PS - The speculation is that some CSP may have rubbed off on Wittgenstein via Frank Ramsey, who was apparently rather impressed with CSP's work, though there are no references to CSP in any Wittgenstein writing, I think.
From: C S Peirce discussion list [mailto:[email protected]] On Behalf Of Michael J. DeLaurentis Sent: Sunday, September 25, 2011 7:23 PM To: [email protected] Subject: Re: [peirce-l] Slow Read : "Sciences as Communicational Communities" Segment 5 Sally - On Wittgenstein and CSP: you can mine a fair number of downloadable articles if you Google the two names [and I'd be happy to send some I have downloaded]. John Upper [who was at Queens U, Ontario] had done an early master's thesis, I believe, comparing the two. Later, Jaime Nubiola, on this list still, I believe, did an overview of scholarship on the two in 1996. Catherine Legg [Melbourne] - also on this list for some time, and possibly still -- had an interesting piece on rules, pragmatism, and skepticism. And there was some years back, and may still be, a Peirce-Wittgenstein research group at U Quebec. The themes of doubt, certainty, and rules seem to run through most of these articles, with reference a few times to this comment from Wittgenstein's "On Certainty": "So I am trying to say something that sounds like pragmatism." Similarities, yes; but many differences, too. It would be an interesting thread. From: C S Peirce discussion list [mailto:[email protected]] On Behalf Of Sally Ness Sent: Sunday, September 25, 2011 5:51 PM To: [email protected] Subject: Re: [peirce-l] Slow Read : "Sciences as Communicational Communities" Segment 5 Gary F., List, Thanks, Gary, for this response. I didn't really know what to make of JR's assertion regarding the distributive vs. collective existence of the communicational community--the translation into Peircean terms is very helpful. I take your point about JR having the life of a Peircean symbol in mind in paragraph 23, with all that that concept implies. When this is factored in, it is clear that the form of life is something to which the inquirer belongs, not one that is coterminous with the inquirer's individual being (my initial reading). This is one moment in the paper when it seems particularly difficult to speak in the spirit of Peirce, as JR certainly is doing, without also speaking in his exact terms as well--without using explicitly Peirce's definition of the symbol and making all that that definition entails clear. In this respect, JR's use of "form of life" does seem to be a good alternative, however. Even if the physicists weren't familiar with Wittgenstein's distinctive notion of "grammar" and its relation to the practices of language games and the forms of life they sustain, the phrase still conveys in a common sensical way that there is a larger reality to which an individual inquirer, as an "inquirer," necessarily belongs. The compatibility of Wittgenstein and Peirce is a topic of interest to me. I have been struck repeatedly by how closely Wittgenstein's thinking can align with Peirce's. If any listers know of work done that compares these two philosophers, I would appreciate any references. Perhaps this needs a different thread, however. Thanks again, Sally Sally, JR's "overall form of life" does sound more like Wittgenstein's Lebensform than a Peircean idiom, but as i think you mentioned before, he seems to be going out of his way here to avoid Peircean terminology that might put off the people he's addressing. However it does seem to me quite compatible with Peirce's ideas on scientific inquiry. I don't think i'd agree that JR "locates truth entirely within the "life" of the inquirer, not in the subject matter that determines the inquirer's inquiry, and not in any relation that the inquirer and the subject-matter might be maintaining to one another". We're talking about the life of a symbol here, and a genuine symbol must involve both indexical and iconic components in generating an interpretant, which does imply a relation between the inquirer and the subject-matter (to put it in less Peircean terms). Speaking of the "communicational community", JR's assertion that it "exists distributively not collectively" looks at first more individualistic than anything Peirce would say, but i think makes a more Peircean sense if we bear in mind the typical Peircean distinction between reality and existence. I think Peirce would say that the community as a "form of life" is more real than the individual inquirer, but it only exists in the actual practice of individual inquirers. And that practice, to be genuine, requires an objective focus on "subject-specific properties", as JR puts it in paragraph 23. That's how i see it, anyway. Gary F. } Sincerity is incommunicable because it becomes insincere by being communicated. [Luhmann] { www.gnusystems.ca/Peirce.htm }{ gnoxic studies: Peirce From: C S Peirce discussion list [mailto:[email protected]] On Behalf Of Sally Ness Sent: September-23-11 6:11 PM To: [email protected] Subject: [peirce-l] Slow Read : "Sciences as Communicational Communities" Segment 5 Segment 5 List, As Jerry Chandler has commented, how much weight the scientific community places on the concept of sincerity may be open to doubt. However, there is little doubt about the weight the community places on the concept of truth. The fifth segment of the paper, "Sciences as Communicational Communities," which is composed of paragraphs 22 and 23 (reproduced below), focuses directly and mainly on the concept of truth. Given the interest that has already been shown in this concept on previous posts, and the expertise many listers have already demonstrated with respect to philosophical discourses focusing on this concept, I am going to leave the main points of this segment open for response by those who have much greater philosophical understanding of them than I. I will attempt little more in what follows than a reprise of the contents of the segment that identifies a few instances where more elaboration, definition, and discussion from those who would be inclined to provide it would be particularly helpful. I hope that listers with greater knowledge of Peirce's thinking with respect to the concept of truth will come forward to fill in the record in these and other respects. JR's language seems to depart more markedly from the letter, if not the spirit, of Peirce in this penultimate segment than in any other part of the paper. JR acknowledges this somewhat at the outset of the segment, but claims that what he is presenting is an original insight from Peirce, forging one of the strongest explicit links to Peirce that appears in the paper in so doing. JR uses the concept of "assertion indicator" to identify the "force" of truth in the predicate "is true." "Assertion indicator" is the first of several concepts, such as "speech-act," "communicational act," and "appropriate responsiveness" that appear to be referencing something other than Peirce's own terminology. I am guessing that Austin's speech act theory is in the background here, but I doubt this is the only non-Peircean frame of reference. Additional identification of what literature JR is most likely drawing on here would be much appreciated. JR indicates that he has gone further elsewhere in his work with these concepts. Perhaps we will see them again in a later paper. In any case, JR's key point in paragraph 22 is that truth ought to be understood, for the purposes at hand at least, in terms of its manifestation in relation to a verbal sign, and a predicate sign specifically, a sign that does not convey "content" (as the subject of the sentence would be doing). Rather, the predicate sign directs those who are interpreting the sentence to do so in a manner that is in accordance with the norms that govern their communicational processes generally speaking. In other words, the phrase, "is true," is a signal designed to compel normative communicative action, nothing more, nothing less. JR specifies that this signalling is not to be confused with any function that speech-act theory might identify. The contrast here is not explicated, however. This is another moment where listers with expertise in speech act theory and communicational act theory (although I wonder if this latter is JR's own original concept entirely) might provide some additional commentary. What strikes me about JR's remarks in this paragraph is his move to the analysis of the phrase "is true" immediately after raising the more general question about the definition of the concept of truth. I read it as his way of keeping the focus of the paper on communicational practices, which makes the shift to discussing a verbal sign and how it functions in utterances understandable. JR seems to be using this focus mainly to show how the analysis of truth can be related to his earlier comments about the norms that govern scientific communication and the definition of its membership. In paragraph 23, however, JR leaves the issue of what "is true" means and returns to the more general question, "What is truth?" It would seem that part of his agenda here has been to make it clear to his audience how different these two questions in fact are. JR then gives what must have come across as an extraordinary answer to the larger question: that truth is a form of life, and one that scientific inquirers themselves embody. He claims that this is fundamentally evident in their communicational conduct, to the extent that their conduct conforms to the community's norms. I find this statement extraordinary in that it locates truth entirely within the "life" of the inquirer, not in the subject matter that determines the inquirer's inquiry, and not in any relation that the inquirer and the subject-matter might be maintaining to one another (via "the data", for example, as Jerry Chandler referred to it in his last post). JR's phrase, "the overall form of life," has to be interpreted very carefully, in this regard. Is this a reference to Wittgenstein, perhaps, in addition to Peirce? Exactly how must it be read so that it does speak, unambiguously, in the spirit of Peirce? JR's view might be seen to change substantially depending on what this phrase is understood to mean. My final question, then, is this: How best to interpret JR's final claim in paragraph 23 as it relates to Peirce's thinking on truth? I hope to post on the final segment of the paper in the next 3-4 days. Best wishes to all, Sally ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- ----- You are receiving this message because you are subscribed to the PEIRCE-L listserv. To remove yourself from this list, send a message to [email protected] with the line "SIGNOFF PEIRCE-L" in the body of the message. To post a message to the list, send it to [email protected] _____ No virus found in this message. 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