-----Original Message-----
From: Phyllis Chiasson [mailto:ath...@olympus.net] 
Sent: Monday, March 05, 2012 12:48 PM
To: 'Catherine Legg'
Subject: RE: [peirce-l] Categorical Aspects of Abduction, Deduction,
Induction

Gary, Cathy and Listers,

I have been a Peirce-list lurker for some time and have enjoyed reading
discussions. Until I finished galley proofs for my latest book I did not
allow myself to post. I have a short window here before I have to clean up
my next book and send it in.

Yes, Cathy, we have been applying these concepts to human subjects since
1978 when the non-verbal assessment was first developed, first in school
settings and in day treatment programs (mostly for adolescents). We began
applying the assessments in business settings in 1986 by performing
site-specific validations. In 2002, we received a grant to begin formal
validity and reliability studies; these were performed at the University of
Oregon decision sciences center. The study found very high inter-rater
reliability and good re-test reliability (though the re-tests were performed
too close to the original for us to feel comfortable with those results).
Discriminate validity studies found a strong correlation between different
non-verbal thinking processes and The Need for Cognition Scale, which is a
paper and pencil questionnaire that addresses intellectual curiosity.

However, thoroughgoing validity studies will require operational
evaluations, which is why Jayne and I wrote this new book: Relational
Thinking Styles and Natural Intelligence: Assessing inference patterns for
computational modeling. 

This information should be a useful platform for developing predictive
models of the operations and outcomes of human systems and programs modeled
on human systems. We refer throughout the book to E. David Ford's book:
Scientific Method for Ecological Research. It is a thoroughly Peircean guide
to researching complex open systems, as are eco-systems. These patterns will
require a similar approach. We are hoping to interest someone(s) with
research/computer modeling backgrounds (which neither of us possess) to
carry on this work.

Regards,
Phyllis

BTW Cathy: I see that you are in Auckland. My husband and I love New
Zealand! We visited our daughter and her family there (Torbay, to be exact)
during the years that her husband was posted there. They are now in Sydney.

-----Original Message-----
From: Catherine Legg [mailto:cl...@waikato.ac.nz] 
Sent: Sunday, March 04, 2012 6:03 PM
To: Phyllis Chiasson
Cc: PEIRCE-L@listserv.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: Categorical Aspects of Abduction, Deduction, Induction

Phyllis I also want to say how nice it is to have you back on the list!

The research into the three types of problem-solving which you outline
below is fascinating. Would you like to say a little more about how
you derived these results - you seem to have experimented with live
human subjects, but how / where /when?

Best regards, Cathy

On Sat, Mar 3, 2012 at 5:32 PM, Phyllis Chiasson <ath...@olympus.net> wrote:
> This discussion is interesting to me, as Jayne Tristan and I address this
> issue from a different perspective in our upcoming book (available in
April
> from IGI Global).
>
> When thinking about the categories from the perspective of habitual
> (automatic, non-deliberate applications), we notice that abductive-like
> Relational thinkers tend to spend quite a bit of time in a sort of
> exploratory phenomenological messing about (Firstness) before beginning to
> juxtapose (Secondness) things together. They operate as Peirce describes a
> phenomenologist ought to do. Often the process of juxtaposing and
> re-juxtaposing takes even longer and returns them back to more
> phenomenological exploration, so that before deciding upon what ought to
be
> represented (if they ever do), they consider many potential possibilities
> and relationships. Based upon many years of observation by means of a
> non-verbal assessment, very few people operate this way and almost all of
> them use qualitative induction (which is also observable) as they proceed.
>
> On the other hand, Deductive-like thinkers, who tend to be analytical in
> nature, determine options, qualities, possibilities, etc. relatively
> quickly, but spend quite a bit of time relating elements before
determining
> a plan for representing these. Because they do not engage significantly in
> the exploratory stage (Firstness), once they decide their general goal,
all
> of further choices are limited to those that will be most appropriate for
> achieving that goal. These individuals shut down the discovery process,
> except for often clever or ingenious adaptations that help them achieve
the
> general goal. They are naturally complex thinkers, but without the
> abductive-like goal generating process, their goals are necessarily
> derivative.
>
> Crude inductive-like (Direct) thinkers quickly apprehend a terminal goal
and
> apply familiar methods for achieving it, so that they are neither
> exploratory, nor analytical. Instead, they jump almost immediately to
> representation, which means that they tend to produce direct copies of
> something they have seen, learned, copied, or previously done. Given
> sufficient intelligence, Direct thinkers also tend to make excellent
> students in many fields.
>
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: C S Peirce discussion list [mailto:PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU] On
> Behalf Of Jon Awbrey
> Sent: Friday, March 02, 2012 10:12 PM
> To: PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU
> Subject: Re: [peirce-l] Categorical Aspects of Abduction, Deduction,
> Induction
>
> GR = Gary Richmond
> JD = Jonathan DeVore
>
> JD: It might be useful to bear in mind that we don't have to
>     think about 3rdnss, 2ndnss, 1stnss in an all-or-nothing
>     fashion. Peirce might have us recall that these elements
>     will be differently prominent according to the phenomenon
>     under consideration -- without being mutually exclusive.
>
> JD: So while 3rdnss is prominent and predominant in deduction,
>     there is also an element of compulsion by which one is forced
>     to a particular conclusion.  That compulsive element could be
>     thought of as the 2ndness of deduction -- which is put to good
>     use by the predominantly mediated character of deduction: i.e.,
>     it serves as the sheriff to the court (of law).
>
> GR: I think your point is well taken, Jonathan.
>
> I agree with Gary that this point is well taken.
>
> If we understand Peirce's categories in relational rather then
non-relative
> terms,
> that is to say, as a matter of the minimum arity required to model a
> phenomenon,
> then all semiotic phenomena, all species of inference and types of
> reasoning,
> are basically category three.
>
> Nevertheless, many triadic phenomena are known to be "degenerate" in the
> formal sense
> that monadic and dyadic relations can account for many of their properties
> relatively
> well, at least, for many practical purposes.  That recognition allows the
> categorical
> question to be re-framed in ways that can be answered through normal
> scientific means.
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon
>
> --
>
> academia: http://independent.academia.edu/JonAwbrey
> inquiry list: http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/
> mwb: http://www.mywikibiz.com/Directory:Jon_Awbrey
> oeiswiki: http://www.oeis.org/wiki/User:Jon_Awbrey
> word press blog 1: http://jonawbrey.wordpress.com/
> word press blog 2: http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/
>
>
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