John,  I followed up on two paper suggestions by Irving (Sluga and Van 
Heijenoort) in the context of the languge or calculus topic. With Sluga, I 
detect the idea that the Begriffsshrift is a universal language because it is 
meaningful in a way that the Boolean logic is not.   Sluga sees his paper as an 
"extension and adjustment" of Van Heijenoort's paper on logic as language or 
calculus. He places great emphasis on the "priority principle."  He quotes from 
Frege, "I begin with judgments and their contents and not with concepts...The 
formation of concepts I let proceed from judgments. (Posthumous writings) Sluga 
says, "This principle of priority, in fact, constitutes the true center of his 
critique of Boolean logic.  That logic is a mere calculus for him because of 
its inattention to that principle, while his own logic approximates a 
characteristic language because of its reliance on it."(Sluga, Frege against 
the Booleans) The Frege quote above is from around 1879 and the material focus 
is on 1884 or earlier; especially "Boole's calculating logic and the 
Begriffsshrift." ( a response to Schroder's criticism) There is a lot more to 
this article, including linking the priority principle to the better known 
"context principle." (words have meaning only in sentences) What I am doing is 
reading these two papers concurrently with Mitchell and Ladd-Franklin from 
Studies in Logic. (1883) Jim I like the way you diagram a thread on your 
site.> Date: Fri, 11 May 2012 08:16:14 -0400
> From:
> Subject: Re: [peirce-l] Frege against the Booleans
> Re: Jim Willgoose
> At:
> JA = Jon Awbrey
> JW = Jim Willgoose
> JA: Just to be sure we start out with the same thing in mind, are you talking 
> about
>      the notion of judgment that was represented by the "judgment stroke" in 
> Frege's
>      “Begriffsschrift” and that supposedly got turned into the turnstile 
> symbol ( ⊦ )
>      or “assertion symbol” in later systems of notation?
> JW: Sluga ties the priority of judgement in Frege to Kant's favoring 
> judgements
>      over concepts in the Critique of Pure Reason.  The article is open 
> source.
>      I can see a connection with the judgement stroke /- since one asserts the
>      truth;  a trick that is hard to do with only concepts or objects.  Sluga
>      includes a quote from Frege where he says something to the effect that
>      he (Frege) never "segments the signs" of even an incomplete expression
>      in any of his work. (ie. "x" is never separated from "F" as in Fx.)
> Jim,
> With this token and this turnstile then we enter on a recurring issue,
> revolving on the role of assertion, evaluation, or judgment of truth,
> in contradistinction to “mere contemplation”, as some of my teachers
> taught me to bracket it, of a “proposition”, whatever that might be.
> If I have not made it clear before, this is one of the points where
> I see the so-called “Fregean Revolution”, more French than American,
> if you catch my drift, begin to take a downward turn.  But I cannot
> decide yet whether to assign that to Frege's account, taken in full
> view of his work as a whole, or whether it is due to the particular
> shards that his self-styled disciples tore off and took to extremes.
> Regards,
> Jon
> -- 
> academia:
> my word press blog:
> inquiry list:
> mwb:
> oeiswiki:
> facebook page:
> ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------
> You are receiving this message because you are subscribed to the PEIRCE-L 
> listserv.  To remove yourself from this list, send a message to 
> with the line "SIGNOFF PEIRCE-L" in the body of 
> the message.  To post a message to the list, send it to 

Reply via email to