Jim, List,
I would like to try a comment on the relation between this two
quotes:
1. "A _Sign_, or _Representamen_, is a First which stands in such
genuine triadic relation to a Second, called its _Object_, as to be capable
of determining a Third, called its _Interpretant..." (CP 2.274)
and
2. "A sign is a third mediating between the mind addressed and the
object represented". (Trichotomic, p. 281
Bref, [ A Sign is a First ] and [ A sign is a third ] as an apparent
contradiction.
I have to give up trying to understand the subtle differences in
English between capital "First" and little "third"... but even so,
something sounds also meaningfull there (even for an Italian leaving head
upside-down in Argentina)...
Since EVERYTHING is a sign, or everything can only be considered as a sing
by humans, and since all discussions can proceed only through signs, etc.
etc... (see CP 1.540, 5.283, 5.308, 5.309 and others...), signs can not be
a 'definitive-something', or all Peirce's effort could get lost in his most
ineresting aspect: the emphasys on relations instead of on taxonomies.
On the other side, every sign can be considered in it's 3 aspects (or
better 9, or 27, or 81, since, only 3 is mostly a very rough cut into
'reality'... that resists symbolization -Lacan-).
In quote 2 we have the sign in context. The sign is considered a little
third, 'only' it's thirdness, which is it's most outstanding aspect to fulfill
the task of mediation. Only the symbolic aspect is considered here,
by using the verbal language (which is lineal and sequential -de Sassure-).
Auke's diagrams (or other diagramms too...) could show the same statement
without 'erasing' the other two aspects of the different signs involved, just by
enphasysing with color the outstanding parts involved in this statement. Here we
have a graphic example (forgive me Ben, the outcome could not be uglyer):
In quote 1 the sign is considered in it's most complex-difficult
aspect, the capital First, which envolves the pure POSSIBILITY, the
quali-quantitative-elemental-abstract-knowledge that "opens" the logical 'power'
of that sign. The most valuable value of any sign is to know and to be aware (by
the 'interpretant') of it's 'firstness'. In that 'possible FIRST' we have the
clue of what comes logically 'after'.
Signs "grow" (historically) from thirdness to firstness, in opposition of
the logical order.
Jim Piat says: "...all signs (which are thirds) are also firsts because
they have qualities. Likewise all signs are seconds because they exist
and have effects. But signs are neither mere Firsts nor mere
Seconds". (bold is mine)
Each coherent statement, in verbal language, should be constructed
logically like quote 2 by relating 1ness, 2ness and 3ness (not necessarily in
this order) of three different signs. This parts have not to be explicit in
the verbal text. The signs are not mere Firsts nor mere Seconds nor mere
Thirds, but the verbal language can give or construct this (terrible)
impression. (like in the traditional bad example: the weathervane IS an
index...)
Jim Piat says: "...I do think Peirce meant for his
three trichotomies of signs* to highlight to certain aspects of signs which
to me are clearly related to his theory of catergories which I take to be
the foundation of his theory of signs. In particular I think his
first trichotomy forgrounds the quality of signs themselves as
either hypotheticals, singulars or generals; the second trichotomy
addresses the ways in which signs can refer to their objects by means of
qualitative similarity, existential correlation, or convention; and
the the third trichotomy addresses the fact that a sign can represent
either a mere quality, an object or another sign. For me this
suggest a three by three matrix of sign aspects based on
Peirce's categories." (bold is mine)
There is already some research done in this direction, for applied
semiotics. The outcome is what I called the "Semiotic Nonagon". It is a
diagrammatic-icon, an operative model that can be used with great advantage in
qualitative research, but it is NOT an explanation of Peirce's
logic-phylosophical proposal. Peirce would probably die again if he sees it as a
diagram of his ideas. In fact he drew the 'triangle' of the 10
classes but never the 9adic matrix. Peirce's proposal could be probably
schetched in hiperspace with the help of computer sciences... but probably, it
would not be easy to 'use' for applied semiotics...
As fare as I know Max Bense (he probably was the first) already draw this
3x3 matrix in the 60's, some other scholars used it too, just to show all 9
aspects in some order. But they never gived the diagram a possibility to be a
tool. I learned it from MagariƱos de Morentin in 1973 and have develloped it for
the use in Architecture, design in general, and qualitative marquet research
with great practical success.
We had already some explanation and discussions in the List on that
subject... not too much success, I have to say...
On the other hand (and just repeating Peirce), I think that diagrams (good
for applied semiotics) could help to emprove the knowledge around Peirce's
theoretical proposal... I see too much discussion "turning around in the
void"...
Like the triadic approach teaches us, an isolated "First" can not
exist fare from Second and Third... on the contary, as already stated... symbols
grow...
Best
Claudio Guerri
----- Original Message -----
From: "Jim Piat" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: "Peirce Discussion Forum" <peirce-l@lyris.ttu.edu>
Sent: Friday, June 23, 2006 8:10 AM
Subject: [peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes
(MS799.2)
>
>
>>>Aw Jim, you're a trouble maker!
>
>>> 66~~~~~~~~~~
>>> *A _Sign_, or _Representamen_, is a First which stands in such genuine
>>> triadic relation to a Second, called its _Object_, as to be capable of
>>> detemining a Third, called its _Interpretant, to assume the same triadic
>>> relation to its Object in which it stands itself to the same Object.*
>>> ~~~~~~~~~~99
>
> Dear Ben, Folks--
>
> Yes, but Peirce also wrote (chapter 20 Trichotomic of The Essential Peirce
> Vol 1 page 281 line two of paragraph two) that "A sign is a third
> mediating between the mind addressed and the object represented".
>
> So I find this confusing. A Peircean categorical third is not a
> caterogical first. A first relates only to iself. There is firstness of
> thirdness but a third is not a first. In my understanding a sign is
> pre-eminently a third. Yet, Peirce obviously does say above that a sign is a
> First that stands in such a genuinely triadic relation to a second and so
> on. What do you make of this? I find it contradictory to speak of mere
> firstness functioning as thirdness. The quality of thirdness makes sense to
> me but firstness (as a Peircean category) in a triadic relation to
> secondness seems to me a contradiction. So I think we need to seek a
> different intepretation of Peirce when he say a sign is a First which stands
> in such genuine triadic relation to a second...
>
> Yes, all signs(which are thirds) are also firsts because they have
> qualities. Likewise all signs are seconds because they exist and have
> effects. But signs are neither mere Firsts nor mere Seconds. Furthermore,
> no First (as a mere first in Peirce's categorical sense) stand in triadic
> relations to anything because to stand in a triadic relation is the essence
> not of firstness but of thirdness. That's the line of thinking that leads
> me to believe Jean-Marc has a point -- at least in so far as the
> interpretation of this particular quote is concerned.
>
> The above notwithstanding, I do think Peirce meant for his three
> trichotomies of signs* to highlight to certain aspects of signs which to me
> are clearly related to his theory of catergories which I take to be the
> foundation of his theory of signs. In particular I think his first
> trichotomy forgrounds the quality of signs themselves as either
> hypotheticals, singulars or generals; the second trichotomy addresses the
> ways in which signs can refer to their objects by means of qualitative
> similarity, existential correlation, or convention; and the the third
> trichotomy addresses the fact that a sign can represent either a mere
> quality, an object or another sign. For me this suggest a three by three
> matrix of sign aspects based on Peirce's categories.
>
> As Joe cautions, Peirce's classifications of signs were a work in progress.
> All the more so for my own limited understanding of Peirce.
>
> * I'm working from Peirce's discussion "Three Trichotomies of Signs" as
> presented on page 101 of Justus Buchler's _Philosophical Writings of Peirce_
>
> Best,
> Jim Piat
> ---
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