Jon S, Jerry, List, Did Peirce reject Platonism in favor of scholastic realism regarding the status of abstract objects?
That is not how I interpret Peirce's inquiries in metaphysics and cosmology. Rather, I agree with several scholars who take Peirce at his word when he says that the position he is developing is an extreme form of scholastic realism and, at the same time, a form of objective idealism. Platonic idealism is label used to characterize a wide range of metaphysical positions that reject various forms of materialism in favor or objective idealism. We've inherited two important distinctions from the classical metaphysics of Plato and Aristotle: the division between realism and nominalism, and the division between idealism and materialism. As an interpretative strategy, I agree with Richard Smyth, Kelly Parker and others who suggest that Peirce is developing ideas in logic, epistemology and metaphysics that stem from the Neo-Platonic tradition of Plotinus and Porphyry. See, for instance, Kelly Parker's short essay https://kellyaparker.net/kap/Neoplatonism/, or Smyth's Reading Peirce Reading. The general thrust of Neo-Platonic thought is to seek a synthesis between Platonic Idealism and Aristotelian Realism. Peirce, I think, is exploring the various ways an evolutionary cosmology might open the door to a richer and deeper synthesis of these two traditions in philosophical metaphysics. So, no, I don't think Peirce rejects Platonism in favor of scholastic realism. As an interpretative strategy, I tend to think such bold claims miss the mark. Yours, Jeff ________________________________ From: [email protected] <[email protected]> on behalf of Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]> Sent: Saturday, November 2, 2024 4:22 PM To: Peirce-L <[email protected]> Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] More on Peirce and Anselm Jerry, List: As has generally been the case with your other recent posts, I frankly do not see the relevance of this one to what the rest of us have been discussing. It does not appear to have anything at all to do with the thread topic. It is not a "conjecture" that Peirce rejected fictionalism, conceptualism, and Platonism regarding the ontological status of abstract objects (including propositions) in favor of scholastic realism. It is also not a "conjecture" that he classified propositions as dicent symbols and therefore legisigns/types, which do not (metaphysically) exist except when and where they are embodied in sinsigns/tokens as replicas/instances. I am not in any way seeking to downplay Peirce's originality as a thinker. After all, he went well beyond the term logic of Aristotelian syllogisms by inventing modern first-order predicate logic independently of Frege. In fact, it is Peirce's notation for the latter (not Frege's), employing the existential and universal quantifiers, that evolved (via Russell) into what we use today. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt<http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt<http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt> On Fri, Nov 1, 2024 at 11:35 PM Jerry LR Chandler <[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: List, Jon, Gary, Helmut: On Nov 1, 2024, at 5:10 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: Of course, Peirce rejected all three of these in favor of scholastic realism--propositions do not (metaphysically) exist, but they are real as representations of purported facts prescinded from reality as a whole. From the perspective of the histories of the sciences and the goals of meaningful communication, I find this conjecture to nothing less than absurd. CSP developed his notions of logic from chemical demonstrations and gives many many examples of this throughout his texts. (Personal and scientific integrity require every CSP scholar to acknowledge the scientific role of these concepts in evaluating CSP texts.) These demonstrations of material facts are remote from the assertions that CSP's originality is merely a minor extension of "scholastic realism” I would suggest that the first four Aristotelian categories (substance, quality, quantity, and relatives) are the principle basis of the developments of the structuralism presented in: Quality-signs, sin-signs, legi-signs, Images(icons), indicies, symbols Rhema, decisions, arguments such that chemical demonstrations are grounded on the chemical indices as constituents of chemical symbols and the “legi-signs" (identities) of the sin-signs. I would further suggest that for CSP, the role of the indices is placed in the center of the eight other terms because it is a direct logical quantitative connective to the qualities and term assignments of all chemical demonstrations. The corresponding grammar of the chemical connectives (essential to semiosis) are expressions of the meanings of connectivity of the semiotic with the semes (cognitive signs), the semiology (legisigns) with the semantics. My reasoning for this logical perspectives is that it is consistent with chemical practice, then and now. The modern chemical practice is grounded in the TERM logic of Aristotelian syllogisms, (chemical elements as names of objects) not the sentential logic of modern first predicate logic grounded in various connectives that are totally unrelated to CSP expressions of chemical connectives as the source of lattice points. In modern terminology, the Quali-signs (semiotic terms) determine the indices of the sin-sign (identity of the object) which in turn determine the argument that generates the legi-sign (the name of the chemical object). In set theoretic terms, the set of indices (determined / demonstrated from) the quali-sign are arranged to assign the organization of the legisign. This line of reasoning follows the structuralism of modern mathematics in the sense of [ “sets” —> "permutation groups” —> “categories”] for any chemical object, including higher order perplex structures. Cheers Jerry
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
