List, I agree with JAS on the architectonic character of the classification of the sciences. I want to complement what he says further and be even more precise about Peirce's deeper thinking. Indeed, JAS is perfectly suitable to note that applying the principle of classification (which Peirce borrows from Auguste Comte, revisiting it as JAS mentioned) leads to placing the Special Sciences in a position to receive their principles from semiotics. But strictly speaking, applying the principle from the first trichotomy of the Sciences of Discovery (CP 1.180) must lead to the more general conclusion that semiotics itself receives its principles from Mathematics and Philosophy (or Cenoscopy). More precisely, as we progress through the successive trichotomies, we see that semiotics receives its principles from a chain of dependencies that necessarily begins with Mathematics and continues with Phenomenology, Aesthetics, Ethics, and Logic (the science of the general laws of signs), which then trichotomizes into Speculative Grammar, Critic and Methodeutic, before providing its principles to Metaphysics.
Peirce is very precise on this point and on what needs to happen in the minds of the scientists concerned: *I set out from Comte's well-known scheme (or schemes). It seemed to me that this embodied a most striking truth about the relations of sciences, along with some glowing falsities. That truth I conceived, and still conceive, to be that the results of one science, A, will often be applied by another science, B, as principles or tools wherewith to solve its problems (not of course, without research of its own), while science, B, will perhaps suggest problems to science, A, but will not furnish it with any great aid in solving its problems. I thought I ought to use this principle of Comte's for all it was worth, without allowing it to run away with me. For what I wish to produce is a scheme which shall exhibit, as far as possible, the most real affinities of the different branches of science as these sciences exist in the minds of those who are now actively pursuing them, or better, as these men are coming to regard these affinities. *(MS 1339: p.4-5) Peirce situates this schema in the Well of Truth, a metaphor that deserves our attention, for it is in this Well that the Sciences of Discovery, and hence scientific knowledge, will be built: [ …] *Auguste Comte wrote that the sciences form a sort of ladder descending into the Well of truth, each one leading on to another, those which are more concrete and special drawing their principles **from those** which are more abstract and general. *(CP 2.119) *Every systematic philosopher must provide himself a classification of the sciences. Comte first proposed to arrange the sciences in a series of steps, each leading another. This general idea may be adopted, and we may adapt our phraseology to the image of the Well of truth with flights of stairs leading down into it *(MS 1345, p.001, undated, NEM, vol III.2: 1122) The first step of the ladder into the Well is the mathematical step. The application of Comte's principle, revisited and iterated, leads to the conclusion that everything that happens in the Well of Truth depends on Mathematics and that without Mathematics, one cannot claim to be working inside the Well. The result is that any formal construction, any opinion, however authoritative, that does not justify a solidly established relationship with mathematics is outside the Well. In this way, a host of informal doctrines are produced, which can nevertheless be helpful insofar as it is possible to give them a mathematized form inside the Well. I realize this is not everyone's liking, especially those bricoleurs who think they've done mathematics because they've drawn a childish picture with universal categories. It should also be clear that the mathematics Peirce refers to cannot be limited to those of his own time. A century separates us from the mathematics of which Peirce was aware, a century of mathematical production available today on the first step of the Well. No one can refuse the use of new mathematical objects, especially if they are well connected with Peirce's intuitions because they lack the training to enable them to apprehend them themselves. What's worse is that, for the same reasons, a classification of the sciences that begins with phenomenology, free of any mathematical dependency, is most often presented. The reason I intervene at the heart of this rather literalist debate on interpretants is that I have seen the notion of "*sufficiently penetrating mind*" appear: *[CSP] "The Normal Interpretant is the Genuine Interpretant, embracing all that the sign could reveal concerning the Object to a sufficiently penetrating mind..." * This notion must be considered within the Peircean social conception of science; that some minds are more penetrating than others, in general, is conceivable. But rather than posing this question in terms of particular competencies unequally distributed among the members of a scientific community, perhaps we should first ask ourselves the question of the exactitude of the thinking of the question and give ourselves the means to do so: *Every science has its mathematical part, in which certain results of the special science are assumed as mathematical hypotheses. But it is not merely in this way that logic is mathematical**. It is mathematical in that way, and to a far greater extent than any other science; but besides that it takes the proceedings of mathematics in all their generality and founds upon them logical principles. All necessary reasoning is strictly speaking mathematical reasoning, that is to say, it is performed by observing something equivalent to a mathematical diagram; but mathematical reasoning par excellence consists in those peculiarly intricate kinds of reasoning which belong to the logic of relatives. The most peculiarly mathematical of these are reasonings about continuity of which geometrical topics, or topology, and the theory of functions offer examples. In my eighth lecture I shall hope to make clear my reasons for thinking that metaphysics will never make any real advance until it avails itself of mathematics of this kind. *(EP 2: 36) And for that, you need to have the "mathematician's sword" in our hands: *I have gained an unfortunate reputation as a writer upon the algebra of logic. It is generally understood that I hold logical algebra to be the main part of logic. But that is quite a mistake. I am in the world but not of the world of formal logic. A calculus, even in mathematics proper, is like the sword that our warriors by sea and land carry at their sides. Having it there at hand marks the mathematician as the sword marks his officer.* (MS 1334, 1905) And what could be more penetrating than a sword? Regards, Robert Marty Honorary Professor ; PhD Mathematics ; PhD Philosophy fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Marty *https://martyrobert.academia.edu/ <https://martyrobert.academia.edu/>* Le sam. 10 févr. 2024 à 04:06, Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com> a écrit : > Jon, > > I would tend to strongly agree with what you've written. However, this > passage seems to me to need a bit of 'unpacking' to be entirely clear. > > JAS: The necessity of collateral experience/observation for any sign to be > understood is one of Peirce's most notable insights. It leads to the > recognition that every name in a proposition is a subject that indexically > denotes one of its objects, while its syntax is the pure predicate that > iconically signifies its interpretant as the general form of their logical > relations > > Best, > > Gary Richmond > > On Fri, Feb 9, 2024 at 7:57 PM Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com> > wrote: > >> Gary, List: >> >> Indeed, as I have said before, usefulness is in the eye of the beholder; >> and as Peirce himself said, "True science is distinctively the study of >> useless things. For the useful things will get studied without the aid of >> scientific men" (CP 1.76, c. 1896). Nobody should disparage one particular >> field of study merely because that person does not happen to find it useful >> for his/her peculiar purposes. >> >> Moreover, Peirce's entire architectonic classification of the sciences is >> based on "the idea that one science depends upon another for fundamental >> principles, but does not furnish such principles to that other" (CP 1.180, >> EP 2:258, 1903). Accordingly, *all *the special sciences--including >> cognitive science, psychology, linguistics, artificial intelligence, >> neuroscience, and anthropology--depend on the normative science of logic as >> semeiotic for fundamental principles, but do not furnish such principles to >> semeiotic. That being the case, the generality of semeiotic is a feature, >> not a bug--like the other branches of philosophy, it "contents itself with >> observations such as come within the range of every man's normal >> experience, and for the most part in every waking hour of his life" (CP >> 1.241, 1902). >> >> Of course, Peirce famously calls himself "a pioneer, or rather a >> backwoodsman, in the work of clearing and opening up what I call >> *semiotic*, that is, the doctrine of the essential nature and >> fundamental varieties of possible semiosis; and I find the field too vast, >> the labor too great, for a first-comer" (CP 5.488, EP 2:413, 1907). I agree >> with Houser--by the way, the quoted paper is excellent, and I commend it to >> anyone who can get their hands on it--that there is still plenty of work to >> be done, and we would be foolish to start over from scratch instead of >> forging ahead from the ground that Peirce has already cleared for us, >> however incompletely. >> >> Regarding his theory of interpretants, I appreciate the reference to my >> own paper on that topic. In addition, I find it quite baffling that anyone >> would suggest that the context-dependence of uttered signs is somehow >> inconsistent with it. On the contrary, the necessity of collateral >> experience/observation for any sign to be understood is one of Peirce's >> most notable insights. It leads to the recognition that every name in a >> proposition is a subject that indexically denotes one of its objects, while >> its syntax is the pure predicate that iconically signifies its interpretant >> as the general form of their logical relations (CP 5.542, c. 1902-3; CP >> 5.151, EP 2:208, 1903; R 611, 1908 Oct 28; NEM 3:885-886, 1908 Dec 5; SS >> 70-72, 1908 Dec 14; R 664, 1910 Nov 26-27). >> >> Regards, >> >> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA >> Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian >> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt >> >> On Fri, Feb 9, 2024 at 6:08 PM Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com> >> wrote: >> >>> List, John, Edwina, Jon, >>> >>> How differently some other distinguished scholars see this matter of the >>> 'usefulness' of Peirce's semeiotic project than John Sowa appears to. >>> Consider this passage near the conclusion of a paper by Nathan Houser in a >>> festschrift for Lucia Santaella published just last year, a passage near >>> the end which would seem to contradict even John's conclusion regarding Tom >>> Short's take on especially Peirce's late taxonomy of signs. I've subdivided >>> the long paragraph in the interest of readability on the List and in order >>> to emphasize certain salient points. Houser writes (emphasis added by me): >>> >>> >>> *Conclusion (and Call to Carry On)* >>> >>> After devoting a great deal of care to Peirce’s later efforts to unravel >>> the puzzle of semiosis and to produce an extended classification of the >>> fundamental varieties of possible signs, *T. L. Short concluded that >>> Peirce’s later taxonomy “is sketchy, tentative, and, as best I can make >>> out, incoherent” (Short 2007, p. 260). But he *[GR, Short] *quickly >>> went on to point out that it is not the inconclusiveness of Peirce’s own >>> findings but “the kind of project” he had conceived and was pursuing that >>> is important.* This reflects Peirce’s candid assessment that the >>> semiotic project he had launched was a great undertaking, far too large for >>> a lone inquirer, and that *he must commend it to “future explorers”* >>> (Peirce 1907, EP 2: 413, 482). >>> >>> In looking back over his own explorations with signs, from his “New >>> List” to his Lowell Lectures of 1903 and the many relevant pages in his >>> Logic Notebook and late correspondence, Peirce likely would not have >>> assessed the record of his explorations, even the rapid-fire tries and >>> retries in his Logic Notebook, to be “incoherent,” but he might have been >>> forced to admit that it was all “a very snarl of twine,” as he had >>> described himself in contrast to his life-long friend, William James (CP >>> 6.184). But *Peirce’s confidence that he had opened the way to a key >>> new science never waned. As Max Fisch pointed out, during the final six >>> years of Peirce’s life he was engaged on a system of logic considered as >>> semiotic which he hoped would “stand for realism in the twentieth century >>> *as >>> Mill’s System of Logic had stood for nominalism in the nineteenth” (Fisch >>> 1986, p. 196). Considering the questions [. . .] that remain open, due to >>> the snarl of ideas they invoke or to continuing disagreements among >>> semioticians, it is apparent that *Peirce’s semiotic project is a work >>> in progress, but it is also apparent that it has attracted capable >>> “explorers” who are carrying the work forward. * >>> >>> It is important to bear in mind that *the issues Peirce left unresolved >>> and the questions he left unanswered are not evidence of the failure of his >>> project but of its potential for new revelations and understandings. This >>> is not a project to only discover what Peirce meant by the signs he left us >>> but to engage with the dynamic objects that were leading him on his >>> laborious investigation of semiotic analysis *and discovery toward the >>> final interpretants that still await us (and which, we must admit, may >>> never be fully achieved, though that is all to the good because it keeps >>> inquiry alive and relevant to the times). *We are engaged in an ongoing >>> collaborative project which has been bequeathed to those of us who have >>> joined or will join the cause.* [. . .] >>> >>> >>> “Peirce’s Ongoing Semiotic Project.” In *Tempo da colheita: homenagem à >>> Lucia Santaella* [Harvest time: Festschrift for Lucia Santaella]. Eds. >>> Priscila Monteiro Borges & Juliana de Oliveira Rocha Franco. São Paulo: >>> Filoczar, 2023: 27–52. >>> >>> >>> John also wrote in an earlier post, first quoting Peirce: >>> >>> >>> [CSP] "The Normal Interpretant is the Genuine Interpretant, embracing >>> all that the sign could reveal concerning the Object to a sufficiently >>> penetrating mind..." >>> >>> JFS]: That is too vague for guiding research on the many issues that >>> Peirce discussed in the many MSS where he mentioned the word >>> *interpretant*. And it can only be used by "sufficiently penetrating >>> minds". >>> >>> >>> But I do not see how this entails coming to the conclusion that *no one* >>> possesses >>> "a sufficiently penetrating mind [to derive] a coherent theory of >>> interpretants" such that any attempt to do so is a waste of time and >>> effort. That Peirce was unable to finish fully spelling out "a coherent >>> theory of interpretants" shouldn't keep us, his successors, from >>> picking up where he left off. As Peirce wrote: "One generation collects >>> premisses in order that a distant generation may discover what they mean" >>> (CP 7.87, 1902). Although I have little doubt that John would disagree, I >>> would point to Jon Schmidt's paper, "Peirce's evolving interpretants," as >>> at least the beginning of an outline for "a coherent theory of >>> interpretants" which, in his characteristic way, Jon supports with exact >>> quotations from Peirce. See: Peirce’s evolving interpretants >>> <https://philpapers.org/rec/SCHPEI-12>, *Semiotica* 2022 (246): 211-223. >>> 2022. >>> https://philarchive.org/archive/SCHPEI-12v1 >>> >>> Moreover, I am certain that I am not alone in seeing the very existence >>> of semeiotics today as arguing against John's dismissal of Peirce's >>> writings about interpretants as "so vague that nobody has been able to use >>> them to do or say anything useful." John seems to be basically advocating >>> ignoring anything that Peirce wrote unless it is somehow relevant to "the >>> latest developments in cognitive science." Doing so suggests that he is >>> employing the methods of tenacity and authority rather than the method of >>> science. >>> >>> Best, >>> >>> Gary Richmond >>> >> _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ >> ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at >> https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at >> https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all >> the links! >> ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >> peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . >> ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to >> l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the >> message and nothing in the body. More at >> https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . >> ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; >> and co-managed by him and Ben Udell. > > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ > ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at > https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at > https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the > links! > ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . > ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to > l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the > message and nothing in the body. More at > https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . > ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and > co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
