Jon S, all,

My initial point was simply that we can trace the roots of objective idealism 
to the writings of Plato. As such, it would be odd to insist that Peirce is not 
a "Platonist" insofar as he is arguing for objective idealism in metaphysics.

Peirce traces the central theses that he groups under the heading of objective 
Idealism to the kind of neo-Platonic metaphysics that is developed by 
Schelling, and explored, on this side of the pond, by Emerson and Thoreau. In 
the passage you cite, he points out that the "grotesque weldings" of doctrines 
that are , on the one hand, nominalist in spirit, and, on the other Platonist, 
are not, by any means, a natural fit. As such, it would be fair to say that he 
is resisting such a grotesque welding of doctrines.

Consider the point Peirce is making in pointing to the example of Westminster 
Abbey. This is how I try to interpret that passage: metaphysical principles do 
not live merely in the writings of philosophers. Rather, the principles live 
and breathe in the heart and soul of entire cultures, and they are expressed in 
its great works of architecture and literature. Philosophers who write essays 
and books in metaphysics are trying to give expression of those principles, but 
it is fair to assume the theories of the philosophers will, by necessity, be 
mere summary accounts of something that is, in reality, much larger and more 
significant that can be expressed in dry scientific prose.

When I think of the example of Westminster Abbey, what comes to mind is that 
the Abbey was built on the site where Catholicism was brought to the British 
Isles--which was a little island in a river near where London became a thriving 
metropolis. The Abbey was the site where Augustinian ideas and principles were 
planted, took root and started to grow--well before the fights between the 
Catholics and the Protestants shaped the religious and political landscape of 
the greater Isles. The Augustinian ideas that took root, were, in both body and 
spirit, largely developments of ideas explored by Plato and, later, by 
Plontinus.

Peirce points out that the philosophical principles and methods articulated by 
Aristotle had such vitality that they shaped the commonsense of every 
schoolboy--on both sides of the pond--for two millennia. A similar point can be 
made, I believe, for the conception of the forms explored in the dialogues of 
Plato. To appreciate the point, one need only look at the depth of the moral 
and religious Ideals expressed in the architecture of the Abbey. The Nineteenth 
century individuals of Peirce's day may have spoken a language informed by the 
common sense of the peripatetic when they walked the streets of London, but 
their eyes were lifted to the heavens by the representation of the form of the 
Good in the spires of the Abbey.

Similar points can be made about the Prologue to the Canterbury Tales, but I'll 
stop here.

Hope that helps,

Jeff






________________________________
From: [email protected] <[email protected]> on 
behalf of Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]>
Sent: Saturday, November 2, 2024 7:44 PM
To: Peirce-L <[email protected]>
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] More on Peirce and Anselm

Jeff, List:

Peirce indeed explicitly and repeatedly endorses scholastic realism (some 
possibilities and some generals are real) and objective idealism (matter is a 
derived and special kind of mind), but Platonism (i.e., Platonic idealism) is 
incompatible with both--there is a sense in which it is actually a form of 
nominalism, because it maintains that abstract objects exist as individuals in 
a different realm from concrete objects.

CSP: Individualists are apt to fall into the almost incredible misunderstanding 
that all other men are individualists, too--even the scholastic realists, who, 
they suppose, thought that "universals exist." It is true that there are 
indications of there having been some who thought so in that greater darkness 
before the dawn of Aristotle's Analytics and Topics, when such grotesque 
weldings of doctrine as that of nominalistic Platonism are heard of, and when 
Roscellin may possibly have said that universals were flatus vocis [breath of 
voice]. But I ask, can anybody who has seen Westminster Abbey, who had read the 
Prologue to the Canterbury Tales, and who stops to consider that the 
metaphysics of the Plantagenet age must have more adequately represented the 
general intellectual standing of that age, when metaphysics absorbed its 
greatest heuristic minds, than the metaphysics of our day can represent our 
general intellectual condition, can any such person believe that the great 
doctors of that time believed that generals exist? They certainly did not so 
opine, but regarded generals as modes of determination of individuals; and such 
modes were recognized as being of the nature of thought. (CP 5.503, c. 1905)

CSP: I am myself a scholastic realist of a somewhat extreme stripe. Every 
realist must, as such, admit that a general is a term and therefore a sign. If, 
in addition, he holds that it is an absolute exemplar, this Platonism passes 
quite beyond the question of nominalism and realism; and indeed the doctrine of 
Platonic ideas has been held by the extremest nominalists. There is some reason 
to suspect that it was shared by Roscellinus himself. (CP 5.470, 1907)

As Robert Lane summarizes in Peirce's Realism and Idealism, "the real generals 
that correspond to hypostatically abstracted concepts are not abstract 
individuals, and so Peirce’s realism about such generals does not amount to 
nominalistic Platonism" (p. 134). Peirce also describes himself as "an 
Aristotelian of the scholastic wing, approaching Scotism, but going much 
further in the direction of scholastic realism" (CP 5.77n, EP 2:180, 1903). By 
contrast, as far as I know, he never refers to himself as a Platonist or 
neo-Platonist.

Returning to the thread topic, I was hoping all along that you (Jeff) might 
have something to say in response to my initial post 
(https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2024-10/msg00046.html). Any thoughts 
on my four questions there?

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt<http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> / 
twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt<http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt>

On Sat, Nov 2, 2024 at 12:02 PM Jeffrey Brian Downard 
<[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
Jon S, Jerry, List,

Did Peirce reject Platonism in favor of scholastic realism regarding the status 
of abstract objects?

That is not how I interpret Peirce's inquiries in metaphysics and cosmology. 
Rather, I agree with several scholars who take Peirce at his word when he says 
that the position he is developing is an extreme form of scholastic realism 
and, at the same time, a form of objective idealism. Platonic idealism is label 
used to characterize a wide range of metaphysical positions that reject various 
forms of materialism in favor or objective idealism.

We've inherited two important distinctions from the classical metaphysics of 
Plato and Aristotle:  the division between realism and nominalism, and the 
division between idealism and materialism. As an interpretative strategy, I 
agree with Richard Smyth, Kelly Parker and others who suggest that Peirce is 
developing ideas in logic, epistemology and metaphysics that stem from the 
Neo-Platonic tradition of Plotinus and Porphyry. See, for instance, Kelly 
Parker's short essay https://kellyaparker.net/kap/Neoplatonism/, or Smyth's 
Reading Peirce Reading.

The general thrust of Neo-Platonic thought is to seek a synthesis between 
Platonic Idealism and Aristotelian Realism. Peirce, I think, is exploring the 
various ways an evolutionary cosmology might open the door to a richer and 
deeper synthesis of these two traditions in philosophical metaphysics.

So, no, I don't think Peirce rejects Platonism in favor of scholastic realism. 
As an interpretative strategy, I tend to think such bold claims miss the mark.

Yours,

Jeff
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