| jerry
Yes- you can feel a headache without going through the rather complicated analysis that it’s a triadic experience.
No- I don’t think the triad requires ‘exterior objects’ in the sense of being external to the person. You can mutter through your own thoughts all alone! But I think the notion of external does apply to the semiotic process. Take a cell- it necessarily interacts with its surroundings- otherwise it would be dead - and these interactions function within the triadic process. In that sense - yes , semiosis functions by an entity interacting with its exterior.
And no - the triadic relation is basic within the physical and chemical and biological realms. Ie the non symbolic realms. But you already know this
Edwina Sent from my iPhone On Jan 11, 2024, at 11:43 AM, Jerry LR Chandler <jerry_lr_chand...@icloud.com> wrote:
Edwina, List.
Very interesting response.
The absence of Persian terminology about semiotics is notable.
In other words, I can have a feeling of a headache Without any notion of triadicity!u
The question becomes one of the role of cognition in creating descriptions of experiences. Does this suggest to you that Peircian semiotics is only for exterior objects?
Is the triadic relation merrily a suggestion for determining a feeling that can be given symbolic descriptions that can be communicated to the Other?
Cheers. Jerry.
Sent from my iPad On Jan 11, 2024, at 8:11 AM, Edwina Taborsky <edwina.tabor...@gmail.com> wrote:
Jerry - list
Ii think you yourself know the answer - but…let’s say, the word ‘ headache’ = or any sound
1] If you have, within your mind, a developed, learned knowledge base that recognizes this sound as having-a-meaning-, then, the triadic interaction is:
Sound-> Memory or Knowledge Base -> Meaning of the sound as a word
2] If you don’t have this sound within your mind’s knowledge base, then, the triadic interaction is:
Sound->Memory or Knowledge Base -> noise/ ..the ‘meaning’ is empty…and the sound entropically dissipates, so to speak.
I like your definitions of ‘relation’ - particularly the sense of ’to bear or to carry’.. I think that describes the semiosic relation quite well.
By the way - the Sinsign is not a single term, but is the mediative Represetnamen within a triad, where the Representamen is in a mode of Secondness.
So- all of life functions within these triadic relations…and , of course, that means that there is even no such thing as a singular triad. Everything is networking with other triads.
Edwina
On Jan 10, 2024, at 10:04 PM, Jerry LR Chandler <jerry_lr_chand...@icloud.com> wrote:
List:
Well, I will continue to search for an adequate semantic _expression_ for my feelings about the meanings (plural) of a triadic relation. Perhaps it would be helpful to note that the meaning of “triadic” is a critical part of the question, but not particularly difficult or controversial (outside the CSP community.) The term “relation” is highly controversial throughout the kingdom of mathematics. The word “relation” is derived from the Latin, “relates” (See the Wikipedia declension below) , putatively meaning to bear or to carry, including sense of “bearing a child”, that is, the biological sense. That is, in the genetic sense. In mathematics, it may mean to “entail”, that is, as an inheritance from a prior sentence or terms of a sentence. So, the implication of a family of relatives may be intrinsic (symbolically) to a set of triadic relations.
From these perspectives, I now give an examples. When one simply states a sinsign, a single term, how is the meaning interpreted as a “triadic relation”.
“HEADACHE”.
Or
“ORANGE”
How does one ascribe meaning to the “triadic relation” in the sense of interrogatories - What, Who, When, Where, How and Why ? (Or any other sense or sensory mode you are capable of exploring.)
In the cognitive (grammatical) sense, what locates the three predicates(?) (Or, what locates the three subjects?) Or are the three terms of the triadic relations merely adjectives?
Beyond what CSP may have opined about, personal interpretations of CSP’s phrases are welcome.
(Yes, Robert, your’s in particular! As you are aware of the role of “ordered pairs” in set theory.) (Ben: In part, this refers back to your “tetradicity” if that term is correctly remembered.)
Alternatively, is this a meaningful conundrum?
Cheers
Jerry
Participle- Perfect passive participle of referō
- (having been) driven or carried back
- (having been) returned, restored, repaid
- (having been) reported
- (having been) reconsidered
On Jan 10, 2024, at 1:28 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote:
List
I think the quotations provided by JAS do not change the meaning of the quotations I provided to show that the categories are described by Peirce as having both genuine and degenerate modes. That is, the category of Secondness has both a genuine and degenerate mode; the category of Thirdness has a genuine, a degenerate in the first degree, a degenerate in the third degree.
These terms of ‘genuine’ and ‘degenerate' are completely different in meaning from the quotation provided by JAS
CSP: A sign is a Priman which is Secundan to an Object and is Tertian in determining an Interpretant into Secundanity to that Object. It has two Objects, the immediate, to which it is degenerately Secundan, the dynamic, to which it is genuinely Secundan. It has three Interpretants, the immediate, to which it is primarily Tertian, the dynamic, to which it is secundally Tertian, the rational, to which it is genuinely Tertian. (R 339:247r, 1905 Jul 7)
The above terms , with, eg, reference to the two objects, means only that the Immediate Object has a ‘degenerate’ or less intact’ form of informational content than the Dynamic Object. These terms, I suggest, refer to the determination of the semiosic process - and have nothing to do with the categories. That is, although JAS declares:
In context, "primarily Tertian" clearly corresponds to doubly degenerate (1ns of 3ns) and "secundally Tertian" corresponds to degenerate (2ns of 3ns)
I continue to disagree, since this is setting up the semiotic triad and hexagon as having the Interpretants all in a categorical mode of Thirdness! But we can see from even the list of ten classes, that there is only ONE class where the Interpretant is in a mode of Thirdness - the Argument Symbolic Legisign. [See 2.234-264 and also 8.341]. All the other nine classes have the Interpretant in a mode of either Firstness [there are SIX of these] or in a mode of Secondness [ there are three of these].
With regard to the following quotation
CSP: A representamen, or sign, is anything which stands, in any respect, at once in a relation of correspondence to a correlate, called its object and to another correlate, its interpretant. which is a possible representamen determined by the first and referring to the same object. (R 1147, c. 1901-2)
I consider that the triad is made up of three correlates or relations, and is irreducible. My reading of the above is that the mediate Representamen/Sign does not stand in - which suggests some kind of passive existence - but actually functions, in that it acts; it transforms the information of the Object into a meaning, an Interpretant, according to the knowledge base /habits, held within the Sign/Representamen in itself.
I see no evidence in the many quotations provided that " the representamen/sign stands in or has that relation to its object and interpretant, it is not that relation itself.”
I consider that the Sign/Representamen is a mediate node in the triadl; it is an active relation and its function is to do just that - mediate between the Object and Interpretant. Therefore - I agree that the Sign/Representamen can be defined as
"anything, of whatsoever mode of being, which mediates between an object and an interpretant" (EP 2:410, 1907).
And note - that Peirce says ‘of whosoever mode of being’ - which means that this Sign/Representamen can function in any of the modal categories - and we can see in the ten classes, that it is in the mode of Firstness only once, in the mode of Thirdness six times, and in the mode of Secondness, three times.
Edwina
On Jan 10, 2024, at 1:51 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com> wrote:
List:
For the record, Peirce describes the first, second, and third correlates of a triadic relation as "simplest," "of middling complexity," and "most complex" right before explicitly identifying the representamen/sign, object, and interpretant as the three correlates of one such relation (CP 2.235-242, EP 2:290, 1903); and he later outlines the two objects and three interpretants in terms of genuine and degenerate in his Logic Notebook, as follows.
CSP: A sign is a Priman which is Secundan to an Object and is Tertian in determining an Interpretant into Secundanity to that Object. It has two Objects, the immediate, to which it is degenerately Secundan, the dynamic, to which it is genuinely Secundan. It has three Interpretants, the immediate, to which it is primarily Tertian, the dynamic, to which it is secundally Tertian, the rational, to which it is genuinely Tertian. (R 339:247r, 1905 Jul 7)
CSP: The Interpretant is Threefold. The Normal Interpretant is the Genuine Interpretant, embracing all that the Sign could reveal concerning the Object to a sufficiently penetrating mind, being more than any mind, however penetrating, could conclude from it, since there is no end to the distinct conclusions that could be drawn concerning the Object from any Sign. ... This triplet concerns the Dynamical, or Genuine Object. It is misleading to call it the real object, since it may be unreal. It is the object that truly determines the sign. (R 339:277r&279r, 1906 Apr 2-3)
It seems clear that the rational and normal interpretants in these passages correspond directly to what Peirce calls the eventual and final interpretants elsewhere, reflecting his confession "that my own conception of this third interpretant is not yet quite free from mist" (CP 4.536, 1906). In context, "primarily Tertian" clearly corresponds to doubly degenerate (1ns of 3ns) and "secundally Tertian" corresponds to degenerate (2ns of 3ns). Again, these are results of phaneroscopic analysis--1ns, 2ns, and 3ns are "the most universal categories of elements of all experience" (CP 1.417, c. 1896), by no means limited to Peirce's various trichotomies for sign classification.
Note also that the three divisions in his best-known taxonomy are according to the nature of the representamen/sign itself, its relation to its object, and its relation to its interpretant (CP 2.243, EP 2:291, 1903). The representamen/sign, object, and interpretant are all correlates, not relations, although they only serve as such within their genuine triadic relation to each other. As Peirce states repeatedly (bold added in quotations below), the representamen/sign stands in or has that relation to its object and interpretant, it is not that relation itself.
CSP: A representamen, or sign, is anything which stands, in any respect, at once in a relation of correspondence to a correlate, called its object and to another correlate, its interpretant. which is a possible representamen determined by the first and referring to the same object. (R 1147, c. 1901-2)
CSP: A Sign, or Representamen, is a First which stands in such a genuine triadic relation to a Second, called its Object, as to be capable of determining a Third, called its Interpretant, to assume the same triadic relation to its Object in which it stands itself to the same Object. (CP 2.274, EP 2:272-273, 1903)
CSP: A Representamen is the First Correlate of a triadic relation, the Second Correlate being termed its Object, and the possible Third Correlate being termed its Interpretant, by which triadic relation the possible Interpretant is determined to be the First Correlate of the same triadic relation to the same Object, and for some possible Interpretant. (CP 2.242, EP 2:290, 1903)
CSP: A sign therefore is an object which is in relation to its object on the one hand and to an interpretant on the other, in such a way as to bring the interpretant into a relation to the object, corresponding to its own relation to the object. (CP 8.332, 1904)
CSP: As a medium, the Sign is essentially in a triadic relation, to its Object which determines it, and to its Interpretant which it determines. (EP 2:544n22, 1906)
CSP: A sign, therefore, has a triadic relation to its Object and to its Interpretant. (CP 8.343, EP 2:482, 1908)
Again, although that relation can be called "representing," I prefer to call it "mediating" because Peirce more generally defines a sign as "anything, of whatsoever mode of being, which mediates between an object and an interpretant" (EP 2:410, 1907).
Jerry, List:
I am honestly not sure exactly what all you are asking me to address here and how my engineering background is relevant. What do you mean by "the origins of the 'triadic relations'"? From what are we seeking to distinguish Peirce's semeiotic? What do you have in mind as semantic aspects of the triadic relations?
My understanding is that the immediate object and immediate interpretant are internal to the sign, while the dynamical object, dynamical interpretant, and final interpretant are external to the sign. Presumably, that is why Peirce's late taxonomies for sign classification include separate trichotomies for the sign's dyadic relations with the latter three correlates, but not the former two.
Regarding where syntax originates and resides, this passage seems relevant.
CSP: A
single Assertion has but a single Predicate; but the simplest Assertion has
more than one Subject, unless it be such a statement as "It rains,"
where one of the Subjects is expressed otherwise than in words. But I must
explain myself more fully, and in the way which alone will be truly expressive,
namely, by examples. I will, however, first remark that the Proposition that
embodies an Assertion has the same Subjects and Predicate as the Assertion
itself. Take the Proposition "Cain killed Abel." This is identically
the same Proposition as "Abel was killed by Cain": It is only the
grammatical dress that is different. Other things being equal, everybody will
prefer the former. Why? Because it is simpler; but why is it simpler? Because
in putting the cause before the effect, it in that respect diagrammatizes the
truth. What are the Subjects of this Proposition[?] Cain, first: that is not
only a Subject of the Proposition, but is the principal Subject of the
Assertion which a historian would naturally make. But in the Proposition Cain
and Abel are, as Subjects, on one footing precisely (or almost precisely, for
Cain is preponderant in causality). But besides these, "killed" =
committed murder upon, is a third Subject, since no study of
the words alone, without extraneous experience, would enable the Ad[d]ressee to
understand it. What, then, is left to serve as Predicate? Nothing but the flow
of causation. It is true that we are more acquainted even with that in
Experience. When we see a babe in its cradle bending its arms this way and
that, while a smile of exultation plays upon its features, it is making
acquaintance with the flow of causation. So acquaintance with the flow of
causation so early as to make it familiar before speech is so far acquired that
an assertion can be syntactically framed, and it is embodied in the syntax of
every tongue. (R 664, 1910)
The proposition "Cain killed Abel" has three subjects denoted by its three words--the dyadic relation of killing and its two correlates, Cain and Abel, all of which require collateral experience/observation to understand--and exactly one predicate, a pure or continuous predicate that "is signified as the logical connexion between the Subjects" (R 611, 1908) only by its syntax. As Peirce explains elsewhere, "A proposition can be separated into a predicate and subjects in more ways than one," but this approach is "the proper way in logic" (NEM 3:885, 1908) because "when we have carried analysis so far as to leave only a continuous predicate, we have carried it to its ultimate elements" (SS 72, 1908). For more on this, I highly recommend Francesco Bellucci's 2013 paper about it ( https://www.academia.edu/11685812/Peirces_Continuous_Predicates).
In the Beta part of Existential Graphs (EG), there are two ways of indexically denoting subjects--lines of identity for indefinite individuals, and names for general concepts--while the pure/continuous predicate is again iconically signified by the syntax, in this case the arrangement of the lines and names (as well as any shaded areas for negation) on the sheet of assertion that represents the universe of discourse. Attributing concepts to individuals by attaching names to lines increases the information being conveyed by making those individuals more definite (increasing logical depth) and those concepts more determinate (increasing logical breadth). As a dyadic relation, the EG for killing has two lines and three names, while as genuine triadic relations, the EGs for representing/mediating and giving have three lines and four names each (as I have noted previously).
When it comes to ordinal numbers, phaneroscopic analysis of the genuine triadic relation of representing/mediating establishes that the sign is the first (simplest) correlate, the object is the second (of middling complexity), and the interpretant is the third (most complex). The upshot is that there is only the genuine correlate for the sign itself, there are genuine (dynamical) and degenerate (immediate) correlates for the object, and there are genuine (final), degenerate (dynamical), and doubly degenerate (immediate) correlates for the interpretant. Nevertheless, the dyadic relations of determining are always from the object through the sign to the interpretant, such that the sign is passive with respect to the object and active with respect to the interpretant (EP 2:544n22, 1906). Again ...
CSP: I will say that a sign is anything, of whatsoever mode of being, which mediates between an object and an interpretant; since it is both determined by the object relatively to the interpretant, and determines the interpretant in reference to the object, in such wise as to cause the interpretant to be determined by the object through the mediation of this "sign." The object and the interpretant are thus merely the two correlates of the sign; the one being antecedent, the other consequent of the sign. (EP 2:410, 1907)
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian Following Robert’s efforts to clarify meanings of terminology in symbolic logics...
The directionality of semiosis is such that the object determines the sign while being unaffected by that sign, and the sign determines the interpretant while being unaffected by that interpretant.
Jon:
Given your background as an engineer, I would appreciate your opinion on the following.
In recent years, I have turned my attention to the distinctions between the classical philosophy of signs, originating in the medical arts and other simpler perspectives of communications. Let’s call these texts as “semiology” texts. In these writings, I do not find any reason not to assume that both the object (detected by writer) and the signs that were described by the ancients in scripts were naturally external to the writer. So, the questions arises, how does one locate the origins of the “triadic relations”?
Then the question arises, how does one distinguish CSP’s “semiotics”. Which semantic aspects of the “triadic relations” are external? Which semantic aspects of the "triadic relations are internal to the describer?
In other words, Where does the syntax for triadic relation originate? And, Where does the syntax for triadic relation reside?
And, how would such a determination fix the differentiation between the adjectives (…ness) and the numbers, either / or cardinal or ordinal? …. neither /nor? Cheers
Jerry
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