or merely supplemented by testimony, yet there is a certain remarkable class of appearances which are continually contradicted by testimony. These are those predicates which we know to be emotional, but which he distinguishes by their connection with the movements of that central person, himself (that the table wants moving, etc.) These judgments are generally denied by others. Moreover, he has reason to think that others, also, have such judgments which are quite denied by all the rest. Thus, he adds to the conception of appearance as the actualization of fact, the conception of it as something private and valid only for one body. In short, error appears, and it can be explained only by supposing a self which is fallible."(CP 5.234)[ Peirce emphasize italic words; emphasize by bold mine] NB by RM > None of the terms, "positivization" and "secondization" appears in CP, EP2, NEM III/2, NEM 4. Regards, Robert Marty Honorary Professor ; Ph.D. Mathematics ; Ph.D. Philosophy fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Marty <https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Marty> https://martyrobert.academia.edu/
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