by Devine, James Charles writes: >The funny thing is dialectics is logic. So, it is a way of talking about things. Formal logic is a linguistic project. Why not dialectical logic to some extent ?<
what exactly is "logic" then? I'm no expert on philosophy, but it seems to me that dialectics isn't a "logic" in the same sense that formal logic is a "logic." (My handy-dandy DICTIONARY OF PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGION: EASTERN AND WESTERN THOUGHT, by W.L. Reese, defines "logic" as "The theory of the conditions of valid ... [inference, i.e.,] passage from one or more statements which are called premises to a further statement called the conclusion.") If dialectics form a system of logic, it's one that's qualitatively different from formal logic. In fact, I'd call them a system of heuristics (which Webster's defines as "an aid to learning, discovery, or problem-solving ... that utilize self-educating techniques"). ^^^^^^ CB: In part calling it logic comes from Hegel's book title _The Science of Logic_. To me you are correct that dialectical logic is qualitatively different than formal logic, although, I think Hegel's approach is that formal logic is part of dialectical logic. For short, the main principle of formal logic is non-contradiction ,whereas dialectics' first principle is contradiction. In formal logic, a thing must be identical with itself. In dialectical logic, as a way of expressing the fact that everything changes, a thing is not identical with itself. Of course, I didn't think of this, but got it from various Marxist commentaries on dialectics. ^^^^ Formal logic looks at a connection "premises X...Z imply conclusion A" and says either "no they don't" or "yes they do." On the other hand, it seems to me that dialectics centers on empirical investigation, saying that we need to look at the "big picture." A dialectician might say that "it's true that premises X...Z logically imply conclusion A, but you left out a lot of stuff. Premise B isn't true, while because of factors F, G, and H, this proposition isn't empirically relevant." An example: there's a bunch of economists called "the social choice school" that derives all sorts of of theorems from their math (mostly about how bad democracy is and therefore how wonderful the market is). My (dialectical) response: you fools ignore the empirical fact that under capitalism, "democracy" works following the principle of "one dollar, one vote" much more than it follows the "one person one vote" principle that you assume. ^^^^ CB: Let me consider your idea. I haven't thought of it this way. Of course, there is the dialectical dictum that the truth is concrete. Perhaps, that is some of what you are getting at ? ^^^^^^ To my mind, Marx & Engels were very strongly empirical in their orientation (without being empiricist). Their critique of Saint Max (no relation to Saint Max Sawicky) and his friends in THE GERMAN IDEOLOGY starts with the idea that Max _et al_ are talking about "a revolution in thought" but what really counts are "revolutions in practice" and, more generally, the empirical world of production, social relationships, history, etc. Given this empirical/practical orientation, it makes sense to embrace Hegel's dialectical heuristics and turn them upside down, away from speculation and toward humanity. jim devine ^^^^ CB: Yes, I think Gould referred to dialectics as a heuristic. I had a thought about that when it was raised years ago on Thaxis by Jim Farmelant, but I have to go into my memory banks. Of course there is this which has probably been copied here before: My dialectic method is not only different from the Hegelian, but is its direct opposite. To Hegel, the life-process of the human brain, i.e., the process of thinking, which, under the name of "the Idea," he even transforms into an independent subject, is the demiurgos of the real world, and the real world is only the external, phenomenal form of "the Idea." With me, on the contrary, the ideal is nothing else than the material world reflected by the human mind, and translated into forms of thought. The mystifying side of Hegelian dialectic I criticised nearly thirty years ago, at a time when it was still the fashion. But just as I was working at the first volume of "Das Kapital," it was the good pleasure of the peevish, arrogant, mediocre 'Epigonoi who now talk large in cultured Germany, to treat Hegel in same way as the brave Moses Mendelssohn in Lessing's time treated Spinoza, i.e., as a "dead dog." I therefore openly avowed myself the pupil of that mighty thinker, and even here and there, in the chapter on the theory of value, coquetted with the modes of expression peculiar to him. The mystification which dialectic suffers in Hegel's hands, by no means prevents him from being the first to present its general form of working in a comprehensive and conscious manner. With him it is standing on its head. It must be turned right side up again, if you would discover the rational kernel within the mystical shell. In its mystified form, dialectic became the fashion in Germany, because it seemed to transfigure and to glorify the existing state of things. In its rational form it is a scandal and abomination to bourgeoisdom and its doctrinaire professors, because it includes in its comprehension and affirmative recognition of the existing state of things, at the same time also, the recognition of the negation of that state, of its inevitable breaking up; because it regards every historically developed social form as in fluid movement, and therefore takes into account its transient nature not less than its momentary existence; because it lets nothing impose upon it, and is in its essence critical and revolutionary. The contradictions inherent in the movement of capitalist society impress themselves upon the practical bourgeois most strikingly in the changes of the periodic cycle, through which modern industry runs, and whose crowning point is the universal crisis. That crisis is once again approaching, although as yet but in its preliminary stage; and by the universality of its theatre and the intensity of its action it will drum dialectics even into the heads of the mushroom-upstarts of the new, holy Prusso-German empire. Karl Marx London January 24, 1873 http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1867-c1/p3.htm
