As for the "thing in itself" and the "noumenon", Peirce's criticisms of Kant are justified. But Kant may be excused for not understanding modern scientific methodology. By the late 19th and early 20th c, Peirce recognized that the science of his day had produced results that people could trust with their lives -- cars, trains, bridges, airplanes, and electricity. That did not guarantee the absolute certainty of scientific "laws", but it meant that they deserved a high level of confidence.
In conclusion, I believe that Jack could "update" Kant by identifying the noumenon with Peirce's search for scientific "laws" that have been tested to a high degree of confidence by scientific methodology. Peirce's final goal of a proof of pragmaticism was very close to Kant's goal of a proof of his noumena John, list, Yes, this is what I am doing as of now. The thesis, that is, when published will be Kant through Peirce (not linear - as of now, convinced I've proven the necessity of the thing in itself but also convinced I've understood the precise juncture where Peirce and Kant come to disagreement and it is, in truth, incredible nuanced as you would expect of each: entirely a categorical matter with respect to each's respective system). Thanks for the information, by the way (have been gathering lots from the list exchange of late). Best Jack ________________________________ From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu <peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu> on behalf of John F Sowa <s...@bestweb.net> Sent: Friday, June 9, 2023 7:06 PM To: Jeffrey Brian Downard <jeffrey.down...@nau.edu> Cc: Peirce-L <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu> Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Re: The Thing In Itself (Kant and Peirce - Again). (Assemblage Formalisms - inference). Jeff, Jon, Jack, Helmut, et al., Before discussing Peirce's comments about Kant and others, I think it's important to review Peirce's background and the influences that led to his final synthesis. By the time Peirce was 8 years old, his father had taught him Greek, Latin, mathematics, and chemistry. When he was 12, he taught himself logic from Whateley's book, and when he was 16, he and his father worked their way through Kant's KdrV (or CdrV in the spelling of that time). I believe that the combined effect of those influences led him to generalize his framework in order to accommodate all the details. I also believe that his correspondence with Lady Welby, starting in 1903, led to him to produce his clearest and most general foundation. The first effect (in 1904) was to replace his abstract phenomenology with a phenomenoscopy that was more compatible with her significs. He produced his final synthesis in 1911, shortly after he had promised to send her a copy of his latest work.. . Jeff> it is helpful to read Peirce's claims in light of his attempt to respond to Kant and, in turn, to Leibniz... Here is a passage from the CP where Peirce tries to diagnose an error by Kant and Leibniz: "Descartes, Leibnitz, Kant, and others appeal to the universality of certain truths as proving that they are not derived from observation, either directly or by legitimate probable inference. … Descartes, Leibnitz, and Kant more or less explicitly state that that which they say cannot be derived from observation, or legitimate probable inference from observation, is a universal proposition in sense (3), that is, an assertion concerning every member of a general class without exception." CP 2.370 Jeff> How do you interpret Peirce's objection to each? The context of CP 2.370 is a section about univerals that begins at 2.367. In the remainder of 2.370 and later, Peirce did not distinguish the positions of those three. He quoted Leibniz (in French) as saying "all the examples that confirm a general truth, no matter how many they are, are not sufficient to establish the universal necessity of that same truth." He then quoted a long German passage in which Kant says that its a serious mistake to conclude "whatever holds in most cases holds in all cases." In the remainder of that section and 2.371, Peirce ignored differences among Descartes, Leibniz, and Kant. His main conclusion was that they agreed that evidence for universals could not come from observations. Kant said that universals came from some "Erkentniss (understanding) a priori", but he did not explain where that Erkentnis came from. Peirce added "Descartes in particular, and Leibnitz in some measure, perhaps even Kant (though it would be very illogical for him to do so) did more or less attach weight to the irresistible apparent evidence, and to some degree to the catholic acceptance, of propositions as tending to persuade us of their truth; but not as criteria of their origin.". Although those three correctly recognized that observations alone could not guarantee the truth of univeersals, none of them had an adequate answer to the question about where the Erkentniss or other kind of understanding might come from. All three of them recognized that problem and wrote many words that Peirce did not find convincing (but he did not analyze their writings in that section). With his training in experimental science, starting at age 8, Peirce would agree with the three of them that observation alone was not sufficient to establish the truth of a universal or general proposition. However, scientific methodology (or his version of pragmaticism) could establish general truth to a high degree of certainty. But his principle of fallibilism meant that nothing could be absolutely certain, and his First Rule of Reason meant that everything must be open to questioning. There is no such thing as a universal principle that cannot be questioned, although there are many that we believe so strongly that we are willing to trust our lives to their truth. Flying in an airplane, for example, requires a high degree of faith in the science and engineering that produced it. As for the "thing in itself" and the "noumenon", Peirce's criticisms of Kant are justified. But Kant may be excused for not understanding modern scientific methodology. By the late 19th and early 20th c, Peirce recognized that the science of his day had produced results that people could trust with their lives -- cars, trains, bridges, airplanes, and electricity. That did not guarantee the absolute certainty of scientific "laws", but it meant that they deserved a high level of confidence. In conclusion, I believe that Jack could "update" Kant by identifying the noumenon with Peirce's search for scientific "laws" that have been tested to a high degree of confidence by scientific methodology. Peirce's final goal of a proof of pragmaticism was very close to Kant's goal of a proof of his noumena. I believe that Peirce, who had a century more experience with science, came closer than Kant. But I would give Kant partial credit. Maybe an A- or at least a B+. John
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