Thanks JM for your brief comments,
I still think we need some way of distinguishing between that which
is for us phenomenologically or experientally real and that which is
(enduringly) existent in the world.
Peirce and Whitehead both operate with notions that postulate some
kind of relational continuity between what we call "mind" and
"matter". In this connection Whitehead introduces into the cartesian
(epistemological) chasm between mental and material substance his
notions of "actual occasion" or "organism", while Peirce handles the
same problem with his conception of matter as "effete mind".
For both, "being" is in some sense always "becoming" -- the
actualisation of a potential for what Peirce often referred to as
"the growth of concrete reasonableness", and what Whitehead refered
to as "satisfaction", or in one of his definitions of that notion:
"the culmination of concrescence into a completely determinate matter
of fact" both of which I think, can be tied to the notion of
"entelecheia", which was discussed at some length here on the list
previously.
I may well be wrong here, of course -- indeed, I haven't been working
with Whitehead's ideas so long myself, and trying to see these in
relation to those of Peirce is actually quite a daunting task -- so
it would be interesting to hear some opinions from other Peirce
listers too...
Best regards
Patrick
Patrick Coppock wrote:
At 0:11 -0400 25-06-2006, Jerry LR Chandler wrote:
I will be at the Whitehead Conference in Salzburg next week so I
do not anticipate much time for replies.
...
However, for us to believe that Firsts, Seconds and Thirds actually
"exist", beyond their being mere transitory events in an ongoing
semiosic process, would be fallibilistic in Peirce's terms, or a
"Fallacy of Misplaced Concreteness" in Whitehead's terms.
Not at all.
Peirce was a "three-category realist", acknowledging the reality fo
Firsts, Seconds and Thirds early on. What you call "Fallacy of
Misplaced Concreteness" is just another word for "nominalism" in
that context. Peirce was not a nominalist.
Peirce acknowledge the reality of actuality or of secondness (around
1890). Look for "outward clash", or "Scotus" in the CPs and his
criticism of Hegel's idealism.
He acknowledged the reality of firsts (the universe of possibility),
and of course the reality of thirdness (the universe of thought or
signs) I don't have the exact references, but that's not too
difficult to find if you go through the Collected Papers, look for
"nominalism", "realism", "idealism" ...
However he wrote that some thirds and seconds are degenerate,
meaning that they have no real existence.
Regards
/JM
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Patrick J. Coppock
Researcher: Philosophy and Theory of Language
Department of Social, Cognitive and Quantitative Sciences
University of Modena and Reggio Emilia
Reggio Emilia
Italy
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