-----Original Message----- From: Phyllis Chiasson [mailto:[email protected]] Sent: Monday, March 05, 2012 12:48 PM To: 'Catherine Legg' Subject: RE: [peirce-l] Categorical Aspects of Abduction, Deduction, Induction
Gary, Cathy and Listers, I have been a Peirce-list lurker for some time and have enjoyed reading discussions. Until I finished galley proofs for my latest book I did not allow myself to post. I have a short window here before I have to clean up my next book and send it in. Yes, Cathy, we have been applying these concepts to human subjects since 1978 when the non-verbal assessment was first developed, first in school settings and in day treatment programs (mostly for adolescents). We began applying the assessments in business settings in 1986 by performing site-specific validations. In 2002, we received a grant to begin formal validity and reliability studies; these were performed at the University of Oregon decision sciences center. The study found very high inter-rater reliability and good re-test reliability (though the re-tests were performed too close to the original for us to feel comfortable with those results). Discriminate validity studies found a strong correlation between different non-verbal thinking processes and The Need for Cognition Scale, which is a paper and pencil questionnaire that addresses intellectual curiosity. However, thoroughgoing validity studies will require operational evaluations, which is why Jayne and I wrote this new book: Relational Thinking Styles and Natural Intelligence: Assessing inference patterns for computational modeling. This information should be a useful platform for developing predictive models of the operations and outcomes of human systems and programs modeled on human systems. We refer throughout the book to E. David Ford's book: Scientific Method for Ecological Research. It is a thoroughly Peircean guide to researching complex open systems, as are eco-systems. These patterns will require a similar approach. We are hoping to interest someone(s) with research/computer modeling backgrounds (which neither of us possess) to carry on this work. Regards, Phyllis BTW Cathy: I see that you are in Auckland. My husband and I love New Zealand! We visited our daughter and her family there (Torbay, to be exact) during the years that her husband was posted there. They are now in Sydney. -----Original Message----- From: Catherine Legg [mailto:[email protected]] Sent: Sunday, March 04, 2012 6:03 PM To: Phyllis Chiasson Cc: [email protected] Subject: Re: Categorical Aspects of Abduction, Deduction, Induction Phyllis I also want to say how nice it is to have you back on the list! The research into the three types of problem-solving which you outline below is fascinating. Would you like to say a little more about how you derived these results - you seem to have experimented with live human subjects, but how / where /when? Best regards, Cathy On Sat, Mar 3, 2012 at 5:32 PM, Phyllis Chiasson <[email protected]> wrote: > This discussion is interesting to me, as Jayne Tristan and I address this > issue from a different perspective in our upcoming book (available in April > from IGI Global). > > When thinking about the categories from the perspective of habitual > (automatic, non-deliberate applications), we notice that abductive-like > Relational thinkers tend to spend quite a bit of time in a sort of > exploratory phenomenological messing about (Firstness) before beginning to > juxtapose (Secondness) things together. They operate as Peirce describes a > phenomenologist ought to do. Often the process of juxtaposing and > re-juxtaposing takes even longer and returns them back to more > phenomenological exploration, so that before deciding upon what ought to be > represented (if they ever do), they consider many potential possibilities > and relationships. Based upon many years of observation by means of a > non-verbal assessment, very few people operate this way and almost all of > them use qualitative induction (which is also observable) as they proceed. > > On the other hand, Deductive-like thinkers, who tend to be analytical in > nature, determine options, qualities, possibilities, etc. relatively > quickly, but spend quite a bit of time relating elements before determining > a plan for representing these. Because they do not engage significantly in > the exploratory stage (Firstness), once they decide their general goal, all > of further choices are limited to those that will be most appropriate for > achieving that goal. These individuals shut down the discovery process, > except for often clever or ingenious adaptations that help them achieve the > general goal. They are naturally complex thinkers, but without the > abductive-like goal generating process, their goals are necessarily > derivative. > > Crude inductive-like (Direct) thinkers quickly apprehend a terminal goal and > apply familiar methods for achieving it, so that they are neither > exploratory, nor analytical. Instead, they jump almost immediately to > representation, which means that they tend to produce direct copies of > something they have seen, learned, copied, or previously done. Given > sufficient intelligence, Direct thinkers also tend to make excellent > students in many fields. > > > -----Original Message----- > From: C S Peirce discussion list [mailto:[email protected]] On > Behalf Of Jon Awbrey > Sent: Friday, March 02, 2012 10:12 PM > To: [email protected] > Subject: Re: [peirce-l] Categorical Aspects of Abduction, Deduction, > Induction > > GR = Gary Richmond > JD = Jonathan DeVore > > JD: It might be useful to bear in mind that we don't have to > think about 3rdnss, 2ndnss, 1stnss in an all-or-nothing > fashion. Peirce might have us recall that these elements > will be differently prominent according to the phenomenon > under consideration -- without being mutually exclusive. > > JD: So while 3rdnss is prominent and predominant in deduction, > there is also an element of compulsion by which one is forced > to a particular conclusion. That compulsive element could be > thought of as the 2ndness of deduction -- which is put to good > use by the predominantly mediated character of deduction: i.e., > it serves as the sheriff to the court (of law). > > GR: I think your point is well taken, Jonathan. > > I agree with Gary that this point is well taken. > > If we understand Peirce's categories in relational rather then non-relative > terms, > that is to say, as a matter of the minimum arity required to model a > phenomenon, > then all semiotic phenomena, all species of inference and types of > reasoning, > are basically category three. > > Nevertheless, many triadic phenomena are known to be "degenerate" in the > formal sense > that monadic and dyadic relations can account for many of their properties > relatively > well, at least, for many practical purposes. That recognition allows the > categorical > question to be re-framed in ways that can be answered through normal > scientific means. > > Regards, > > Jon > > -- > > academia: http://independent.academia.edu/JonAwbrey > inquiry list: http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/ > mwb: http://www.mywikibiz.com/Directory:Jon_Awbrey > oeiswiki: http://www.oeis.org/wiki/User:Jon_Awbrey > word press blog 1: http://jonawbrey.wordpress.com/ > word press blog 2: http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/ > > ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- > ----- > You are receiving this message because you are subscribed to the PEIRCE-L > listserv. To remove yourself from this list, send a message to > [email protected] with the line "SIGNOFF PEIRCE-L" in the body of > the message. To post a message to the list, send it to > [email protected] > > ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- ----- > You are receiving this message because you are subscribed to the PEIRCE-L listserv. To remove yourself from this list, send a message to [email protected] with the line "SIGNOFF PEIRCE-L" in the body of the message. To post a message to the list, send it to [email protected] --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- You are receiving this message because you are subscribed to the PEIRCE-L listserv. To remove yourself from this list, send a message to [email protected] with the line "SIGNOFF PEIRCE-L" in the body of the message. To post a message to the list, send it to [email protected]
