Dear Sally,
The Nubiola article mentioned by Michael DeLaurentis is: Nubiola,
Jaime. 1996. "Scholarship on the Relations between Ludwig Wittgenstein and
Charles S. Peirce." Proceedings of the III Symposium on History of Logic,
edited by I. Angelelli and M. Cerezo. Berlin: Gruyter. Retrieved December 5,
2007, from: http://www.cspeirce.com/menu/library/aboutcsp/nubiola/scholar.htm
Re: the compatibility of Wittgenstein and Peirce. I have a brief
discussion of early Wittgenstein from a Peircean perspective on pp. 240-243 in
the last chapter of my book Meaning and Modernity. It is in a section titled
"Principia Diaboli," and I criticize the broader culture of nominalism; its
split between thought and things, and denial of the reality of the symbol. I
contrast the diabolic (to throw apart) with the symbolic (to throw together).
Later Wittgenstein's broader idea of "meaning as use" still seems
to me be far more contracted than Peirce's idea of meaning as found in
conceivable consequences.
Perhaps this might also have some interest, in the context of
communicative community virtues. In a recent blog, Michael Weinman attempted to
apply Peirce's idea of fallibilism to a conception of political fallibilism:
http://www.deliberatelyconsidered.com/2011/08/two-forms-of-political-fallibilism/
My attempt at a Peircean response to him is also there.
Gene
From: C S Peirce discussion list [mailto:[email protected]] On Behalf
Of Sally Ness
Sent: Sunday, September 25, 2011 5:51 PM
To: [email protected]
Subject: Re: [peirce-l] Slow Read : "Sciences as Communicational Communities"
Segment 5
Gary F., List,
Thanks, Gary, for this response. I didn't really know what to make of JR's
assertion regarding the distributive vs. collective existence of the
communicational community--the translation into Peircean terms is very helpful.
I take your point about JR having the life of a Peircean symbol in mind in
paragraph 23, with all that that concept implies. When this is factored in, it
is clear that the form of life is something to which the inquirer belongs, not
one that is coterminous with the inquirer's individual being (my initial
reading). This is one moment in the paper when it seems particularly difficult
to speak in the spirit of Peirce, as JR certainly is doing, without also
speaking in his exact terms as well--without using explicitly Peirce's
definition of the symbol and making all that that definition entails clear. In
this respect, JR's use of "form of life" does seem to be a good alternative,
however. Even if the physicists weren't familiar with Wittgenstein's
distinctive notion of "grammar" and its relation to the practices of language
games and the forms of life they sustain, the phrase still conveys in a common
sensical way that there is a larger reality to which an individual inquirer, as
an "inquirer," necessarily belongs.
The compatibility of Wittgenstein and Peirce is a topic of interest to me. I
have been struck repeatedly by how closely Wittgenstein's thinking can align
with Peirce's. If any listers know of work done that compares these two
philosophers, I would appreciate any references. Perhaps this needs a
different thread, however.
Thanks again,
Sally
Sally,
JR's "overall form of life" does sound more like Wittgenstein's Lebensform than
a Peircean idiom, but as i think you mentioned before, he seems to be going out
of his way here to avoid Peircean terminology that might put off the people
he's addressing. However it does seem to me quite compatible with Peirce's
ideas on scientific inquiry. I don't think i'd agree that JR "locates truth
entirely within the "life" of the inquirer, not in the subject matter that
determines the inquirer's inquiry, and not in any relation that the inquirer
and the subject-matter might be maintaining to one another". We're talking
about the life of a symbol here, and a genuine symbol must involve both
indexical and iconic components in generating an interpretant, which does imply
a relation between the inquirer and the subject-matter (to put it in less
Peircean terms).
Speaking of the "communicational community", JR's assertion that it "exists
distributively not collectively" looks at first more individualistic than
anything Peirce would say, but i think makes a more Peircean sense if we bear
in mind the typical Peircean distinction between reality and existence. I think
Peirce would say that the community as a "form of life" is more real than the
individual inquirer, but it only exists in the actual practice of individual
inquirers. And that practice, to be genuine, requires an objective focus on
"subject-specific properties", as JR puts it in paragraph 23.
That's how i see it, anyway.
Gary F.
} Sincerity is incommunicable because it becomes insincere by being
communicated. [Luhmann] {
www.gnusystems.ca/Peirce.htm<http://www.gnusystems.ca/Peirce.htm> }{ gnoxic
studies: Peirce
From: C S Peirce discussion list [mailto:[email protected]] On Behalf
Of Sally Ness
Sent: September-23-11 6:11 PM
To: [email protected]
Subject: [peirce-l] Slow Read : "Sciences as Communicational Communities"
Segment 5
Segment 5
List,
As Jerry Chandler has commented, how much weight the scientific community
places on the concept of sincerity may be open to doubt. However, there is
little doubt about the weight the community places on the concept of truth.
The fifth segment of the paper, "Sciences as Communicational Communities,"
which is composed of paragraphs 22 and 23 (reproduced below), focuses directly
and mainly on the concept of truth.
Given the interest that has already been shown in this concept on previous
posts, and the expertise many listers have already demonstrated with respect to
philosophical discourses focusing on this concept, I am going to leave the main
points of this segment open for response by those who have much greater
philosophical understanding of them than I. I will attempt little more in what
follows than a reprise of the contents of the segment that identifies a few
instances where more elaboration, definition, and discussion from those who
would be inclined to provide it would be particularly helpful. I hope that
listers with greater knowledge of Peirce's thinking with respect to the concept
of truth will come forward to fill in the record in these and other respects.
JR's language seems to depart more markedly from the letter, if not the spirit,
of Peirce in this penultimate segment than in any other part of the paper. JR
acknowledges this somewhat at the outset of the segment, but claims that what
he is presenting is an original insight from Peirce, forging one of the
strongest explicit links to Peirce that appears in the paper in so doing. JR
uses the concept of "assertion indicator" to identify the "force" of truth in
the predicate "is true." "Assertion indicator" is the first of several
concepts, such as "speech-act," "communicational act," and "appropriate
responsiveness" that appear to be referencing something other than Peirce's
own terminology. I am guessing that Austin's speech act theory is in the
background here, but I doubt this is the only non-Peircean frame of reference.
Additional identification of what literature JR is most likely drawing on here
would be much appreciated. JR indicates that he has gone further elsewhere in
his work with these concepts. Perhaps we will see them again in a later paper.
In any case, JR's key point in paragraph 22 is that truth ought to be
understood, for the purposes at hand at least, in terms of its manifestation in
relation to a verbal sign, and a predicate sign specifically, a sign that does
not convey "content" (as the subject of the sentence would be doing). Rather,
the predicate sign directs those who are interpreting the sentence to do so in
a manner that is in accordance with the norms that govern their communicational
processes generally speaking. In other words, the phrase, "is true," is a
signal designed to compel normative communicative action, nothing more, nothing
less. JR specifies that this signalling is not to be confused with any
function that speech-act theory might identify. The contrast here is not
explicated, however. This is another moment where listers with expertise in
speech act theory and communicational act theory (although I wonder if this
latter is JR's own original concept entirely) might provide some additional
commentary.
What strikes me about JR's remarks in this paragraph is his move to the
analysis of the phrase "is true" immediately after raising the more general
question about the definition of the concept of truth. I read it as his way of
keeping the focus of the paper on communicational practices, which makes the
shift to discussing a verbal sign and how it functions in utterances
understandable. JR seems to be using this focus mainly to show how the
analysis of truth can be related to his earlier comments about the norms that
govern scientific communication and the definition of its membership.
In paragraph 23, however, JR leaves the issue of what "is true" means and
returns to the more general question, "What is truth?" It would seem that part
of his agenda here has been to make it clear to his audience how different
these two questions in fact are. JR then gives what must have come across as an
extraordinary answer to the larger question: that truth is a form of life, and
one that scientific inquirers themselves embody. He claims that this is
fundamentally evident in their communicational conduct, to the extent that
their conduct conforms to the community's norms. I find this statement
extraordinary in that it locates truth entirely within the "life" of the
inquirer, not in the subject matter that determines the inquirer's inquiry, and
not in any relation that the inquirer and the subject-matter might be
maintaining to one another (via "the data", for example, as Jerry Chandler
referred to it in his last post). JR's phrase, "the overall form of life," has
to be interpreted very carefully, in this regard. Is this a reference to
Wittgenstein, perhaps, in addition to Peirce? Exactly how must it be read so
that it does speak, unambiguously, in the spirit of Peirce? JR's view might be
seen to change substantially depending on what this phrase is understood to
mean.
My final question, then, is this: How best to interpret JR's final claim in
paragraph 23 as it relates to Peirce's thinking on truth?
I hope to post on the final segment of the paper in the next 3-4 days.
Best wishes to all,
Sally
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