Before I go on with international trade, I want to specify further P's
position re China's constraints. Again, recall my earlier point that P
rejects the old Malthusian claim that China was fast-approaching
an overpopulation crisis by 1750/1800. There were Malthusian
signs particularly in some areas of China by 1800, but not serious
enough to have triggered the operation of positive Malthusian
checks. "[T]he further growth of Chinese population - by at least
150,000,000 and perhaps even 225,000,000 - between 1800 and
the 1930s was accomplished without any clear decline in
nutritional levels" "Thus, there is little to suggest either
'overpopulation' or imminent 'ecological crisis' in 1800 (much less
1750), if by this we mean a threat to existing expectations. At
most we could argue that there was an ecological 'bottleneck'
constraining any sharp further improvement in living standards, as
well as some hints of more serious problems in the future for North
and Northwest China" (241).
Just as certain areas of Europe - i.e. Britain and Denmark - were
experiencing certain constraints, so were certain areas of China.
These constraints worsened later in China and not Europe because
China did not have the fortune to "internalize the extraordinary
ecological bounty that Europeans gained from the New World" (11).
Thus far I have responded to this by demonstrating that China did
manage to internalize certain new world crops like maize and
potato. I have also suggested that, if we look at the demographic
patterns of post 1750/1800 China on a regional basis, we can
detect, in some of its "core" regions, far more *serious*
Malthusian limitations than in the core regions of Europe. I cited
two passages from P which indicated that "population grew little"
in the Lower Yangzi between 1750-1850 (p139), but that it in
Shandong and Zhili/Hebei (which are in North China) it "increased
over 40 percent between 1750 and 1870", and by about 80 percent
by 1913" (p141).
Then I showed that by 1800 the potato "accounted for almost half
the year's food supply of the poor of Shantung [Shandong]" (Bray),
suggesting that those regions which continued to feed a growing
population were assisted by the adoption of new world crops. I
mentioned as well that "areas of West and North China where new
world crops had their greatest influence also reported some of the
highest rates of increase [in population during the 19th and 20th
centuries] -- nearly 1 1/2 times the norm" (Hartwell).
BUT, we have to be careful *not* to assume - as I seemed to be -
that the potato benefited only regions which had hitherto *not* been
as advanced, or that *no core* regions were assisted by these
crops. Shangdong and other areas of North China (together with
the Yangzi Delta) were the most densely populated and developed
areas of China. These new world crops were cultivated in the
marginal hillsides of Shangdon, becoming a major food supply for
the poor, easing the land constraints, and allowing the population
to continue to grow during the *19th century*.
Now, it is not clear what Harwell means by "West China" in the
above citation.(We will see later). I also need to verify the
demographic-potato correlation in Bray's previously cited fact that
"by the 18th century [the potato] was grown in all the Yangtze
provinces, and Szechwan had become a leading producer" -- did
these regions also avoided an earlier Malthusian crisis thanks to
the arrival of the potato? Well, I have found another passage in P
in which he states that, not just in Shandong and Zhili/Hebei, but
that "Chinese population growth [between 1750 and 1850]
was...concentrated in regions such as north China *and the Middle
and Upper Yangzi*" (239).
But this is as far as my criticism of P can go without seriously
studying China's historical geography. Let's us recall that a central
contention of P is that China is not a homgenous entity, and that it
would be more accurate to compare core regions of China with
core regions of Europe. But P does not give you a map and seems
to relish the fact that non Chinese specialists will be unable to
follow the intricacies of his arguments. He is right: generalizations
about China will no longer do.
