Mary, Jeff, List: The new volume by Atkins is surely another valuable contribution from him to Peirce scholarship, but searching it on Google Books turns up zero instances of "thing in itself," "things in themselves," or "*Ding an sich*." It apparently does not even discuss collateral experience/observation, which would be the most relevant Peirce-specific terminology.
Again, the first premiss in CP 5.525 is that that every subject of a meaningful proposition must be either indicated or found. This is the basic principle of logic that we can *only *identify and distinguish an individual external thing using an *index *(2ns), not a verbal description (3ns) of its qualities (1ns)--e.g., a line of identity in the Beta part of Existential Graphs, or a variable in the now-standard first-order predicate calculus. Any interpreter of a sign referring to that thing (dynamical object) must *already *be acquainted with it from collateral experience/observation. CSP: [E]very correlate of an existential relation is a single object which may be indefinite, or may be distributed; that is, may be chosen from a class by the interpreter of the assertion of which the relation or relationship is the predicate, or may be designated by a proper name, but in itself, though in some guise or under some mask, it can always be perceived, yet never can it be unmistakably identified by any sign whatever, without collateral observation. Far less can it be defined. It is *existent*, in that its being does not consist in any *qualities*, but in its effects--in its actually acting and being acted on, so long as this action and suffering endures. Those who experience its effects perceive and know it in that action; and just that constitutes its very being. It is not in perceiving its qualities that they know it, but in hefting its insistency then and there, which Duns called its *haecceitas *... (CP 6.318, 1907) Biological twins are neither identical (strictly speaking) nor indiscernible, no matter how closely they resemble each other in appearance. At a minimum, they occupy different locations in space. Unless they are sons of George Foreman, we can distinguish them by using their proper names, which Peirce classified as rhematic indexical legisigns; or if we happen to be with them in the same room, then we can do so simply by pointing at them. Thanks, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Thu, Jun 8, 2023 at 1:30 PM Jeffrey Brian Downard < [email protected]> wrote: > Hello John, Mary, all, > > I'd be happy to compare notes on Peirce's, Kant's, Leibniz's arguments and > remarks about the intelligibility of a "thing in itself." As I've suggested > earlier, it is helpful to read Kant's claims in light of his attempt to > respond to Leibniz. Similarly, it is helpful to read Peirce's claims in > light of his attempt to respond to Kant and, in turn, to Leibniz. > > Given John's notes about individuating individuals who are biological > twins, he appears to be interested in the logical and semantic character of > Leibniz's two principles: (1) the identity of individuals that are > indiscernible and (2) the indiscernibility of individuals that are > identical. > > In order to sort out the points of agreement and disagreement between > Peirce, Kant and Leibniz on the application of those principles to actual > things, it will be helpful to consider the differences in their respective > accounts of how signs can be used to refer to individual objects as > existing and as having qualities and real relations to other objects. That > is, I think we can make progress on sorting out their disagreements by > looking at their respective accounts of representation of actual > individual's, the abstract qualities they may possess, and the real general > laws that govern such individuals. > > A fundamental disagreement is over the types of signs that are essential > for cognition. Leibniz claims there is one fundamental type of sign, which > is that of a general conception. The sensations that are part of our > perceptual observations of actual objects are just confused general > conceptions. Kant maintains that there are two basic types of signs, > individual representations as perceptual "intuitions" of things as being at > a place in time and space, and general conceptions. Peirce, of course, > maintains that signs can be classified triadically based on their own > character, that of the object and that of the interpretant—and the > requisite relations between those three. The result is a richer theory of > signs and relations than either Leibniz or Kant provide. > > We need to interpret Peirce's responses to Kant's, or to Leibniz's claims > about the intelligibility of a "thing in itself" in light of these > differences in their accounts of signs and semiotic relations. Then, we > need to consider different kinds of "things" that we might try to > individuate, such as a rock, a human person or God. Contrast the attempts > of these philosophers to clarify the grounds for individuating such various > things as individuals, as compared to the grounds for understanding > something—such as a law of causality--to be a real universal that governs > actual individual objects. > > Here is a passage from the CP where Peirce tries to diagnose an error by > Kant and Leibniz: > > Descartes, Leibnitz, Kant, and others appeal to the universality of > certain truths as proving that they are not derived from observation, > either directly or by legitimate probable inference. … Descartes, Leibnitz, > and Kant more or less explicitly state that that which they say cannot be > derived from observation, or legitimate probable inference from > observation, is a universal proposition in sense (3), that is, an assertion > concerning every member of a general class without exception. CP 2.370 > How do you interpret Peirce's objection to each? > > --Jeff >
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