Gary F., List: I doubt that Peirce's use of "sentiments" in R 953 in exactly the same as when he says elsewhere that reasoning is subordinate to sentiment in matters of vital importance. On my reading, he is simply anticipating his later recognition of esthetics as the normative science that "considers those things whose ends are to embody qualities of feeling" (CP 5.129, EP 2:200, 1903), aligning meliorism with the identification of concrete reasonableness as the *summum bonum* and its constant growth as the ongoing process of creation. The beginning and the end are ideal limits, not actual events, and the latter state is "better than" the former in the specific sense that it is utterly determinate instead of utterly indeterminate, corresponding to perfect knowledge instead of blank ignorance.
CSP: The Meliorist view is that there are in the first place certain real facts, which are as they are quite independently of what you or I or any man many think about them. Secondly, truth, being the agreement of our assertions with those facts, is something definitely one way, and not otherwise. Thirdly, observation and reflection, stimulated by an eager desire to ascertain that truth, gradually lead minds toward it, so that, though ignorance and error always remain in reference to each question, yet they become gradually dispelled. (R 953:7-8[6-7], c. 1899) By contrast, pessimism identifies "eternal nothingness" as the *summum bonum*, and epicureanism effectively denies that there is any *summum bonum* at all. My James/Rorty interlocuters seem to fall into the latter camp, embracing "tragic pluralism" as inevitable because they believe that some value conflicts are genuinely unresolvable in principle. Thanks, Jon On Mon, Apr 24, 2023 at 6:50 PM <[email protected]> wrote: > Jon and other folks in this thread, > > [Sorry about the disappearing text in my previous send of this, I copied > some text from PDF and forgot I had to change the color manually.] > > Doesn’t it seem a bit inconsistent for Peirce to argue about “what our > sentiments toward things in general *should* be,” when he usually argues > that “sentiments” are *less* fallible than our reasoning, precisely > because they are products of evolution rather than logic? > > Personally i have no doubt that the universe is in a continuous state of > change, or in Peirce’s terms, “the universe has on the whole a definite > tendency toward a state of things” *different* from any past state of > things. (In other words I believe that time is real.) But I see no reason > to believe that it has either beginning or end, or that some future state > of things will be *better* than any past state. And that applies not only > to the observable universe but to the universe of “human knowledge,” as far > as I can see. I’m inclined to think that Peirce’s view on that was just a > symptom of that overconfident 19th-century European-American optimism > that landed us in the Anthropocene! > > Love, gary > > Coming from the ancestral lands of the Anishinaabeg > > } Open your mouth, always be busy, and life is beyond hope. [*Daodejing* > 52 (Feng/English)] { > > https://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{ Turning Signs <https://gnusystems.ca/TS/> > > > > *From:* [email protected] <[email protected]> *On > Behalf Of *Jon Alan Schmidt > *Sent:* Friday, April 21, 2023 5:57 PM > *To:* Peirce-L <[email protected]> > *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] A question for pragmatists > > > > List: > > For anyone interested, attached is my complete transcription of R 953. I > am now suggesting a date of c. 1899 based on it mentioning "my unpublished > Principles of Philosophy," for which Peirce unsuccessfully advertised > subscriptions (1894) and later apparently wrote CP 1.176-179 (c. 1896) as a > forward, and saying that the first volume "is devoted to the consideration > of the question of where we are at this end of the Nineteenth Century." > Moreover, the text references Büchner, whom Peirce also invokes in CP 1.192 > (c. 1893), and begins to discuss the three grades of clearness that he > introduced in "How to Make Our Ideas Clear" (1878)--which he updated to > serve as chapter 16 of *How to Reason: A Critick of Arguments* (1894)--and > presented again in "The Logic of Relatives" (1897). Presumably, he would > have been keen to revisit them once more after William James started > popularizing pragmatism (1898). > > Peirce's definition of epicureanism in this context, contrasted with > pessimism and meliorism, is admittedly idiosyncratic. Here is how he > summarizes all three with respect to cosmology and knowledge. > > CSP: These three opinions about the universe, are then > > 1st, that of the pessimist, that the infinitely distant future comes to > that same nothingness that was in the infinitely distant past; > > 2nd, that of the Epicurean, that the universe has no general character or > tendency whatever, and that nothing at all can be alleged of it as a whole; > > 3rd, that of the Meliorist, that the universe has on the whole a definite > tendency toward a state of things in the infinitely distant future > different from that in the infinitely distant past. > > These opinions about the universe, in general, are capable [of] various > special applications. Among other things, they can be applied to human > knowledge. ... > > Here, then, are three opinions about science and philosophy. Each has much > to support it. > > The first is that opinion advances by a regular course of development > toward a destined goal; but that goal is the very state of complete doubt > from which it first set out. > > The second is that opinion does not advance at all, but only shifts about, > appearing for a time to be reaching something but soon passing into > disputes. > > The third is that opinion progresses toward a certain predestinate > settlement, which must be called the truth. > > Each of these views of human knowledge harmonizes with a corresponding > view of the constitution of the universe. > > In light of previous comments in this thread, it also seems noteworthy > that Peirce treats Büchner as a stand-in for what today we call scientism, > including materialism/physicalism and > necessitarianism/determinism--additional characteristics of our > intellectual climate that are contrary to synechism/pragmaticism. > > CSP: When I speak of Büchner and Büchnerism, I do not mean an exact > adherence to Dr. Büchner's personal opinions, but I use that name to > designate a general type of opinion, namely, the opinion that physics has > discovered that the universe consists of molecules moving about under the > governance of inflexible law, the law of energy; that that is all there is > to it; and that consequently the ideas of God, Freedom of the Soul, and > Immortality are silly superstitions. That whole type of opinion I think > superficial. ... > > If the Büchnerite cared to pause to listen to my answer to his question of > whether I am not in favor of Büchner and a philosophy based on facts > instead of a philosophy based on tradition, he might be somewhat surprised. > For I should tell him that, to my mind, his own opinion is based on > tradition, in the most unwholesome way possible. He converts science into > an infallible Pope. ... > > The Büchnerites talk of their doctrine as the "teaching of science." But > it certainly is not science; it is a philosophical doctrine, the result of > a generalization from physics. It seems to me a hasty and overconfident > generalization. ... > > The Büchnerites undertake to make use of the truths of physics to answer > the questions which are the furthest removed from physics that any > questions possibly can be. > > In fact, Peirce indicates in the advertisement for his ambitious *Principles > of Philosophy* that its first volume (out of twelve!) was "Nearly ready" > and would include "Sketch of a thoroughgoing philosophy of continuity. The > great opponent of this philosophy has been in history, and is in logic, > infallibilism, whether in its milder ecclesiastical form, or in its more > dire scientistic and materialistic apparitions." My working title for a > more extensive paper based on my 10-minute presentation is "Thoroughgoing > Synechism," so I am curious whether that sketch has survived in a > manuscript somewhere. It might be R 946, "An Outline Sketch of the > Synechistic Philosophy," which contains discarded drafts for the opening > paragraphs of "Immortality in the Light of Synechism" (EP 2:1-3, 1893). One > of them states, "My own thorough-going *synechism *is the doctrine that > continuity rules the whole domain of experience ..." > > Thanks, > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > > Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian > > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt >
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