In "The Looming Tower" it is elaborated that Al Qaida itself was a remarkably diverse conglomeration. Members tended to be strongly focused on unseating their own national despotisms, rather than going global, and they also had differing strategic and tactical viewpoints. A strong factor in OBL's leadership was not his theoretical or oratorical brilliance, but because he was the dude with money. At least, that's what the book claims.
IMO the fundamental fallacy of the 'caliphate' bugaboo is that Islamic radicals tend to be locally concerned and tend not to give a crap about the U.S., unless they see it in their backyard. On Wed, Jan 27, 2010 at 5:06 AM, Bill Lear <[email protected]> wrote: > My understanding of the relationship between Al Qaida, Osama bin > Laden, and the Taliban was that the Taliban was not terribly friendly > with Al Qaida, and did not "shelter" bin Laden after 9/11. However, > this is stated as an assumption in an article in the NY Times today by > Mark Landler and Helene Cooper: > > As the U.S. government pours additional troops into Afghanistan, it > has begun grappling with whether to reconcile with those who sheltered > Osama bin Laden. > > If I remember correctly, the Taliban offered to work with the United > States to hand over bin Laden, but the U.S. rejected the overture. > > Am I remembering things incorrectly? > > > Bill > _______________________________________________ > pen-l mailing list > [email protected] > https://lists.csuchico.edu/mailman/listinfo/pen-l > _______________________________________________ pen-l mailing list [email protected] https://lists.csuchico.edu/mailman/listinfo/pen-l
