List: For the record, Peirce describes the first, second, and third correlates of a triadic relation as "simplest," "of middling complexity," and "most complex" right before explicitly identifying the representamen/sign, object, and interpretant as the three correlates of one such relation (CP 2.235-242, EP 2:290, 1903); and he later outlines the two objects and three interpretants in terms of genuine and degenerate in his Logic Notebook, as follows.
CSP: A sign is a Priman which is Secundan to an Object and is Tertian in determining an Interpretant into Secundanity to that Object. It has two Objects, the *immediate*, to which it is *degenerately* Secundan, the *dynamic*, to which it is *genuinely* Secundan. It has three Interpretants, the *immediate*, to which it is primarily Tertian, the *dynamic*, to which it is secundally Tertian, the *rational*, to which it is genuinely Tertian. (R 339:247r, 1905 Jul 7) CSP: The Interpretant is Threefold. The Normal Interpretant is the Genuine Interpretant, embracing all that the Sign could reveal concerning the Object to a sufficiently penetrating mind, being more than any mind, however penetrating, could conclude from it, since there is no end to the distinct conclusions that could be drawn concerning the Object from any Sign. ... This triplet concerns the Dynamical, or Genuine Object. It is misleading to call it the *real* object, since it may be unreal. It is the object that truly determines the sign. (R 339:277r&279r, 1906 Apr 2-3) It seems clear that the rational and normal interpretants in these passages correspond directly to what Peirce calls the eventual and final interpretants elsewhere, reflecting his confession "that my own conception of this third interpretant is not yet quite free from mist" (CP 4.536, 1906). In context, "primarily Tertian" clearly corresponds to doubly degenerate (1ns of 3ns) and "secundally Tertian" corresponds to degenerate (2ns of 3ns). Again, these are results of phaneroscopic analysis--1ns, 2ns, and 3ns are "the most universal categories of elements of all experience" (CP 1.417, c. 1896), by no means limited to Peirce's various trichotomies for sign classification. Note also that the three divisions in his best-known taxonomy are according to the nature of the representamen/sign *itself*, its *relation *to its object, and its *relation *to its interpretant (CP 2.243, EP 2:291, 1903). The representamen/sign, object, and interpretant are all *correlates*, not relations, although they only serve as such *within *their genuine triadic relation to each other. As Peirce states repeatedly (bold added in quotations below), the representamen/sign *stands in *or *has *that relation to its object and interpretant, it is not that relation *itself*. CSP: A *representamen*, or sign, is anything which *stands, in any respect, at once in a relation* of correspondence to a *correlate*, called its *object* and to another *correlate*, its *interpretant*. which is a possible representamen determined by the first and referring to the same object. (R 1147, c. 1901-2) CSP: A *Sign*, or *Representamen*, is a First which *stands in such a genuine triadic relation* to a Second, called its *Object*, as to be capable of determining a Third, called its *Interpretant*, to assume the same triadic relation to its Object in which it stands itself to the same Object. (CP 2.274, EP 2:272-273, 1903) CSP: A *Representamen *is the First *Correlate of a triadic relation*, the Second *Correlate *being termed its *Object*, and the possible Third *Correlate *being termed its *Interpretant*, by which triadic relation the possible Interpretant is determined to be the First Correlate of the same triadic relation to the same Object, and for some possible Interpretant. (CP 2.242, EP 2:290, 1903) CSP: A sign therefore is *an object which is in relation* to its object on the one hand and to an interpretant on the other, in such a way as to bring the interpretant into a relation to the object, corresponding to its own relation to the object. (CP 8.332, 1904) CSP: As a *medium*, the Sign is *essentially in a triadic relation*, to its Object which determines it, and to its Interpretant which it determines. (EP 2:544n22, 1906) CSP: A sign, therefore, *has a triadic relation* to its Object and to its Interpretant. (CP 8.343, EP 2:482, 1908) Again, although that relation can be called "representing," I prefer to call it "mediating" because Peirce more generally defines a sign as "anything, of whatsoever mode of being, which mediates between an object and an interpretant" (EP 2:410, 1907). Regards, Jon On Tue, Jan 9, 2024 at 5:08 PM Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com> wrote: > Jerry, List: > > I am honestly not sure exactly what all you are asking me to address here > and how my engineering background is relevant. What do you mean by "the > origins of the 'triadic relations'"? From what are we seeking to > distinguish Peirce's semeiotic? What do you have in mind as *semantic* > aspects of the triadic relations? > > My understanding is that the immediate object and immediate interpretant > are *internal *to the sign, while the dynamical object, dynamical > interpretant, and final interpretant are *external *to the sign. > Presumably, that is why Peirce's late taxonomies for sign classification > include separate trichotomies for the sign's dyadic relations with the > latter three correlates, but not the former two. > > Regarding where syntax originates and resides, this passage seems relevant. > > CSP: A single Assertion has but a single Predicate; but the simplest > Assertion has more than one Subject, unless it be such a statement as "It > rains," where one of the Subjects is expressed otherwise than in words. But > I must explain myself more fully, and in the way which alone will be truly > expressive, namely, by examples. I will, however, first remark that the > Proposition that embodies an Assertion has the same Subjects and Predicate > as the Assertion itself. Take the Proposition "Cain killed Abel." This is > identically the same Proposition as "Abel was killed by Cain": It is only > the grammatical dress that is different. Other things being equal, > everybody will prefer the former. Why? Because it is simpler; but why is it > simpler? Because in putting the cause before the effect, it in that respect > diagrammatizes the truth. What are the Subjects of this Proposition[?] > Cain, first: that is not only a Subject of the Proposition, but is the > principal Subject of the Assertion which a historian would naturally make. > But in the Proposition Cain and Abel are, as Subjects, on one footing > precisely (or almost precisely, for Cain is preponderant in causality). But > besides these, "killed" = committed *murder* upon, is a third Subject, > since no study of the words alone, without extraneous experience, would > enable the Ad[d]ressee to understand it. What, then, is left to serve as > Predicate? Nothing but the *flow of causation*. It is true that we are > more acquainted even with that in Experience. When we see a babe in its > cradle bending its arms this way and that, while a smile of exultation > plays upon its features, it is making acquaintance with the flow of > causation. So acquaintance with the flow of causation so early as to make > it familiar before speech is so far acquired that an assertion can be > syntactically framed, and it is embodied in the syntax of every tongue. (R > 664, 1910) > > > The proposition "Cain killed Abel" has three subjects denoted by its three > words--the dyadic relation of killing and its two correlates, Cain and > Abel, all of which require collateral experience/observation to > understand--and exactly one predicate, a *pure *or *continuous *predicate > that "is signified as the logical connexion between the Subjects" (R 611, > 1908) only by its *syntax*. As Peirce explains elsewhere, "A proposition > can be separated into a predicate and subjects in more ways than one," but > this approach is "the proper way in logic" (NEM 3:885, 1908) because "when > we have carried analysis so far as to leave only a continuous predicate, we > have carried it to its ultimate elements" (SS 72, 1908). For more on this, > I highly recommend Francesco Bellucci's 2013 paper about it ( > https://www.academia.edu/11685812/Peirces_Continuous_Predicates). > > In the Beta part of Existential Graphs (EG), there are two ways of > indexically denoting subjects--lines of identity for indefinite > individuals, and names for general concepts--while the pure/continuous > predicate is again iconically signified by the syntax, in this case the > arrangement of the lines and names (as well as any shaded areas for > negation) on the sheet of assertion that represents the universe of > discourse. Attributing concepts to individuals by attaching names to lines > increases the information being conveyed by making those individuals more > definite (increasing logical depth) and those concepts more determinate > (increasing logical breadth). As a *dyadic *relation, the EG for killing > has two lines and three names, while as genuine *triadic *relations, the > EGs for representing/mediating and giving have three lines and four names > each (as I have noted previously). > > When it comes to ordinal numbers, phaneroscopic analysis of the genuine > triadic relation of representing/mediating establishes that the sign is the > first (simplest) correlate, the object is the second (of middling > complexity), and the interpretant is the third (most complex). The upshot > is that there is only the genuine correlate for the sign itself, there are > genuine (dynamical) and degenerate (immediate) correlates for the object, > and there are genuine (final), degenerate (dynamical), and doubly > degenerate (immediate) correlates for the interpretant. Nevertheless, the > dyadic relations of determining are always from the object through the sign > to the interpretant, such that the sign is passive with respect to the > object and active with respect to the interpretant (EP 2:544n22, 1906). > Again ... > > CSP: I will say that a sign is anything, of whatsoever mode of being, > which mediates between an object and an interpretant; since it is both > determined by the object *relatively to the interpretant*, and determines > the interpretant *in reference to the object*, in such wise as to cause > the interpretant to be determined by the object through the mediation of > this "sign." The object and the interpretant are thus merely the two > correlates of the sign; the one being antecedent, the other consequent of > the sign. (EP 2:410, 1907) > > > Regards, > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > > On Mon, Jan 8, 2024 at 10:06 PM Jerry LR Chandler < > jerry_lr_chand...@icloud.com> wrote: > >> Following Robert’s efforts to clarify meanings of terminology in symbolic >> logics... >> >> On Jan 8, 2024, at 9:45 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com> >> wrote: >> >> The directionality of semiosis is such that the object determines the >> sign while being unaffected by that sign, and the sign determines the >> interpretant while being unaffected by that interpretant. >> >> Jon: >> >> Given your background as an engineer, I would appreciate your opinion on >> the following. >> >> In recent years, I have turned my attention to the distinctions between >> the classical philosophy of signs, originating in the medical arts and >> other simpler perspectives of communications. Let’s call these texts as >> “semiology” texts. In these writings, I do not find any reason not to >> assume that both the object (detected by writer) and the signs that were >> described by the ancients in scripts were naturally external to the writer. >> So, the questions arises, how does one locate the origins of the “triadic >> relations”? >> >> Then the question arises, how does one distinguish CSP’s “semiotics”. >> Which semantic aspects of the “triadic relations” are external? >> Which semantic aspects of the "triadic relations are internal to the >> describer? >> >> In other words, Where does the syntax for triadic relation originate? >> And, Where does the syntax for triadic relation reside? >> >> And, how would such a determination fix the differentiation between the >> adjectives (…ness) and the numbers, either / or cardinal or ordinal? …. >> neither /nor? >> Cheers >> >> Jerry >> >
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