Jerry, List:
Every word is a token of a type--in Peirce's 1903 taxonomy, a replica of a
rhematic symbol or symbolic rheme, and therefore a peculiar kind of
rhematic indexical sinsign.
CSP: Eighth, a Rhematic Symbol, or Symbolic Rheme, is a sign connected with
its Object by an association of general ideas in such a way that its
Replica calls up an image in the mind which image, owing to certain habits
or dispositions of that mind, tends to produce a general concept, and the
Replica is interpreted as a sign of an Object that is an instance of that
concept. Thus, the Rhematic Symbol either is, or is very like, what the
logicians call a general term. The Rhematic Symbol, like any Symbol, is
necessarily itself of the nature of a general type, and is thus a Legisign.
Its Replica, however, is a Rhematic Indexical Sinsign of a peculiar kind,
in that the image it suggests to the mind acts upon a Symbol already in
that mind to give rise to a general concept. ... A Replica of the word
"camel" is likewise a Rhematic Indexical Sinsign, being really affected,
through the knowledge of camels, common to the speaker and auditor, by the
real camel it denotes, even if this one is not individually known to the
auditor; and it is through such real connection that the word "camel" calls
up the idea of a camel. The same thing is true of the word "phoenix." For
although no phoenix really exists, real descriptions of the phoenix are
well known to the speaker and his auditor; and thus the word is really
affected by the Object denoted. (CP 2.261, EP 2:295, 1903)
We can substitute "headache," "orange," or any other common noun for
"camel" in this passage. The word by itself is a name, its dynamical object
is the general concept that it denotes, its immediate object is the idea
that can be associated with it by virtue of previous collateral experience,
its immediate interpretant is its verbal definition describing the range of
meanings that it *possibly could* have, its dynamical interpretant is any
effect that it *actually does *have, and its final interpretant is the
effect that it *necessarily would *have under ideal circumstances, after
infinite inquiry by an infinite community. However, "there can be no
isolated sign" (CP 4.551, 1906)--each dynamical interpretant is affected by
the context of the word's utterance and the interpreter's established
habits of interpretation. Moreover ...
CSP: The purpose of every sign is to express "fact," and by being joined
with other signs, to approach as nearly as possible to determining an
interpretant which would be the *perfect Truth*, the absolute Truth, and as
such (at least, we may use this language) would be the very Universe. (EP
2:304, c. 1901)
CSP: A *state of things* is an abstract constituent part of reality, of
such a nature that a proposition is needed to represent it. There is but
one *individual*, or completely determinate, state of things, namely, the
all of reality. A. *fact *is so highly a prescissively abstract state of
things, that it can be wholly represented in a simple proposition, and the
term "simple," here, has no absolute meaning, but is merely a comparative
expression. (CP 5.549, EP 2:378, 1906)
CSP: {A]n Argument is no more built up of Propositions than a motion is
built up of positions. So to regard it is to neglect the very essence of
it. ... [P]ropositions are either roughly described states of
Thought-motion, or are artificial creations intended to render the
description of Thought-motion possible; and Names are creations of a second
order serving to render the representation of propositions possible. (R
295, 1906)
CSP: [N]o sign of a thing or kind of thing--the ideas of signs to which
concepts belong--can arise except in a proposition; and no logical
operation upon a proposition can result in anything but a proposition; so
that non-propositional signs can only exist as constituents of
propositions. But it is not true, as ordinarily represented, that a
proposition can be built up of non-propositional signs. The truth is that
concepts are nothing but indefinite problematic judgments. The concept of *man
*[or headache or orange] necessarily involves the thought of the possible
being of a man [or headache or orange]; and thus it is precisely the
judgment, "There may be a man."(CP 4.583, 1906)
In short, words as names of concepts are artifacts used to formulate
propositions describing facts prescinded from the real and continuous
inferential process of semiosis. That is why Existential Graphs, as
individual frames in "a moving-picture of Thought" (CP 4.11, 1906), always
represent propositions. In the Beta part, a name typically cannot be
scribed by itself, it must be attached to at least one line of identity. As
I said before, this attribution of a general (indeterminate) concept to an
indefinite individual makes the former more determinate and the latter more
definite. The logical meaning of a concept (second grade of clearness) is
the continuum of all possible propositions that would truthfully affirm or
deny it of something, while its pragmatistic meaning (third grade of
clearness) is a general mental habit described by a subjunctive conditional
proposition.
CSP: Consider what effects that might conceivably have practical bearings
you conceive the object of your conception to have: then the general mental
habit that consists in the production of these effects is the whole meaning
of your concept. (R 318, 1907)
CSP: I do not deny that a concept, proposition, or argument may be a
logical interpretant. I only insist that it cannot be the final logical
interpretant, for the reason that it is itself a sign of that very kind
that has itself a logical interpretant. The habit alone, though it may be a
sign in some other way, is not a sign in that way in which the sign of
which it is the logical interpretant is a sign. The habit conjoined with
the motive and the conditions has the action for its energetic
interpretant; but action cannot be a logical interpretant, because it lacks
generality. The concept which is a logical interpretant is only imperfectly
so. It somewhat partakes of the nature of a verbal definition, and is as
inferior to the habit, and much in the same way, as a verbal definition is
inferior to the real definition. The deliberately formed, self-analyzing
habit,--self-analyzing because formed by the aid of analysis of the
exercises that nourished it,--is the living definition, the veritable and
final logical interpretant. Consequently, the most perfect account of a
concept that words can convey will consist in a description of the habit
which that concept is calculated to produce. But how otherwise can a habit
be described than by a description of the kind of action to which it gives
rise, with the specification of the conditions and of the motive? (EP
2:418, 1907)
Regards,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
On Wed, Jan 10, 2024 at 9:00 PM Jerry LR Chandler <
[email protected]> wrote:
> List:
>
> Well, I will continue to search for an adequate semantic expression for my
> feelings about the meanings (plural) of a triadic relation.
> Perhaps it would be helpful to note that the meaning of “triadic” is a
> critical part of the question, but not particularly difficult or
> controversial (outside the CSP community.)
> The term “relation” is highly controversial throughout the kingdom of
> mathematics.
> The word “relation” is derived from the Latin, “relates”
> (See the Wikipedia declension below) , putatively meaning to bear or to
> carry, including sense of “bearing a child”, that is, the biological
> sense. That is, in the genetic sense. In mathematics, it may mean to
> “entail”, that is, as an inheritance from a prior sentence or terms of a
> sentence. So, the implication of a family of relatives may be intrinsic
> (symbolically) to a set of triadic relations.
>
> From these perspectives, I now give an examples.
> When one simply states a sinsign, a single term, how is the meaning
> interpreted as a “triadic relation”.
>
> “HEADACHE”.
>
> Or
>
> “ORANGE”
>
> How does one ascribe meaning to the “triadic relation” in the sense of
> interrogatories - What, Who, When, Where, How and Why ? (Or any other
> sense or sensory mode you are capable of exploring.)
>
> In the cognitive (grammatical) sense, what locates the three predicates(?)
> (Or, what locates the three subjects?) Or are the three terms of the
> triadic relations merely adjectives?
>
> Beyond what CSP may have opined about, personal interpretations of CSP’s
> phrases are welcome.
>
> (Yes, Robert, your’s in particular! As you are aware of the role of
> “ordered pairs” in set theory.)
> (Ben: In part, this refers back to your “tetradicity” if that term is
> correctly remembered.)
>
> Alternatively, is this a meaningful conundrum?
>
> Cheers
>
> Jerry
> Participle
>
> *relātus* (*feminine* *relāta
> <https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/relata#Latin>*, *neuter* *relātum
> <https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/relatum#Latin>*); *first
> <https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/Appendix:Latin_first_declension>/second-declension
> <https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/Appendix:Latin_second_declension> participle*
>
> 1. Perfect passive participle of *referō
> <https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/refero>*
> 1. (having been) driven <https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/driven> or
> carried <https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/carried> back
> 2. (having been) returned <https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/returned>
> , restored <https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/restored>, repaid
> <https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/repaid>
> 3. (having been) reported <https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/reported>
> 4. (having been) reconsidered
> <https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/reconsidered>
>
>
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at
https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at
https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links!
► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON
PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] .
► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to [email protected]
with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the
body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html .
► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and
co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
