Gene, Stephen, List, Gene, thanks for this enlightening post, quite relevant to the threaded discussion. Also, thanks for your great good humor: "if I were Aristotle, I'd get me an intellectual property lawyer." Best, Gary
>>> "Stephen C. Rose" <[email protected]> 8/16/2011 5:20 PM >>> Re Aristotle, I doubt that Harold Bloom who owes the farm to Shakespeare would not acknowledge his debt. Funny thing about Bloom is I gather he never read Peirce but his notions of influence are not inimical Pierce save when Peirce more or less dissolves the individual under the rubric of the golden rule. On Tue, Aug 16, 2011 at 4:12 PM, Eugene Halton <[email protected]> wrote: Dear Drake, You say, "Some ideas expressed in Aristotle's texts have been further developed, even considerably so -- but this development doesn't owe to Aristotle except as Aristotle's texts have been concretely given. Other ideas expressed in his texts have been debunked, and this also doesn't owe to Aristotle except as his texts are given to be debunked." So are you saying the concrete products of Aristotle cannot be taken as consequences of that which is Aristotle? The consequences of Aristotle's ideas are severed at the immediate moment of his writing them, so that there can be no tradition of continuing interpretation that is Aristotelian, truly a continuation of the spirit of Aristotle as embodied in the writings/signs? Some of Aristotle's ideas which have more potential in them than Aristotle was able to express, and that other interpreters are capable of developing further, do not, you say, owe to Aristotle. If so, if I were Aristotle, I'd get me an intellectual property lawyer. The ideas of Aristotle don't depend on Aristotle for their validity, to be sure. But that, it seems to me, does not prevent them from also being the ideas of Aristotle, manifesting further consequences in continuing inquiries. Joe Ransdell raises a pertinent point in the paper under discussion: "...by the time you read this my compositional intention no longer has anything to do with the matter; it is up to the signs themselves to bring about such a convergence in the sign-interpretant process, and if they cannot do it there is no remedy except that of adding some more signs to it in hopes that the further semiosis they contribute will bring that end about..." I agree with these words, and I also understand them as expressing an idea of Joseph Ransdell which is being developed further in this discussion. On the one hand Joe's original intention may be eclipsed, but on the other, his idea can be understood as undergoing development. And from Peirce, "Every symbol is a living thing in a very strict sense that is no mere figure of speech. The body of the symbol changes slowly, but its meaning inevitably grows, incorporates new elements and throws off old ones." We may only know some glimpses of the private life of the man Aristotle, but we see much more of the public life of the man in the writings that have survived. One can take the writings just in their own terms, and also, in another perspective, as the product of their author, Aristotle, and their continuing interpretation as the continuing life of those signs. Peirce can be considered, in part, as a consequence of Aristotle, as a way some of Aristotle's ideas lived and found new interpretation and application beyond the original text. For example, Peirce drew from Aristotle's idea of final causation, but applied it in new context, attempting to show that its exclusion from modern science was unwarranted. Ideas are not born ex nihilo, but through contexts that very often involve the living influence of predecessors "in a very strict sense that is no mere figure of speech." Drake: "...I altogether disagree with the notion that words "live and breathe", except in explicitly metaphorical usage, so I disagree with this method of extending the meaning of the term 'consciousness' to an imaginary realm in which words, as such, "live and breathe as social consciousness"... But there are a lot of ellipses in any jump to "a man's spirit is embodied in others", e.g., what is the exact definition of "spirit"? What is the connection?" Gene: Your words live and breathe as I read them. They live as a social communication in my interpreting consciousness. And they breathe in it too, for I read your words as well-phrased, as words are when vocalized, and vocalizing is breathing. A text is a living process in interpretation. Semiosis. So just where are your words when I read them and they are occupying my mind? Is that an "imaginary realm," as you put it? Or is it that "a man's spirit," namely, the meaning of your words, is embodied in others, in me or anyone reading this? It seems to me that the reality you seem to be denying by describing it as an imaginary realm is simply social communication. Communication is a social process, whether internal or external, isn't it? Consider how the pragmatist George Herbert Mead put it: "Our contention is that mind can never find expression, and could never have come into existence at all, except in terms of a social environment....If mind is socially constituted, then the field or locus of any given individual mind must extend as far as the social activity or apparatus of social relations extends; and hence that field cannot be bounded by the skin of the individual organism to which it belongs" (Mead 1934: 223). Perhaps all this could be clearer if you consider further what Peirce means by a general, why it is of a different modality of being than that of existence, and how it relates to his pragmatic maxim. If I understand you, you are making the existence of texts of Aristotle paramount ("final," as though the only question is simply the actual text per se), where I am trying, however unclearly perhaps, to argue the Peircean point that the generals "Aristotle" and "Aristotle's texts," have pragmatic meaning found in the conceivable consequences they engender. Gene -----Original Message----- From: C S Peirce discussion list [mailto:[email protected]] On Behalf Of d_obrien Sent: Monday, August 15, 2011 9:08 PM To: [email protected] Subject: Re: [peirce-l] Slow Read: "Teleology and the Autonomy of the Semiosis Process" > From: Eugene Halton > > Dear Drake, > You make it seem as though the meaning of Aristotle could not grow, > just because Aristotle the man happened to be dead. That is the curious view > of materialism, and legacy of Cartesianism, with its dualism of mind and body. > Eugene, I have no idea what you mean by the phrase "the meaning of Aristotle". Do you mean "the meaning expressed in Aristotle's writings"? I ask this because you immediately (below) conflate "the conceivable consequences signs engender" with "the conceivable consequences [the self] engenders". I see no reason for positing or hypothesizing a notion that human consciousness has a "meaning" in the sense that words have meaning. I certainly wouldn't take such a notion as axiom and build a theory on that basis! Aristotle's texts are concrete, and final. This is historical fact that has nothing to with "Cartesianism" or "dualism of mind and body". Some ideas expressed in Aristotle's texts have been further developed, even considerably so -- but this development doesn't owe to Aristotle except as Aristotle's texts have been concretely given. Other ideas expressed in his texts have been debunked, and this also doesn't owe to Aristotle except as his texts are given to be debunked. > But consider that if pragmatic meaning is the conceivable > consequences signs engender, that the pragmatic meaning of a self is the > conceivable consequences it engenders. As such, the self is a sign-complex, a > communicative medium in transaction with its inner and outer environment. > A self's conceivable consequences do not end with the death of the > individual bodily portion. These words you are reading are the true > expression of my self, even if I were no longer living. But there is also an > element of social consciousness inherent to a self, such that, "a man's spirit is > embodied in others, and which continues to live and breathe and have its > being very much longer than superficial observers think" (Peirce [1893] > 1998:3). > Agreed that the common language of a people is independent of specific persons, although such a thing exists only because individual persons coin the terms. But there are a lot of ellipses in any jump to "a man's spirit is embodied in others", e.g., what is the exact definition of "spirit"? What is the connection? > As I tried to put it in an essay titled "Mind Matters," "It is the life of > signs of the body social, in which we are participant. Suppose, for example, I > perished after tapping out these words you are gazing at. They, and hence a > part of me, would live and breathe as social consciousness, independent of > my carnal consciousness, through you. They would continue minding both as > signs and as conceivable consequences, as Peirce also does in this discussion, > which can also be considered as one of the conceivable consequences of > pragmaticism. I disagree with the notion that if you perished after typing those words, the words "would live and breathe". I altogether disagree with the notion that words "live and breathe", except in explicitly metaphorical usage, so I disagree with this method of extending the meaning of the term 'consciousness' to an imaginary realm in which words, as such, "live and breathe as social consciousness". That particular invention of a "social consciousness" is unintelligible to me, so a distinction between it and a so-called "carnal consciousness" makes no sense to me. > By claiming that humans are capable of spiritual consciousness, Peirce > does not mean religion in the everyday sense but participation in truth, > however that comes about. His doctrine of synechism is an aspect of his > scientific philosophy, though he saw it as conducive to eventually reconciling > religion and science. In Peirce's semiotic sense of 'spiritual,' the life of science > is an example of spiritual consciousness. > It is inquiry into the truth of those eternal forms such, as Peirce the > mathematician would put it, that mathematics makes us aware of, or of > those generals that result from a specific research, or in a different context, > that art manifests. Science and art "parasitize" the bodies they incorporate, > as all mind, in mattering, might be said to do...." (Halton 2008: 126). > Here you're making many jumps. From "spiritual consciousness" to "truth", and to "science" and "religion", then to "the life of science" which is equated to a kind of "spiritual consciousness", and from there to "eternal forms", to "mathematics" to finally to "art". To my mind these jumps are nonsensical. > Indeed, one might say that the idea of pragmatism engendered by > Peirce is still engendering further consequences through "parasitizing" the > body-minds of all of us here. Not to worry though, some would say that the > parasite is conceivably curative. > > Gene > --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- You are receiving this message because you are subscribed to the PEIRCE-L listserv. To remove yourself from this list, send a message to [email protected] with the line "SIGNOFF PEIRCE-L" in the body of the message. To post a message to the list, send it to [email protected] --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- You are receiving this message because you are subscribed to the PEIRCE-L listserv. To remove yourself from this list, send a message to [email protected] with the line "SIGNOFF PEIRCE-L" in the body of the message. To post a message to the list, send it to [email protected] --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- You are receiving this message because you are subscribed to the PEIRCE-L listserv. To remove yourself from this list, send a message to [email protected] with the line "SIGNOFF PEIRCE-L" in the body of the message. To post a message to the list, send it to [email protected] --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- You are receiving this message because you are subscribed to the PEIRCE-L listserv. To remove yourself from this list, send a message to [email protected] with the line "SIGNOFF PEIRCE-L" in the body of the message. To post a message to the list, send it to [email protected]
