Ben,
I didn't meant to intimate that you are inarticulate or that I had no
inkling of how your position differs from Peirce's. I have asked for
additional clarification because I have been trying to formulate for myself
a reasonably succinct statement of your position relative to Pierce's that
might serve as a benchmark for further conversation. I have
suspected that in addition to your penchant for "quadricity" you might disagree
with Peirce on some ontological, epistemological, and phenomenological issues
which, in responding to my posts, your might address, and which, it seems to me
that, somewhat obliquely, in your last two posts you have. Assuming that
what I have referred to as assessing the "fidelity" of a sign's representation
of it object is or includes what you are calling "verification,"
and, without going into further detail, here is how I presently see
it.
I understand Peirce to say that there are two interrelated but
distinguishable semiosical triads, namely, the triad (Interpreter - Sign -
Object) and the triad (Interpretant - Sign - Object). Your references to
extrasemiosical collateral experience appear to me to focus on the triad
(Interpreter - Sign - Object) and to isolate the (Interpreter - Object) relation
(extrasemiosical collateral experience) from an Interpreter's relation to signs,
interpretants of signs, and objects of signs--the semiosical (Interpretant -
Sign - Object) relation. That is, there is an immediate--non-mediated and,
hence, cognitively autonomous relation between cognizing subjects and objects
consisting of phenomena and/or things in themselves who are in some sense able
to "see" or "recognize" objects and relations between and among objects as
they are independent of how they are represented by signs and their
interpretants. On this account of cognition, signs and systems of signs
are "instrumental" auxiliaries to cognition and their semiosical instrumentality
is subject to being and is consciously or unconsciously continuously being
extrasemiosically evaluated, validated, or "verified" by cognizing
subjects; a process which Peirce, who makes cognition and cognitive growth an
exclusively semiosical process, ignores.
Charles
On Sat, 19 Aug 2006 18:02:48 -0400 "Benjamin Udell" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
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- [peirce-l] Re: The "composite photograp... Joseph Ransdell
- [peirce-l] Re: The "composite photograph" metap... Charles F Rudder
- [peirce-l] Re: The "composite photograph" ... Benjamin Udell
- [peirce-l] Re: The "composite photograph&qu... Joseph Ransdell
- [peirce-l] Re: The "composite photograph" metap... Benjamin Udell
- [peirce-l] Re: The "composite photograph" ... Joseph Ransdell
- [peirce-l] Re: The "composite photograph" metap... Charles F Rudder
- [peirce-l] Re: The "composite photograph" ... Benjamin Udell
- [peirce-l] Re: The "composite photograph&qu... Benjamin Udell
- [peirce-l] Re: The "composite photograp... Joseph Ransdell
- [peirce-l] Re: The "composite photograph" metap... Charles F Rudder
- [peirce-l] Re: The "composite photograph" ... Jim Piat
- [peirce-l] Re: The "composite photograph&qu... Gary Richmond
- [peirce-l] Re: The "composite photograph&qu... Benjamin Udell
- [peirce-l] Re: The "composite photograp... Joseph Ransdell
- [peirce-l] Re: The "composite photograp... Gary Richmond
- [peirce-l] Re: The "composite photo... Benjamin Udell
- [peirce-l] Re: The "composite photograph" ... Benjamin Udell
- [peirce-l] Re: The "composite photograph" metap... Charles F Rudder
- [peirce-l] Re: The "composite photograph" metap... Benjamin Udell
- [peirce-l] Re: The "composite photograph" ... Joseph Ransdell