Jim Devine wrote:

> Simple commodity production does not have
> the same mechanisms that capitalism has
> for taking abstract labor-time out of the
> realm of theory and putting it into the
> world of practice. That is, there's no
> capitalist drive to simplify labor,
> breaking it down into the littlest pieces
> and making it homogeneous, reducing skill
> levels, etc.
...
> But there's another problem. Values do not
> correspond to the amount of labor that's
> used to produce things. Rather, it's the
> social necessary abstract labor-time that
> defines value. The "abstract" part is crucial.
> Simple commodity production does not have the
> same mechanisms that capitalism has for taking
> abstract labor-time out of the realm of theory
> and putting it into the world of practice.
> That is, there's no capitalist drive to
> simplify labor, breaking it down into the
> littlest pieces and making it homogeneous,
> reducing skill levels, etc. Braverman's story
> in LABOR AND MONOPOLY CAPITAL does not
> apply. In practice, labor would be still concrete
> labor.
>
> Well, many Marxologists don't see deskilling
> as required to make abstract labor real.
> Rather, under SCP, what's important is the
> value = price of what an individual concrete
> labor produces. That defines what's socially
> necessary and labor "proves" its abstract
> content in the exchange of its products.

Let's leave Marxology alone.  Let's think about it.

When we cooperate directly, our private labor is immediately social
labor.  When we trade, our private labor becomes social labor only
indirectly.  It needs mediation.  Commodity exchange bridges the
division of (private) labor(s): it mediates the conversion of concrete
private labors into abstract social labor.

What Marx wrote in Grundrisse is that, historically, the concept of
abstract labor required economic conditions under which individual
labor is fluid: workers are standardized and routinely transferred
across occupations, industries, etc.  Capitalist production makes this
standardization and transfer of labor a matter of routine.  So it
makes sense that it took the development of capitalist production for
thinkers to get the notion of abstract labor.  But conceptualizing
abstract labor is not the same as bringing about abstract labor in
reality.

Analogy: to understand that combustion uses up O2 and emits CO2, we
need the chemical sciences to develop up to a point, which requires
that the productive force of labor develops up to a point.  But
chemistry, backward or advanced, doesn't create actual O2 or CO2 out
of concepts.  The fact is that abstract labor exists as long as people
trade and thereby combine concrete private, independent labors at a
social scale.

How about de-skilling?  Well, capital continuously revolutionizes the
conditions of production, individual labor processes and the whole
division of social labor.  Capital continuously em-skills, de-skills,
and re-skills labor, both at the level of the individual and the
collective worker.  Witness the current state of the publishing
industry.  The division of labor is extended and continuously
reshuffled under capitalism, but the division of labor and private
ownership didn't start historically with capitalism.  The dual
character of labor is inherent to commodity production in general.

I'm writing all this to follow you in your long detour around abstract
labor, de-skilling, etc., to show that these issues are not material
to the question of whether some sort of cost/benefit analysis is
inherent to allocating social labor time under any type of society --
the issue that David posed to Michael, which triggered this thread.

Also, the notion that individual capital has a built-in impulse to
crush us, unless we force it to back off, is a given.  Capital tends
to degrades human life and the very natural basis of human life.  The
issue is whether c/b analysis in general is fundamentally flawed or
the flaw lies in the way in which it is done by the capitalists.

Another red herring is the issue of the "impossibility" of a "social
welfare function."  Do people regularly cooperate?  Yes, they do.  Or
they perish.  Do the mechanisms through which humans cooperate lead to
paradoxes?  Absolutely.  It's not a problem of democracies alone.
It's a problem of human cooperation in general.  (By the way, it's not
true that "economists know" that -- as you wrote -- "a democratic
process cannot be summarized by any kind of 'social welfare
function'."  Arrow's theorem doesn't say that a well-behaved social
welfare function is impossible when people allocate social labor time
democratically.  All it says is that it is not guaranteed under his
reasonable assumptions.  Very different.  By the same token, it is
easy to show that "well-behaved markets" are "impossible" under very
reasonable assumptions.)

The real issue here is simple (even a child can understand it, as Marx
says in his letter to Ludwig Kugelmann): A communist society (or any
other for that matter) must decide on whether to allocate more labor
to apple production at the expense of orange production, or the
alternative.

There's nothing mystical about human life.  The production of apples
and oranges (along with other things) *is* the production and
reproduction of human material life.  The economic choice is not only
about "things" outside of us: it's mainly about the use of our time,
the use of our life, the reproduction of our life -- nothing less.  In
other words, our life exists in the form of apples and oranges,
because apples and oranges objectify our human subjectivity (they are
our products) and also because they are objects of our consumption,
i.e. objects that reproduce us as subjects, as humans.

Therefore, to make our collective economic choice, we have to be able
to compare apples and oranges!  How?  How can we know that we rather
produce more apples and less oranges, or the alternative?  Please
don't say that economic choices under communism are multidimensional
or that communism celebrates heterogeneity.  Of course.  There are
many dimensions in how we lead our lives, qualitative diversity in
what we make out of our time on earth.  Here I'm giving you two of
those dimensions: apples and oranges.  The real issue is that we need
to compare them!

So, tell us, how do *you* compare apples and oranges?  I'll tell you
how: by "reducing" them to a scalar, an amount of one and the same
attribute common to both.  This reduction is a fact of social life.
The reduction is done differently in different types of society, but
it is always done.  Under commodity production, capitalist production,
and actually existing political democracies, it is to some extent an
alienated process: it escapes our control and crushes us.  Under other
forms of production, it may be a means to direct human ends placed
under our conscious control.  Insofar as we are deciding how much to
produce of each good, that attribute can only be the amount of
humanity it takes us to produce each good, apples and oranges: i.e.
our social labor time.

> I guess my prose is really bad, because
> Julio doesn't understand what I wrote
> (and thus does not know that I already
> answered his questions).

You give no straight answer to the questions: How would you act if
your life were infinitely valuable?  How would others act?  Would that
make any sense to you?

> As I said before, the "value" of
> _anyone's_ life depends on one's _point
> of view_, just as opportunity costs
> always depend on one's point of view.

This is no problem.  Suppose your life is infinitely valuable from
your point of view: how would you act?  Alternatively, suppose your
life is infinitely valuable from the point of view of society: how
would others act?
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