Jeffrey, List,
I guess there are two ways of classification: Creation and observation. Both make things. Creation is primary and produces the crude thing, the universal ground of it, like a first sketch. The thing may then be further specified (individuated) by observation. For a theist God is the creator, for a pantheist the universe is, and for an atheist chance and natural selection (evolution) is. I think that Peirce was a pantheist or maybe panentheist, because he said, that the universe has a quasi-mind. In any case, i think, that no thing is caused by itself, because it exists due to one or more of these institutions. I think a universal is generated by the universe. A human is generated by evolution, but evolution is controlled by the universe (by its laws). Is an individuated thing then set free, so it exists in itself? I wouldn´t say so, because it still is dependent on the universe`s laws. But a human can decide what to do by him/herself. So, is free will a thing in itself? And, in physical inanimate nature, is chance one? Chance and free will are not things you can touch, but concepts. But chance has existed before individuals capable of having concepts have existed, and chance is proven by chaos theory. But it still is a concept of the universe. So it is not in itself, but in the universe.
I think, to decide, whether you may speak of a thing in itself, it may be helpful to test, if the itself-aspect of a thing can be prescinded, discriminated, or dissociated from a thing, and if the product of one of these Peircean processes then is a part of reality, and therefore a thing too. I can´t do that (too abstract for me). Perhaps one of you can do that?
Best Regards, Helmut
Gesendet: Donnerstag, 08. Juni 2023 um 20:30 Uhr
Von: "Jeffrey Brian Downard" <[email protected]>
An: Kein Empfänger
Cc: "Peirce-L" <[email protected]>
Betreff: Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Re: The Thing In Itself (Kant and Peirce - Again). (Assemblage Formalisms - inference).
Von: "Jeffrey Brian Downard" <[email protected]>
An: Kein Empfänger
Cc: "Peirce-L" <[email protected]>
Betreff: Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Re: The Thing In Itself (Kant and Peirce - Again). (Assemblage Formalisms - inference).
Hello John, Mary, all,
I'd be happy to compare notes on Peirce's, Kant's, Leibniz's arguments and remarks about the intelligibility of a "thing in itself." As I've suggested earlier, it is helpful to read Kant's claims in light of his attempt to respond to Leibniz. Similarly, it is helpful to read Peirce's claims in light of his attempt to respond to Kant and, in turn, to Leibniz.
Given John's notes about individuating individuals who are biological twins, he appears to be interested in the logical and semantic character of Leibniz's two principles: (1) the identity of individuals that are indiscernible and (2) the indiscernibility of individuals that are identical.
In order to sort out the points of agreement and disagreement between Peirce, Kant and Leibniz on the application of those principles to actual things, it will be helpful to consider the differences in their respective accounts of how signs can be used to refer to individual objects as existing and as having qualities and real relations to other objects. That is, I think we can make progress on sorting out their disagreements by looking at their respective accounts of representation of actual individual's, the abstract qualities they may possess, and the real general laws that govern such individuals.
A fundamental disagreement is over the types of signs that are essential for cognition. Leibniz claims there is one fundamental type of sign, which is that of a general conception. The sensations that are part of our perceptual observations of actual objects are just confused general conceptions. Kant maintains that there are two basic types of signs, individual representations as perceptual "intuitions" of things as being at a place in time and space, and general conceptions. Peirce, of course, maintains that signs can be classified triadically based on their own character, that of the object and that of the interpretant—and the requisite relations between those three. The result is a richer theory of signs and relations than either Leibniz or Kant provide.
We need to interpret Peirce's responses to Kant's, or to Leibniz's claims about the intelligibility of a "thing in itself" in light of these differences in their accounts of signs and semiotic relations. Then, we need to consider different kinds of "things" that we might try to individuate, such as a rock, a human person or God. Contrast the attempts of these philosophers to clarify the grounds for individuating such various things as individuals, as compared to the grounds for understanding something—such as a law of causality--to be a real universal that governs actual individual objects.
Here is a passage from the CP where Peirce tries to diagnose an error by Kant and Leibniz:
Descartes, Leibnitz, Kant, and others appeal to the universality of certain truths as proving that they are not derived from observation, either directly or by legitimate probable inference. … Descartes, Leibnitz, and Kant more or less explicitly state that that which they say cannot be derived from observation, or legitimate probable inference from observation, is a universal proposition in sense (3), that is, an assertion concerning every member of a general class without exception. CP 2.370
How do you interpret Peirce's objection to each?
--Jeff
From: [email protected] <[email protected]> on behalf of John F Sowa <[email protected]>
Sent: Thursday, June 8, 2023 9:01 AM
To: Mary Libertin <[email protected]>
Cc: Peirce-L <[email protected]>; Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]>; [email protected] <[email protected]>
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Re: The Thing In Itself (Kant and Peirce - Again). (Assemblage Formalisms - inference).
Sent: Thursday, June 8, 2023 9:01 AM
To: Mary Libertin <[email protected]>
Cc: Peirce-L <[email protected]>; Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]>; [email protected] <[email protected]>
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Re: The Thing In Itself (Kant and Peirce - Again). (Assemblage Formalisms - inference).
Mary,
Thanks for citing that book.
Note to all: If anybody has a copy of that book (or any other reference pro or con the issue of the "thing in itself"), please find and send us any excerpt or summary that might clarify these issues.
After further thought about this issue, my doubts about Peirce's attempts to refute Kant's claims are getting stronger. Just consider the case of identical twins. When they are in the same room, it's clear that they are two distinct individuals. But the differences between them are minor aspects of their appearance. Are there any considerations other than surface observations that could distinguish them as two distinct "things in themselves"?
For mass produced items today -- ranging from newly minted coins to bottles of beer -- there is no way to distinguish their "ding an sich" except for tiny discrepancies from their intended specifications.
John
________________________________________
From: "Mary Libertin" <[email protected]>
Sent: 6/8/23 9:58 AM
Sent: 6/8/23 9:58 AM
John, Peirce-list
For Our Information: Oxford UP has just published a book appropriate to this discussion.
- Peirce on Inference: Validity, Strength, and the Community of Inquirers, By Richard Kenneth Atkins
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