Though Harold Bloom appears unaccountably to have never come upon Pierce, he is quite convincing on the matter of posthumous influence, the Bard in particular. I certainly think of Peirce as only part way to achieving his full influence.
On Wed, Aug 10, 2011 at 4:01 PM, Eugene Halton <[email protected]>wrote: > Dear Drake, > You make it seem as though the meaning of Aristotle could not grow, > just because Aristotle the man happened to be dead. That is the curious view > of materialism, and legacy of Cartesianism, with its dualism of mind and > body. > > But consider that if pragmatic meaning is the conceivable > consequences signs engender, that the pragmatic meaning of a self is the > conceivable consequences it engenders. As such, the self is a sign-complex, > a communicative medium in transaction with its inner and outer environment. > A self's conceivable consequences do not end with the death of the > individual bodily portion. These words you are reading are the true > expression of my self, even if I were no longer living. But there is also an > element of social consciousness inherent to a self, such that, "a man's > spirit is embodied in others, and which continues to live and breathe and > have its being very much longer than superficial observers think" (Peirce > [1893] 1998:3). > > As I tried to put it in an essay titled "Mind Matters," "It is the > life of signs of the > body social, in which we are participant. Suppose, for example, I perished > after tapping > out these words you are gazing at. They, and hence a part of me, would live > and > breathe as social consciousness, independent of my carnal consciousness, > through > you. They would continue minding both as signs and as conceivable > consequences, > as Peirce also does in this discussion, which can also be considered as one > of the > conceivable consequences of pragmaticism. > By claiming that humans are capable of spiritual consciousness, > Peirce does not > mean religion in the everyday sense but participation in truth, however > that comes > about. His doctrine of synechism is an aspect of his scientific philosophy, > though he > saw it as conducive to eventually reconciling religion and science. In > Peirce's semiotic > sense of 'spiritual,' the life of science is an example of spiritual > consciousness. > It is inquiry into the truth of those eternal forms such, as Peirce the > mathematician > would put it, that mathematics makes us aware of, or of those generals that > result > from a specific research, or in a different context, that art manifests. > Science and art > "parasitize" the bodies they incorporate, as all mind, in mattering, might > be said to > do...." (Halton 2008: 126). > > Indeed, one might say that the idea of pragmatism engendered by > Peirce is still engendering > further consequences through "parasitizing" the body-minds of all of us > here. Not to worry > though, some would say that the parasite is conceivably curative. > > Gene > > > > -----Original Message----- > From: C S Peirce discussion list [mailto:[email protected]] On > Behalf Of d_obrien > Sent: Tuesday, August 09, 2011 2:02 AM > To: [email protected] > Subject: Re: [peirce-l] Slow Read: "Teleology and the Autonomy of the > Semiosis Process" > > Benjamin, you say: > " Peirce believed in a spiritual consciousness, a soul-consciousness, > confusable with social and carnal kinds of consciousness but becoming clear > to one, as Peirce came to believe, in surviving the body's death." > > That statement makes little sense to me, and I was brought up a Roman > Catholic. I might think of the consciousness of a person, e.g. Aristotle, > in which case I say that Aristotle was conscious of the ideas that he > taught, along with all the things his consciousness roamed over in his > well-examined life. This consciousness of one or the other object is > *identical*, it is Aristotle's and none other that I mean. Now, > Aristotle's consciousness didn't "survive his body's death", as if such > disassociation from reality were possible. Unlike his consciousness in his > life of learning, the written record of his teaching remains static, > unchanging, and unless we can find a long-lost volume somewhere, the > intricacies of his terminology will forever have to be judged as-is, > finished. What survives Aristotle isn't some "spiritual soul-consciousness > surviving Aristotle's death", but only his body of writings in context of > histories written of that epoch. In those writings Aristotle speaks of > "eternal truths". But Aristotle isn't speaking about some > "eternal-spiritual-soul-consciousness", he's speaking (in a precise and > definitive manner) about certain declarative sentences. It is the > declarative sentences that he's speaking of that are "eternally true", but > only as defined - and this sense of 'eternal' is not identical with some > mystical "eternal consciousness" or "soul-consciousness". > > Drake > > > --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- > You are receiving this message because you are subscribed to the PEIRCE-L > listserv. To remove yourself from this list, send a message to > [email protected] with the line "SIGNOFF PEIRCE-L" in the body > of the message. To post a message to the list, send it to > [email protected] > > > --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- > You are receiving this message because you are subscribed to the PEIRCE-L > listserv. To remove yourself from this list, send a message to > [email protected] with the line "SIGNOFF PEIRCE-L" in the body > of the message. To post a message to the list, send it to > [email protected] > --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- You are receiving this message because you are subscribed to the PEIRCE-L listserv. To remove yourself from this list, send a message to [email protected] with the line "SIGNOFF PEIRCE-L" in the body of the message. To post a message to the list, send it to [email protected]
