Gary F., List,
Thanks, Gary, for this response. I didn't really know what to make
of JR's assertion regarding the distributive vs. collective existence
of the communicational community--the translation into Peircean terms
is very helpful.
I take your point about JR having the life of a Peircean symbol in
mind in paragraph 23, with all that that concept implies. When this
is factored in, it is clear that the form of life is something to
which the inquirer belongs, not one that is coterminous with the
inquirer's individual being (my initial reading). This is one moment
in the paper when it seems particularly difficult to speak in the
spirit of Peirce, as JR certainly is doing, without also speaking in
his exact terms as well--without using explicitly Peirce's definition
of the symbol and making all that that definition entails clear. In
this respect, JR's use of "form of life" does seem to be a good
alternative, however. Even if the physicists weren't familiar with
Wittgenstein's distinctive notion of "grammar" and its relation to
the practices of language games and the forms of life they sustain,
the phrase still conveys in a common sensical way that there is a
larger reality to which an individual inquirer, as an "inquirer,"
necessarily belongs.
The compatibility of Wittgenstein and Peirce is a topic of interest
to me. I have been struck repeatedly by how closely Wittgenstein's
thinking can align with Peirce's. If any listers know of work done
that compares these two philosophers, I would appreciate any
references. Perhaps this needs a different thread, however.
Thanks again,
Sally
Sally,
JR's "overall form of life" does sound more like Wittgenstein's
Lebensform than a Peircean idiom, but as i think you mentioned
before, he seems to be going out of his way here to avoid Peircean
terminology that might put off the people he's addressing. However
it does seem to me quite compatible with Peirce's ideas on
scientific inquiry. I don't think i'd agree that JR "locates truth
entirely within the "life" of the inquirer, not in the subject
matter that determines the inquirer's inquiry, and not in any
relation that the inquirer and the subject-matter might be
maintaining to one another". We're talking about the life of a
symbol here, and a genuine symbol must involve both indexical and
iconic components in generating an interpretant, which does imply a
relation between the inquirer and the subject-matter (to put it in
less Peircean terms).
Speaking of the "communicational community", JR's assertion that it
"exists distributively not collectively" looks at first more
individualistic than anything Peirce would say, but i think makes a
more Peircean sense if we bear in mind the typical Peircean
distinction between reality and existence. I think Peirce would say
that the community as a "form of life" is more real than the
individual inquirer, but it only exists in the actual practice of
individual inquirers. And that practice, to be genuine, requires an
objective focus on "subject-specific properties", as JR puts it in
paragraph 23.
That's how i see it, anyway.
Gary F.
} Sincerity is incommunicable because it becomes insincere by being
communicated. [Luhmann] {
<http://www.gnusystems.ca/Peirce.htm>www.gnusystems.ca/Peirce.htm }{
gnoxic studies: Peirce
From: C S Peirce discussion list
[mailto:PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU] On Behalf Of Sally Ness
Sent: September-23-11 6:11 PM
To: PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU
Subject: [peirce-l] Slow Read : "Sciences as Communicational
Communities" Segment 5
Segment 5
List,
As Jerry Chandler has commented, how much weight the scientific
community places on the concept of sincerity may be open to doubt.
However, there is little doubt about the weight the community places
on the concept of truth. The fifth segment of the paper, "Sciences
as Communicational Communities," which is composed of paragraphs 22
and 23 (reproduced below), focuses directly and mainly on the
concept of truth.
Given the interest that has already been shown in this concept on
previous posts, and the expertise many listers have already
demonstrated with respect to philosophical discourses focusing on
this concept, I am going to leave the main points of this segment
open for response by those who have much greater philosophical
understanding of them than I. I will attempt little more in what
follows than a reprise of the contents of the segment that
identifies a few instances where more elaboration, definition, and
discussion from those who would be inclined to provide it would be
particularly helpful. I hope that listers with greater knowledge of
Peirce's thinking with respect to the concept of truth will come
forward to fill in the record in these and other respects.
JR's language seems to depart more markedly from the letter, if not
the spirit, of Peirce in this penultimate segment than in any other
part of the paper. JR acknowledges this somewhat at the outset of
the segment, but claims that what he is presenting is an original
insight from Peirce, forging one of the strongest explicit links to
Peirce that appears in the paper in so doing. JR uses the concept
of "assertion indicator" to identify the "force" of truth in the
predicate "is true." "Assertion indicator" is the first of several
concepts, such as "speech-act," "communicational act," and
"appropriate responsiveness" that appear to be referencing
something other than Peirce's own terminology. I am guessing that
Austin's speech act theory is in the background here, but I doubt
this is the only non-Peircean frame of reference. Additional
identification of what literature JR is most likely drawing on here
would be much appreciated. JR indicates that he has gone further
elsewhere in his work with these concepts. Perhaps we will see them
again in a later paper.
In any case, JR's key point in paragraph 22 is that truth ought to
be understood, for the purposes at hand at least, in terms of its
manifestation in relation to a verbal sign, and a predicate sign
specifically, a sign that does not convey "content" (as the subject
of the sentence would be doing). Rather, the predicate sign directs
those who are interpreting the sentence to do so in a manner that is
in accordance with the norms that govern their communicational
processes generally speaking. In other words, the phrase, "is
true," is a signal designed to compel normative communicative
action, nothing more, nothing less. JR specifies that this
signalling is not to be confused with any function that speech-act
theory might identify. The contrast here is not explicated,
however. This is another moment where listers with expertise in
speech act theory and communicational act theory (although I wonder
if this latter is JR's own original concept entirely) might provide
some additional commentary.
What strikes me about JR's remarks in this paragraph is his move to
the analysis of the phrase "is true" immediately after raising the
more general question about the definition of the concept of truth.
I read it as his way of keeping the focus of the paper on
communicational practices, which makes the shift to discussing a
verbal sign and how it functions in utterances understandable. JR
seems to be using this focus mainly to show how the analysis of
truth can be related to his earlier comments about the norms that
govern scientific communication and the definition of its membership.
In paragraph 23, however, JR leaves the issue of what "is true"
means and returns to the more general question, "What is truth?" It
would seem that part of his agenda here has been to make it clear to
his audience how different these two questions in fact are. JR then
gives what must have come across as an extraordinary answer to the
larger question: that truth is a form of life, and one that
scientific inquirers themselves embody. He claims that this is
fundamentally evident in their communicational conduct, to the
extent that their conduct conforms to the community's norms. I find
this statement extraordinary in that it locates truth entirely
within the "life" of the inquirer, not in the subject matter that
determines the inquirer's inquiry, and not in any relation that the
inquirer and the subject-matter might be maintaining to one another
(via "the data", for example, as Jerry Chandler referred to it in
his last post). JR's phrase, "the overall form of life," has to be
interpreted very carefully, in this regard. Is this a reference to
Wittgenstein, perhaps, in addition to Peirce? Exactly how must it
be read so that it does speak, unambiguously, in the spirit of
Peirce? JR's view might be seen to change substantially depending
on what this phrase is understood to mean.
My final question, then, is this: How best to interpret JR's final
claim in paragraph 23 as it relates to Peirce's thinking on truth?
I hope to post on the final segment of the paper in the next 3-4 days.
Best wishes to all,
Sally
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------
You are receiving this message because you are subscribed to the
PEIRCE-L listserv. To remove yourself from this list, send a message
to lists...@listserv.iupui.edu with the line "SIGNOFF PEIRCE-L" in
the body of the message. To post a message to the list, send it to
PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------
You are receiving this message because you are subscribed to the PEIRCE-L listserv. To
remove yourself from this list, send a message to lists...@listserv.iupui.edu with the
line "SIGNOFF PEIRCE-L" in the body of the message. To post a message to the
list, send it to PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU
