John, List:

It seems that we both made mistakes when addressing the e-mails reproduced
below. I apologize for sending mine to the List, it was intended for only
Gary as its moderator. Because of our unfortunate history of contentious
interactions, I often use him as a sounding board whenever I consider
replying to one of your posts. I sincerely hope that we can make the best
of it and move on.

I meant no insult with my last remark, I was simply stating my honest
opinion, and my preceding claim was *not *mistaken.

JFS: Can anybody find a genuine example of 3ns that could not be the answer
to a question that begins with the word "Why"?

JAS: How did the woman obtain the brooch? Her husband gave it to her.

JFS: The verb 'give' is triadic. It implies a dyadic physical transfer
(answer to How) plus the reason why: a gift includes the reason why the
transfer was made.


The question begins with the word "How," not "Why"; and by your own
admission, the answer is triadic, thus a genuine example of 3ns by your
criterion. "*Why* did the woman's husband give her the brooch?" is a
completely different question that would require a completely different
answer.

JFS (corrected by JAS): Can anybody find an example of an answer to a
question that begins with the word "Why" but is not a genuine example of
3ns?


JAS: Why did the gunpowder explode? A spark ignited it.

JFS: The stated answer is dyadic. It explains how the explosion occurred,
but it does not say why.


The question begins with the word "Why," thereby meeting your only
stipulation; and by your own admission, the answer is dyadic, thus not a
genuine example of 3ns by your criterion. The fact that someone might
ask *additional
*questions that have triadic answers, such as why the spark occurred, is
irrelevant.

Here is another counterexample--Why did the woman wear the brooch? It is
red. This answer is monadic, thus not a genuine example of 3ns by your
criterion.

Hence, I stand by my statement that distinguishing 1ns, 2ns, and 3ns solely
on the alleged basis that the answers to who/what/when/where, how, and why
questions are monadic, dyadic, and triadic indicates a serious
misunderstanding of both Peirce's categories and his semeiotic. As you
reiterated for the umpteenth time in another thread late last night ...

JFS: It's good to explore further developments of his ideas, but we have to
be careful to distinguish his words from our extensions. Anything other
than an exact quotation is the opinion of the author. Nobody can claim that
his or her ideas are what Peirce intended.


Accordingly, without exact quotations, nobody can claim that Peirce would
have agreed with the novel suggestion that every example of 3ns can be
explained as the answer to a question that begins with word "why," let
alone that he would have been "delighted" by it. Would you really find it
unobjectionable for me to say, "I realize that Peirce did not specify the
logical order of determination for all ten trichotomies in sign
classification, but I think that he would have been delighted if Lady Welby
or some other correspondent had suggested my solution"? (For the record, I
would never actually say such a thing--we should not ascribe sentiments to
him without exact quotations, any more than intentions.)

Regards,

Jon

On Thu, Feb 15, 2024 at 12:17 PM John F Sowa <s...@bestweb.net> wrote:

> Jon, List,
>
> Thank you for noting that I had intended to push the SEND ALL button for
> my previous note (copied at the end).
>
> But I stand by my claim that every example of Thirdness can be interpreted
> as an answer to a question that begins with the word "Why".
>
> I agree with your point that every sign (which includes every sentence) is
> an example of Thirdness.  But that is not what I wrote above or in my
> previous notes,  Note the exact wording "example of Thirdness".  But in
> order to show an example of Thirdness, it's necessary to use signs of some
> sort (most likely words and sentences).  But I expect the readers to look
> beyond the signs to the examples of Thirdness that the words are used to
> indicate.
>
> If you disagree with my claim, please look beyond the words to the example
> of Thirdness.   Please find some example of Thirdness that cannot be found
> in a sentence that answers a why-question.  Or conversely, an answer to a
> why-question that does not contain an example of Thirdness, explict or
> implicit.
>
> And why do you think Peirce would disagree?  He was always looking for
> clear criteria to test and explain his theories.   I also prefixed by claim
> that he would be delighted to find such a simple test with the phrase "I
> believe".  I was not attributing any opinion to Peirce.  I was stating *MY
> OPINION* about his reaction.
>
> And we should all remember that Peirce List is a collaboration, not a
> competition.   If somebody corrects one of our mistakes, we should thank
> them for the correction.   For example, I thank you for correcting my
> mistake below:
>
> JFS> Can anybody find a genuine example of Thirdness that could not be the
> answer to a question that begins with the word "Why"? Conversely, can
> anybody find an example of Thirdness that could not be used as an answer to
> a question that begins with the word 'Why'?
>
> JAS> These are both the same question. Maybe he intended the second one to
> be, "Can anybody find an example of an answer to a question that begins
> with the word 'Why' but is not a genuine example of 3ns?"
>
> Yes, indeed.  I admit that I made a mistake in that statement.   But
> insults are never appropriate in any collaboration.  You have every right
> to state your opinions, right or wrong.  But an insult is never
> appropriate.  And by the way, you prefixed your insult with a mistaken
> claim:
>
> JAS> Of course, I already fulfilled both requests, but he dismissed my
> counterexamples with a bunch of hand-waving.
>
> John
>
> ------------------------------
> *From*: "Jon Alan Schmidt" <jonalanschm...@gmail.com>
>
> Gary:
>
> As always, I appreciate your positive feedback. I am starting to wonder if
> my recent flurry of List activity might finally result in a paper on
> speculative grammar.
>
> JFS already replied to my post (see below) but did so off-List, sending it
> to me only, without changing the subject line or otherwise saying so. Along
> with his questions at the end that are directed to "anybody else who may be
> interested," this suggests that it was unintentional, such that he might
> eventually send it to the List after all.
>
> JFS: Your comments confirm the fact that every example of Thirdness can be
> explained as the answer to a question that begins with word 'Why'.
>
>
> Obviously, my comments do no such thing, and hopefully, others would
> readily see that for themselves.
>
> JFS: Although Peirce hadn't mentioned that point, I think he would have
> been delighted if Lady Welby or some other correspondent had suggested it.
>
> JFS: I realize that Peirce did not mention the connection between the word
> 'why' and every instance of Thirdness. But if somebody had mentioned that
> connection to him, I believe that he would have been delighted to have that
> simple test.
>
>
> I honestly suspect that Peirce would have bluntly told JFS, Lady Welby, or
> anyone else making such a suggestion that it indicates a serious
> misunderstanding of both his categories and his semeiotic. So much for not
> putting words in his mouth, claiming to know what he intended, or (in this
> case) attributing specific sentiments to him without exact quotations. Just
> imagine how JFS would have reacted if I had said in my post, "I realize
> that Peirce did not specify the logical order of determination for all ten
> trichotomies in sign classification, but I think that he would have been
> delighted if Lady Welby or some other correspondent had suggested this
> solution."
>
> JAS: On the contrary, every answer to every question is an example of 3ns,
> because every sign is in the genuine triadic relation of mediating between
> its object and its interpretant.
>
> JFS: That point, although true, does not distinguish the three kinds of
> answers.
>
>
> Exactly--there is no distinction between the three kinds of answers that
> corresponds to Peirce's three categories. All signs, including every answer
> to every question, are examples of 3ns. Qualities and reactions are
> examples of 1ns and 2ns, respectively, not any answers to any questions.
>
> JFS: Can anybody find a genuine example of Thirdness that could not be the
> answer to a question that begins with the word "Why"? Conversely, can
> anybody find an example of Thirdness that could not be used as an answer to
> a question that begins with the word 'Why'?
>
>
> These are both the same question. Maybe he intended the second one to be,
> "Can anybody find an example of an answer to a question that begins with
> the word 'Why' but is not a genuine example of 3ns?" Of course, I already
> fulfilled both requests, but he dismissed my counterexamples with a bunch
> of hand-waving.
>
> Thanks,
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
> <http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt>
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>
> On Wed, Feb 14, 2024 at 6:29 PM John F Sowa <s...@bestweb.net> wrote:
>
> Jon,
>
> Your comments confirm the fact that every example of Thirdness can be
> explained as the answer to a question that begins with word 'Why'.
> Although Peirce hadn't mentioned that point, I think he would have been
> delighted if Lady Welby or some other correspondent had suggested it.
>
> JFS:  The monadic relations of 1ns express answers to the words Who, What,
> When, or Where. The dyadic relations of 2ns express answers to the word
> How. And the triadic relations of 3ns express answers to the word Why. In
> particular, all examples of 3ns can be expressed as answers to
> Why-questions.
>
> JAS>  On the contrary, every answer to every question is an example of
> 3ns, because every sign is in the genuine triadic relation of mediating
> between its object and its interpretant.
>
> That point, although true, does not distinguish the three kinds of
> answers.
>
> For the first four question words (who, what, when, where), the words in
> parentheses in your answers are irrelevant, since the single word or phrase
> is sufficient.
>
> JAS> Who retrieved the book? My dog (retrieved the book). What did the man
> give his wife? (He gave her) a brooch. When did he give it to her? (He gave
> it to her) on Valentine's Day. Where did the datestone hit the Jinnee? (It
> hit him) in the eye.
>
> The next two sentences show that sentences given as answers may include
> more or less than what was asked.  The person who asked the question may
> ask a follow-up question if more information is necessary.
>
> JAS>  How did the woman obtain the brooch? Her husband gave it to her.
>
> The verb 'give' is triadic.  It implies a dyadic physical transfer (answer
> to How) plus the reason why:  a gift includes  the reason why the transfer
> was made.   The word 'lend' could have been used for the same physical
> transfer, but it would not have implied a transfer of ownership.
>
> And by the way, a transfer of ownership does not require a physical
> transfer.  "See that house on the hillside?  I bought it for you."
>
> JAS> Why did the gunpowder explode? A spark ignited it.
>
> The stated answer is dyadic.  It explains how the explosion occurred, but
> it does not say why.   Anybody who asked that question would very likely
> ask for the purpose, goal, or intention:  Was it an accident?  Was the
> explosion used for mining coal?  For clearing a landslide?  For digging a
> tunnel?  For a fireworks display?
>
> JAS> Again, defining 3ns in terms of explanation or reason
> (intelligibility) is more generally accurate than defining 3ns in terms of
> (conscious) intentionality or purpose.
>
> I used the word 'intention' in my previous note but consciousness of the
> reason is not a requirement. In other writings, I often give a list of
> related words, such as goal, purpose, or motive as alternatives or
> additional options for intention.  But consciousness is not a requirement.
> Example:  people walking to the store while talking on a cell phone.
>
> Peirce emphasized the continuity from lower life forms, including insects
> and plants, and he did not imply that a human level of consciousness or
> intellect is a requirement,
>
> Please note my response to Mike Bergman, who brought up "crystals and
> bees".  In my response, I discussed two issues:  (1) why did Peirce
> consider the possibility that crystals might have a kind of internal goal;
> (2) an analysis at a molecular level would show that external forces, not
>  an internal goal of each atom would be sufficient to explain the formation
> of crystals.   But bees, plants, and even bacteria have internal goals or
> purposes without anything that resembles human consciousness.
>
> I realize that Peirce did not mention the connection between the word
> 'why' and every instance of Thirdness.  But if somebody had mentioned that
> connection to him, I believe that he would have been delighted to have that
> simple test.
>
> Question for Jon or anybody else who may be interested:  Can anybody find
> a genuine example of Thirdness that could not be the answer to a question
> that begins with the word "Why"?
>
> Conversely, can anybody find an example of Thirdness that could not be
> used as an answer to a question that begins with the word 'Why'?
>
> John
>
>
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at 
https://cspeirce.com  and, just as well, at 
https://www.cspeirce.com .  It'll take a while to repair / update all the links!
► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON 
PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . 
► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu 
with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the 
body.  More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html .
► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP;  moderated by Gary Richmond;  and 
co-managed by him and Ben Udell.

Reply via email to